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ABSTRACT

Prescription opioid misuse: initiation, sources of supply, and the role of medical
providers
by
Alexandra Harocopos
Advisor: Lucia Trimbur

Over the past 25 years, opioid analgesic misuse has increased dramatically in the U.S.,
with concomitant deleterious effects on health. Results from the 2014 National Survey on Drug
Use and Health (NSDUH) reported that an estimated 4.3 million people aged 12 or older were
current non-medical users of opioid analgesics, representing 1.6 percent of the population
(SAMHSA, 2015), and unintentional drug poisoning deaths now surpass motor vehicle accidents
as the leading cause of injury death (CDC 2014). Opioid analgesics are produced in the U.S.
within a system of tight control and any entity or person manufacturing, distributing, prescribing,
or dispensing opioid analgesics can only do so under license from the DEA. However,
medication diversion—the transfer of a pharmaceutical product from a medical to non-medical
channel of distribution or use—is endemic and has been estimated to be a $25 billion a year
industry (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003).
Although there has been some analysis of the mechanisms of pharmaceutical diversion,
much of the literature stems from epidemiologically grounded population-level analysis and few
studies to date have examined the socio-cultural factors that may facilitate the movement of
opioid analgesics from sanctioned to unsanctioned use. In this dissertation, I investigate the
medical and non-medical use of opioid analgesics among a sample of New York City residents
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to explore experiences of initiation and the ways in which misuse is situated within a medical
context. In particular, I focus on how participants acquire the opioids they use and the sources of
pills that are diverted into the illicit market. Finally, I explore the impact of two supply-side
interventions that have shaped the opioid market, and end with a discussion of the political and
economic landscape that has facilitated opioid analgesic misuse in the U.S.
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INTRODUCTION

An opioid high is the best fucking thing in the world. Like, it’s just like all your guilty
feelings, everything like that, anything that bothers you, for that quick moment,
everything just goes out the fucking window, and you’re just sitting there, like when you
catch a nod, you’re not even thinking about anything in the world . . . When you catch
that nod, it’s like there’s not a worry in the world. Like you don’t think about anything,
no bills, no nothing. You don’t feel pain, nothing.
Phillip (white, aged 25)

Opioid analgesics such as oxycodone, hydrocodone, and morphine, are central nervous
system depressants that bind to opioid receptors in the brain, blocking the perception of pain, and
resulting in a general calming and anti-depressant effect (NAABT, 2014). The effect of these
medications is similar to that of heroin, and similar to heroin, their misuse can lead to respiratory
depression and death. Despite having almost identical pharmacological and physiological
properties, the legal status of heroin and opioid analgesics is very different.
The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CITE 21 USC § 801) coalesced laws governing the
manufacture and distribution of narcotics and other drugs, placing substances in one of five
schedules based on their potential for harm, medical value, and abuse. While heroin (or
diacetylmorphine) is considered Schedule I,1 opioid analgesics are categorized as Schedule II.

1

The definition of a Schedule I drug is: a) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse; b) The drug or
other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; c) There is a lack of
accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision. (Controlled Substances Act (1970)
USC § 801). Substances comprising Schedules II through IV, while controlled, have some identified medicinal
purpose and may be administered or prescribed by licensed medical professionals.
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Accordingly, although it is recognized that opioid analgesics have a high abuse potential, and
that their use may lead to psychological or physical dependence, they also have an accepted
medical use. Following, where heroin is only legally available in the U.S. for research purposes,
opioid analgesics can be prescribed by licensed medical practitioners under the control of the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
While the efficacy of opioid analgesics for treating end of life pain has long been
accepted by the medical establishment (American Academy of Pain Medicine, 1997; Melzack,
1990; Phillips, 2000), there is less evidence showing their effectiveness for chronic non-cancer
pain (Furlan et al., 2006; Ballantyne and Shin, 2008). Indeed, the American Academy of
Neurology (AAN) advised that the risk of serious adverse effects from opioid analgesics
outweighs the benefits when treating chronic non-cancer conditions (Franklin, 2014).
However, research conducted in the 1980s suggesting that opioids could safely be
prescribed to individuals on a long-term basis (Porter and Jick, 1980; Portenoy and Foley, 1986),
coupled with lobbying from physicians specializing in pain management, as well as the
pharmaceutical industry, resulted in the relaxation of government regulation surrounding these
drugs and over the past two decades, the prescribing of opioid analgesics in the U.S. has
increased dramatically (Paone et al., 2012; Paulozzi et al., 2011; Spiller et al., 2009). Between
1990 and 2009, the annual worldwide consumption of hydrocodone, one of the most commonly
prescribed opioid analgesics, rose almost 10-fold from 3628kgs to 35,380kgs, 99 percent of
which was consumed by the U.S. During the same period, the worldwide consumption of
oxycodone also increased from 2722kgs to 69,853kgs, with the U.S. consuming more than fourfifths of this amount (International Narcotics Control Board, 2010). In 2012, prescribers wrote
82.5 opioid prescriptions for every 100 U.S. citizens (Paulozzi et al., 2014). Further, between
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2000 and 2010, the average dose of both oxycodone and hydrocodone prescriptions increased by
69.7 percent and 69.4 percent, respectively, as measured by morphine milligram equivalents
(MMEs)2 (Kenan et al., 2012).
Concomitant with these increases, the rate of opioid analgesic misuse has also increased
and in the U.S., the non-medical use of these drugs now constitutes the second most common
form of illicit drug use after cannabis (SAMHSA, 2012). Results from the 2014 National Survey
on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) reported that an estimated 4.3 million people aged 12 or
older, representing 1.6 percent of the population were current non-medical users of opioid
analgesics (SAMHSA, 2015). The public health consequences of opioid analgesic misuse have
been immense. In 2011, of the 1,244,872 Emergency Department visits involving the
nonmedical use of pharmaceutical drugs, 39.2 percent were opioid related (SAMHSA, 2011).
Further, the proportion of individuals entering detoxification facilities with opioid analgesic as
their primary drug increased from 2.4 percent in 2002 to 9.7 percent in 2012 (SAMHSA, 2014).
In 2012, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that opioid analgesics
were involved in 43 percent of unintentional drug poisoning deaths, more fatalities than from
heroin and cocaine combined, and, as shown below, drug overdose among 25 to 64 year olds has
overtaken motor vehicle traffic crashes as the leading cause of injury death (CDC, 2014). In New
York City, between 2000 and 2013, the rate of opioid analgesic involved overdose death
increased by 256 percent.

2

Different types of opioids have different strengths making it difficult to calculate the accumulated dosage
prescribed to patients, especially if they are taking more than one formulation. The Morphine Milligram Equivalent
(MME) is used to measure the dose of different types of opioids using a standard conversion table. This is
particularly important in light of recent prescribing guidelines from the CDC suggesting that doses at or above 60
MME per day increase the risk for overdose by at least two times (CDC, 2016).

3

Figure 1: Rates of drug poisoning deaths have now surpassed motor vehicle accidents,
United States, 1980-2010
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Source: NCHS Data Brief, December, 2011.

Opioid analgesics are produced in the U.S. within a system of tight control and any entity
or person manufacturing, distributing, prescribing, or dispensing opioid analgesics can only do
so under license from the DEA. However, medication diversion—the transfer of a
pharmaceutical product from a medical to non-medical channel of distribution or use—is
endemic and has been estimated at a $25 billion a year industry (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 2003). Although there has been some analysis of the mechanisms relating to
pharmaceutical diversion, much of the literature stems from epidemiologically grounded
population-level analysis, and few studies to date have examined the socio-cultural factors
facilitating the movement of opioid analgesics from sanctioned to unsanctioned use. Inciardi and
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colleagues consider a number of ways that pain medication and other psychotherapeutic drugs3
might be funneled into the illicit market including: medication theft from manufacturers,
distributers and pharmacies; theft from institutional drug supplies; residential burglaries;
overprescribing by physicians; prescription forgery; and, “doctor shopping,” through which an
individual visits multiple physicians to procure prescriptions (Inciardi et al., 2009a). However,
while it is likely that each of these mechanisms play a part in fueling the illicit opioid analgesic
market, there is little consensus about the weight that can be attributed to each. For example,
while enforcement officials often perceive medical practitioners to be a primary force of
diversion, physicians typically highlight the role of “deceptive” patients (Inciardi et al., 2009).
In New York City, law enforcement estimates of diversion or loss of opioid analgesics
from manufacturers or distributers are low. For example, between 2012 and 2014 there were 35
pharmacy robberies and 94 pharmacy burglaries involving controlled prescription drugs in NYC4
(NY/NJ HIDTA, 2015). In addition, data collated from DEA 106 forms,5 suggest that diversion
as a result of robberies or burglaries from doctors’ offices, pharmacies, or hospitals does not
constitute a substantial portion of the illicit opioid analgesic market in the city (NY/NJ HIDTA,
2015). While the impact of some types of diversion are difficult to assess, data from the New
York State Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) provide a comprehensive overview
of the number of prescriptions written by prescribers in New York City and filled by New York
City residents. Between 2008 and 2010, there were more than 5.5 million opioid analgesic
prescriptions filled by New York City residents for opioid analgesics, and in 2010, 722,000 New

3

Psychotherapeutic medications are those that relieve symptoms of anxiety, depression, or other mental health
disorders.
4
This figure includes attempted burglaries and robberies where controlled prescription drugs appear to have been
the intended target.
5
Persons or entities licensed to manufacture or distribute controlled substances are obliged to notify the DEA of any
significant loss or theft by submitting a 106 form.

5

Yorkers filled more than 2 million opioid analgesic prescriptions (Paone et al., 2012). Figure 2
shows the number of opioid analgesic prescriptions filled, stratified by oxycodone and
hydrocodone, constituting the most popular opioid analgesics currently on the market.

Figure 2: Number of opioid analgesic prescriptions filled by New York City residents
2008- 2012
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Source: New York State Department of Health, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program, 2008–2012.

Prescribing practices, however, differ widely, and a more granular review of these data
has shown that nearly half (49%) of all prescribers wrote only one to three opioid analgesic
prescriptions per year, accounting for only 2 percent of all opioid analgesic prescriptions; over
one-third of prescribers (36%) wrote 15 percent of the total number of opioid prescriptions; 14
percent of prescribers wrote 51 percent of prescriptions, and the remaining 1 percent of
prescribers wrote 31 percent of prescriptions. Thus, medical practitioners with the highest rates
of prescribing wrote an average of 1,159 prescriptions per year, compared to an average of one
6

prescription per year for prescribers with the lowest rates (Paone et al., 2012). Figure 3, shows
the percentage of patients and prescriptions by prescribing frequency in New York City in 2010.

Figure 3: Percent of patients and prescriptions by prescribing frequency in New York City, 2010
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Source: NYS Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (Paone et al., 2012).

While it is likely that these variations are attributable in part to prescriber specialty and
practice setting (Paone et al., 2012), it is also suggestive of widely differing prescribing practices
and oversight. Overprescribing of opioid analgesics has been noted from so-called “pill mills,”
pain clinics that distribute large quantities of opioid analgesics with minimal medical care. For
example, a 2014 indictment of a network of Astramed clinics based in the Bronx, NY, alleged
that doctors working for the company had unlawfully distributed five million oxycodone tablets
over a period of three years (U.S. AO, Southern District, 2014). However, to date, most of the
literature regarding prescription diversion has tended to focus on the role of the patient rather
than that of the prescriber as a driver for opioid analgesic misuse (Cepeda et al., 2012; McDonald
and Carlson, 2013; Wilsey et al., 2010). Further, given that much of the extant literature has been
7

generated using data from large-scale surveys, less is known about the sociocultural factors that
may influence the misuse of and access to prescription medication (Quintero et al., 2006), or how
diversion “connects the doctor’s office or the pharmacy with networks of drug users who can
diffuse the product and knowledge about it” (Lovell, 2006: 156).
The purpose of this study was to analyze the accounts of opioid analgesic misuse among
a sample of New York City residents to understand: (1) the circumstances under which
individuals begin to misuse opioid analgesics; and (2) the sources of the pills they misuse. Using
data from semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted with New York City residents with a
history of opioid misuse, the study investigated four interrelated questions:

1.

Under what circumstances do individuals begin misusing opioid analgesics and what is
the relationship between opioid misuse and warranted medical treatment?

2.

How do individuals acquire the opioid analgesics they misuse? How do these sources
vary in relation to patterns of use? How do external factors influence pill acquisition?

3.

What role do prescribers play in the illicit opioid analgesic market?

4.

How can an understanding of the initiation and acquisition of opioid analgesics inform
public health and criminal justice initiatives to reduce the harms related to opioid
analgesic misuse?

The current situation with opioids in the U.S. has been classified as an “epidemic” by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2012); however, this is not the first time this
country has experienced an opioid crisis. In Chapter 1, I present an historical overview of opioids
and the waxing and waning of their use for medical and non-medical purposes. This chapter also
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explores the social and legislative controls enacted as a result of concerns about opioids in the
early twentieth century, which has governed their use in the medical sphere for most of the
previous century. I also provide a brief history of the pharmaceutical industry as the current
opioid crisis cannot be understood in isolation of this industry’s practices. Chapter 2 offers an
account of events in the late 1980s and early 1990s that contributed to a sea change in the use of
opioids in the U.S., with particular attention to the reconceptualization of pain as the fifth vital
sign and the concurrent release to the market of a new long-acting opioid formula, OxyContin®.
Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the research design and methods utilized for the data
presented in this dissertation.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the pathways into opioid analgesic misuse as reported by
participants in this study and argue that both motivation of use, as well as the source from which
the pills were obtained are important factors to consider in determining the etiology of opioid
analgesic misuse. Focusing on the context of initiation into opioid misuse, I highlight the current
reluctance within the medical community to acknowledge the extent of the iatrogenic6
consequences of opioid prescribing, and additionally, explore the definitional ambiguity
surrounding the terminology used to describe the use and misuse of opioid analgesics. Chapter 5
examines sources of opioid analgesics among members of two different groups of study
participants, those who reported opioid dependence and those who did not. The chapter includes
participants’ accounts of their trajectories toward opioid dependence and I consider how, for
many entrenched users, pills were easily obtained from community insiders and ongoing misuse
facilitated by close social networks. I also discuss the strategies that some participants employed

An iatrogenic consequence is defined as one in which the patient experiences an adverse health condition “induced
inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical treatment or diagnostic procedures.” (NIH MedLine Plus)
6
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to obtain opioid analgesics, differentiating between medical providers who were complicit in
prescribing beyond the scope of professional practice, and those who were not.
In Chapter 6, I present a typology of prescriber oversight to describe the continuum of
prescribing practices as reported by participants in this study. Ranging from flagrant, to loose, to
routine, to judicious, these typologies describe the nuances of prescribing practices and explore
how different initiatives to curb the overprescribing of opioids are likely to affect each group.
Chapter 7 continues by describing the impact of two recent supply-side interventions including
the reformulation of OxyContin® into an abuse-deterrent formulation, and the implementation of
a New York State bill mandating that prescribers look up their patients in the prescription drug
monitoring program registry prior to writing a prescription for a controlled substance. Finally, in
conclusion, I reflect on the political and economic structures that have facilitated the misuse of
opioid analgesics in the U.S.

10

Definition of terms
Throughout this dissertation, I have employed the term “opioid” to denote any drug
derived from the opium poppy, as well as synthetic, or semi-synthetic substances. Examples of
opioids include: opium alkaloids such as morphine and codeine, semi-synthetic opioids such as
oxycodone, hydrocodone, and heroin, and fully synthetic opioids such as methadone. Brand
names under which prescription opioids are sold include: Vicodin®, OxyContin®, Percodan®, and
Percocet®. The term “misuse” refers to taking opioid analgesics for the experience or feeling, or
in any manner other than prescribed by a doctor, including: taking opioids without a prescription;
taking medication beyond the cessation of pain; self-medication for a different injury/health
condition; and mixing medication with other substances for euphoric effect. Although broad, this
definition has been widely utilized in the literature to describe the nontherapeutic use of opioid
analgesics in the U.S.
The medical literature describes several processes of opioid dependence distinguishing
between tolerance, physical dependence, and psychological dependence (often termed
“addiction”). According to the American Academy of Pain Medicine, the American Pain
Society, and the American Society of Addiction Medicine (2001), the definitions of each of these
concepts are as follows: “tolerance” is a state of adaptation in which exposure to a drug induces
changes that result in a diminution of one or more of the drug’s effects over time; “physical
dependence” is a state of adaptation that is manifested by a drug class-specific withdrawal
syndrome that can be produced by abrupt cessation, rapid dose reduction, decreasing blood level
of the drug, and/or administration of an antagonist;7 and, “addiction” is a primary chronic,

7

An antagonist is a chemical that binds to a receptor (in this case the mu receptor) but does not activate a biological
response and can block the effect of other agonists. For example, opioids are an agonist and naloxone, the
medication that reverses overdoses is an antagonist.
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neurobiologic disease, with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental factors influencing its
development and manifestations and characterized by behaviors that include one or more of the
following: impaired control over drug use, compulsive use, continued use despite harm, and
craving.
In this study, the term “opioid dependence” is based on participants’ self-report of
withdrawal symptoms related to prolonged opioid use. Because of the physiologic effect that
opioids have on the body, regular use over a period of days or weeks results in tolerance, and if a
dose is missed, or if use of opioids is ceased abruptly, the body becomes biochemically
dysregulated, and a person is likely to feel withdrawal symptoms, including but not limited to:
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, night sweats, insomnia, anxiety, irritability, and restless leg
syndrome. While participants in this study did not undergo a formal clinical assessment for
substance use disorder,8 self-reported opioid dependence is considered an indication of
problematic opioid use.

8

In the fifth and most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V),
previously defined categories of ‘substance abuse’ and ‘substance dependence’ were combined into a single
diagnosis of ‘substance use disorder’ measured on a continuum from mild to severe (DSM-V, 2013). Diagnosis is
based on an 11-point scale and includes: (1) Taking the substance in larger amounts or for longer than the you meant
to; (2) Wanting to cut down or stop using the substance but not managing to; (3) Spending a lot of time getting,
using, or recovering from use of the substance; (4) Cravings and urges to use the substance; (5) Not managing to do
what you should at work, home or school, because of substance use; (6) Continuing to use, even when it causes
problems in relationships; (7) Giving up important social, occupational or recreational activities because of
substance use; (8) Using substances again and again, even when it puts the you in danger; (9) Continuing to use,
even when the you know you have a physical or psychological problem that could have been caused or made worse
by the substance; (10) Needing more of the substance to get the effect you want (tolerance); (11) Development of
withdrawal symptoms, which can be relieved by taking more of the substance. Accordingly, two of three of these
listed symptoms are indicative of a mild substance use disorder, four or five symptoms indicate a moderate
substance use disorder, and six or more symptoms indicate a severe substance use disorder.

12

CHAPTER ONE:
OPIOIDS AND THE INDUSTRY THAT SELLS THEM: A BRIEF HISTORY
“Into the bowl in which their wine was mixed, she slipped a drug that had the power of robbing
grief and anger of their sting and banishing all painful memories. No one who swallowed this
dissolved in their wine could shed a single tear that day, even for the death of his mother or
father, or if they put his brother or his own son to the sword and were there to see it done…”
Homer’s Odyssey.

The history of opioid use stretches back to ancient Mesopotamia, and it is generally
accepted among scholars that opium from seed pods of the Papaver somniferum poppy was first
cultivated by the Sumerians at the end of the third millennium BCE (Schiff, 2002). Known as hul
gil, or “joy plant” (Booth, 1996), opium was initially used by priests for ritualistic purposes.
However, its medicinal qualities were soon recognized and references to preparations derived
from opium can be found in several early medical texts including the Egyptian Ebers Papyrus
(c.1550 BCE), and Dioscorides’ De Materia Medica (c.50 CE), where the preparation of raw
opium is discussed for medicinal use (Riddle, 1985). Archaeological evidence from Cyprus
suggests that Papaver somniferum was grown commercially as early as 1500 BCE (Gerritsen,
2000) and by the time of the Roman Empire, “theriak,” a preparation of opium mixed with a
combination of other ingredients, was a common household elixir utilized as an antidote against
a wide variety of ailments (Schiff, 2002).
As the influence of the Romans waned, the availability of opium declined in Europe but
its use and cultivation continued throughout the Arab empire and by the eighth century had
spread to India and China by way of ancient trade routes (Brownstein, 1993). Historical records
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and artefacts suggest that during this period, opium remained largely confined to ritualistic and
therapeutic use (Gerritsen, 2000). However, as it was cultivated and traded more widely, the
social context in which opium was used began to change. By the late 1400s in China, other
properties of the drug had been recognized and in the lexicon of the Ming court, opium came to
be known as chun yao, meaning “spring drug” or aphrodisiac (Zheng, 2005). During this era,
opium use was still largely restricted to the elite and ingested by mouth. The introduction of
tobacco to the Chinese marketplace by Portuguese sailors in the seventeenth century presented a
new route of administration via the pipe, facilitating its spread to the broader population (Agnew,
2014).
By the late eighteenth century, opium use was widespread in China. Predominantly
produced in India, opium was exported by the British who were keen to balance a substantial
trade deficit accrued through the importation of Chinese tea (Booth, 1996). Recognizing opium
use as a growing problem, in 1839, the opium trade was severely restricted by Emperor Tao
Kuang (Rowe, 2006); however, its value was too great to the British and, after a series of battles
known as the First Opium War (1839-1842), the Chinese were forced to open up five ports to
international trade, essentially dismantling the Canton system9 which had previously restricted
the flow of foreign goods into the country. This, followed by the Treaty of Tientsin signed in
June 1858, effectively legalized the opium market resulting in a massive increase in the volume
of the drug imported into China, and research suggests that throughout the nineteenth century,
rates of opium dependence in China were higher than anywhere else in the world (Courtwright,
2001a).

9

A method for the Chinese to control and regulate foreign trade, the Canton System was in operation for almost 200
years from 1757 until 1842. By limiting trade to a small southern port (Guangzhou), the Chinese were able to restrict
contact between foreign merchants and the local population and tightly control the flow of goods in and out of the
country. (Van Dyke, 2005).
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In Europe, after an initial hiatus following the collapse of the Roman Empire, opium once
again found its way into the annals of medicine, albeit via a different route of administration than
the pipe favored by the Chinese. The discovery of laudanum—credited to Paracelsus (d.1541)
and pioneered a century later by the English physician Thomas Sydenham (d.1689)—led to the
wide availability of a palliative tincture made by dissolving opium in alcohol. Popularized by
preparations such as Dover’s Powder— a solution of opium dissolved in alcohol combined with
ipecac, an emetic added to limit the amount consumed thereby reducing the risk of overdose—
laudanum, and a less potent camphorated tincture, paregoric, was used extensively in the West
for the next 200 years.
In nineteenth century Britain, fueled by ready availability and an open market, opium was
widely used by a diverse population irrespective of class or social standing (Harding, 1988).
Taken to alleviate common symptoms such as diarrhea, toothache, sleeplessness and “nervous”
conditions, the majority of the opium consumed during this period was self-prescribed and
scholars have suggested that “the corner shop, and not the doctor’s surgery, was the center of
popular opium use” (Berridge and Edwards, 1987:30). As Berridge and Edwards point out, the
working class, often without the resources to seek medical care, relied on opioids for palliative
care, as well as to deal with the ennui and depression of their everyday lives. In the middle and
upper classes, self-medication was also the most common reason for use, although the line
between medical and non-medical (i.e., “social”) use may often have been blurred (Berridge and
Edwards, 1987).
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Morphine and heroin
Until the beginning of the 1800s, raw opium was the purest form of morphine available,
with an average morphine content of around 10 percent (Gerritson, 2000). However, advances in
chemistry at the turn of the century led to the first isolation of a natural plant alkaloid and in
1805, Friedrich Sertürner succeeded in extracting morphine from opium (Brownstein, 1993). The
resulting increase in purity had important consequences for the medical and pharmaceutical
professions, including the potential for production on a large-scale (Gerritson, 2000), and in the
years that followed, processes were discovered for isolating several more opium alkaloids,
including codeine and thebaine, a precursor to the synthetic opioid oxycodone (Schiff, 2002). For
medical practitioners, morphine was an invaluable addition to their medicine chest. Whereas
opium differed in potency and was often adulterated, morphine could be more accurately dosed
to produce a predictable therapeutic response (Courtwright, 2001a), and in 1927, a German
pharmacist named Friedrich Jacob Merck, began manufacturing morphine on a commercial
basis. A second important development that had a significant impact on the use of morphine was
the perfection of the hypodermic syringe in the 1850s (Schiff, 2002). Morphine comes in the
form of a crystallized salt, soluble in water, which can then be administered as a liquid through a
hypodermic syringe. Subcutaneous and intravenous injection enabled anesthesia to be
administered with almost immediate effect and cemented the reputation of morphine as a rapid
and effective pain reliever.
Although morphine had distinct advantages over raw opium in terms of efficiency and
dosing accuracy, its purity also resulted in more severe consequences for the habitual user and,
by the late 1800s, the dangers of physical opioid dependence had been recognized (Courtwright,
2001a). Instructed by his supervisor at Bayer, a chemical and pharmaceutical company, to find a
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less potent opioid with reduced potential for addiction, a German chemist named Hoffman
combined morphine with acetic anhydride to make diacetylmorphine.10 The resulting compound
was, ironically, even more potent than morphine, but for the next decade it was aggressively
marketed on an international scale under the trade name “heroin” as a non-addictive alternative
to morphine, suitable for alleviating respiratory ailments. This is not the only time that an opioid
has been erroneously marketed as non-addictive and in Chapter 2, I will examine the case of
OxyContin®, a synthetic extended- release opioid analgesic, the sales and marketing of which
had an important influence on the current resurgence of opioid prescribing in the U.S.

Opioids in the United States
Opioid use in the U.S. was influenced by both Europe and China. Initially used for
predominantly medicinal purposes, by the time of the Civil War (1861 to 1865) opium and
morphine were prescribed on a large scale for a range of afflictions, including dysentery,
insomnia, and injuries sustained in combat (Agnew, 2014). Indeed, the use of opioids was so
widespread among the troops on both sides that the term “army disease” was coined to describe
soldiers who had become physically dependent on opioids as a result of prolonged exposure to
the drug (Madsen, 2012).
A second important factor that stimulated opioid use during this period was the
proliferation of patent medications during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Brought over
from England by the first settlers, patent medicines were originally manufactured under patents
of royal favor bestowed on their makers by members of the royal family (Cook, 1976). Although
the ingredients were usually a well-guarded secret, these nostrums were not typically patented
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Diacetylmorphine was first discovered in 1874 by C. Alder Wright, but was not developed further because of its
extreme potency.
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and were widely distributed by quacks as well as physicians. As in England, opioid-based
remedies were extremely popular among Americans, alleviating the symptoms of people who
were unable to afford a doctor’s ministration (Dykstra, 1955), and when trade was interrupted by
the American War of Independence, the patent medicine industry in the US quickly burgeoned
(Inciardi and McElrath, 2011). As literacy improved and the number of publications increased,
products were widely advertised both in the popular press (Healy, 2012) and professional
medical journals, and messaging around patent medicines was ubiquitous (Young, 1961).
In his insightful book Phamageddon (2012) Healy provides an early example of how
advertising serves to stimulate sales of medical preparations, even when there are competing
products on the market. In Connecticut in the 1830s, two Patent medicine companies produced a
similar remedy known as “Bilious Pills.” Rather than saturate the market, the competition
between the two companies, whose battleground consisted predominantly of newspaper
advertising, resulted in increased sales for both products and similar preparations subsequently
brought on to the market by other proprietors did equally well (Healy, 2012).
Healy further notes that “the proprietary medicines industry was the first to market
lifestyles rather than the compounds per se” (2012: 21), a paradox given the opposition to curealls shown by the newly emerging medical profession in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. This trend continues today with pharmaceutical companies making concerted efforts to
tie their products to images depicting successful, happy people leading enviable lives as a result
of taking their medication. An excellent example of this is illustrated by Hertzberg (2009), who
cites the “super-mom” advertisement depicting a fulfilled, hardworking, yet nurturing woman
who, we are told, has been taking medication to treat her depression for the past five years:
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“Prozac-powered supermoms thus could have it all: white-collar careers, families, good
marriages, even a good night’s sleep.” (Hertzberg, 2009: 182).
In addition to the medicinal use of opioids, the practice of smoking opium was brought to
the U.S. by Chinese immigrants who had come to California to work in the mines and on the
transport infrastructure. It is worth noting here the clear moral distinction that emerged between
smoking opium and self-administering opioid-based nostrums for medical or quasi-medical
reasons. As Courtwright suggests, although the safety of opioids for medical use had started to
be debated among both physicians and the general populous, smoking opium was seen to have
“no legitimate therapeutic purpose; it was a ruinous vice, practiced by the irresponsible and the
wicked” (Courtwright, 2001a: 61). By the beginning of the 1900s, the distinction between the
medical and non-medical use of substances with similar psychoactive properties, as well as the
profile of the individuals who were inclined to use them, influenced the passage of several
regulatory and control measures delineating the use of narcotics for recreational and medical use,
and structuring the pharmaceutical and illicit drug market as it is today.
In addition to forming the basis of drug control policy, the distinction between “good”
and “bad” substances has formed the basis of existing drug control policy perpetuating a racially
bias system whereby substances are often demonized through their association with people of
color (Hart, 2013). A similar pattern can be seen in the comparison between opioid analgesics
and heroin which, while pharmacologically similar, are portrayed vastly differently in the media,
largely due to their use being yoked to white and black or brown people. A recent analysis by
Netherland and Hanson (2016) reveals consistent differences in the ways in which blacks and
Latinos who use heroin are depicted in media reports compared with whites who use opioid
analgesics. The authors suggest that rather than proving that “anyone can become an addict,”
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white opioid use is instead “resetting the terms of drugs and race in popular culture in ways that
insidiously further distinguish white from black (and brown) suffering” (2016: 665).

Legislative controls
The first prohibitive drug policies in the U.S. were enacted at the municipal level, and in
1875, the city of San Francisco passed an ordinance prohibiting opium smoking, a law clearly
directed at the Chinese population (Harvey Brown, 2002). State followed city, and in 1881, the
California legislature passed a law against operating or patronizing an “opium den”
(Courtwright, 2001a). Rather than the result of heightened concern over actual drug effect, the
legislation against opium dens was directed against Chinese immigrants who had become
economically superfluous following the end of the gold rush and the completion of the rail-road
(Reinarman, 1994). Fueled by racism, other cities and states with high numbers of Chinese-born
residents followed suit, and by 1909, the importation of opium for non-medical use, and
following, opium that was prepared specifically for smoking was prohibited (Harvey Brown,
2002).
Another important legislative change was the push for manufacturers of consumable
products to be transparent about their ingredients. The impetus for greater transparency came
about as a result of new techniques for food preservation introduced at the time of the Civil War
which signified the beginning of the food processing industry. Chemicals enabled manufacturers
to enhance their food by modifying texture, color, and flavor, and to prolong shelf life (Young,
1961), and often were added to foods without the knowledge of the consumer. Driven by Harvey
Wiley, a chemist working for the U.S. Department of Agriculture under President Roosevelt, the
Pure Food and Drug Act was passed in 1906 requiring that active ingredients be labelled clearly
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on any product designed for consumption, including all medications. While the bill did not ban
the use of any particular substance, the assumption was that, providing the consumer was
furnished with an accurate description of the product, they could make an informed choice
whether or not to use it, and so avoid the risk of unintentionally consuming potentially toxic
substances (Young, 1961). Thus, as the debate regarding the safety of opioids continued, the
potent ingredients of the elixirs and nostrums that had been widely sold by quacks were now
revealed. Within a year of the bill’s passage, estimates suggest that the sale of patent medications
containing narcotics dropped by around 30 percent (Musto, 1999). Further, with the
professionalization of the medical and pharmaceutical industries, it was increasingly in a
physician’s self-interest to quash the practice of self-medication in favor of a paid consultation
following which an appropriate medication could be prescribed (Reinarman, 1994).
The first decade of the twentieth century saw a slew of activity related to the control of
narcotics culminating in the 1914 Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act the full title of which was: “An
Act to provide for the registration of, with collectors of internal revenue, and to impose a special
tax upon all persons who produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, distribute,
or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations, and for other
purposes” (Public Law No. 223, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess., December 17). Although in essence the
purpose of the legislation was to regulate and tax the narcotics trade, the result of the Harrison
Act was to solidify the division between medical and non-medical drug use. Several scholars
have suggested that the distinction between “medicine” and “dope” was in response to a growing
concern about addiction and a shift in the demography of a typical opioid user who, up to this
point, was likely to be a white, middle-class, female whose opioid dependence was iatrogenic
(Herzberg, 2009; Rowe, 2006). Indeed, there was a strong racial element to narcotics regulation
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as illustrated by a statement made by Hamilton Wright, named to the International Opium
Commission who suggested that: “One of the most unfortunate phases of the habit of smoking
opium in this country [was] the large number of women who have become involved and were
living as common-law wives or cohabitating with Chinese in the Chinatowns of our various
cities” (Wright, 1910:44 cited in Kandell, 1998: 43).
Following the passage of the Harrison Act, the use and supply of specific drug types
(e.g., heroin) was criminalized and brought under the control of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
(later the Drug Enforcement Administration). At the same time, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) was established to ensure that “medical” drugs (e.g., morphine) were
correctly labelled and regulated in order that patients and doctors could make better decisions
about medical care. Herzberg (2009) suggests these two events resulted in a schism between
“medical” and “non-medical” substances: medicating with pharmaceutical drugs was seen as a
rational choice, while illicit drug use became associated with a pathological compulsion to “get
high.” Similarly, Lovell suggests that movement or “leakage” from the licit to illicit market
transposes an object that is legitimized (i.e., as a medicine or treatment), to a “dirty commodity”
with “a radically different rationality and symbolic nature” (Lovell, 2006: 138). This
transformation may also occur within the licit market place when prescribed medication results
in unintended euphoria for the patient. Thus, as with all things considered deviant, it is the social
characterization of a thing rather than the thing itself that defines it as either licit or illicit.
Alongside this, the perception of a “typical” drug user also shifted and Herzberg suggests “the
antidrug coalition … helped make it seem a logical absurdity for an ordinary, respectable (i.e.,
white, middle-class) American to become addicted unless they had been “infected” by someone
from the dangerous classes” (Hertzberg, 2009: 89).
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Although the Harrison Act was not designed to prohibit the use of opioids, one particular
paragraph stating that: “Nothing in this section shall apply to the dispensing or distribution of
any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered
under this Act in the course of his professional practice only” (emphasis added: Harrison
Narcotic Act, 1914, Section 2a), became a legal point of contention between the medical
community and law enforcement (Musto, 1999). If opioid dependence was recognized as a
medical condition, prescribing opioids could be considered within the realms of professional
practice. If, on the other hand, “addiction” was seen as a moral aberration, prescribing opioids to
patients who were opioid dependent would be construed as a criminal act (Booth, 1996). In 1919,
Webb et al. v. United States was brought before the US Supreme Court involving a physician
from Tennessee who had been prescribing opioids to patients, “not after consideration of the
applicant’s individual case, and in such quantities and with such direction as, in his judgment,
would tend to cure the habit, or as might be necessary or helpful in an attempt to break the habit,
but with such consideration and rather in such quantities as the applicant desired for the sake of
continuing his accustomed use” (Emphasis added. Webb, et al. v. United States, 249 U.S. 96).
Critically, the decision went against Webb, and during the next 25 years, tens of thousands of
doctors were prosecuted for prescribing opioids to dependent patients (Booth, 1996; Hohenstein,
2001). As a result of the Harrison Act and other legislative changes introduced in the early
1900s, the number of physicians prescribing opioids to their patients substantially decreased and
cases of iatrogenic opioid dependence, as well as opioid dependence as a consequence of selfmedication, dwindled to almost nothing (Courtwright, 2001a).
Repealed in 1970, the Harrison Act was replaced by the Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act (DAPCA) Title II of which is the Controlled Substances Act legislating the
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regulation of prescription drugs (Musto, 1999), and in 1975, United States v. Moore (423 U.S.
122, 124) reiterated the earlier Webb ruling that physicians could be prosecuted for prescribing
beyond the scope of professional practice including “diverting” medication (Libby, 2006). In the
U.S., semi-synthetic opioids such as oxycodone and hydrocodone, in addition to morphine,
continued to be prescribed on a limited basis by doctors for pain relief, but until the end of the
twentieth century, the source of most opioid dependence resulted from the illicit use of heroin,
the domestic use and production of which was criminalized in 1924. For example, in 2003 only 3
percent of substance use treatment admissions reported a primary drug of opioid analgesics;
however, by 2013 this number had increased to 9 percent (SAMHSA, 2015). Figure 3 shows the
relationship between sales of opioid analgesics and rates of opioid drug treatment admissions
over a decade period.
Figure 4: Rates of opioid treatment admissions, and kilograms sold in the US 1999-2010
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The modern pharmaceutical industry
The Harrison Act effectively changed the culture of opioid prescribing and for most of
the twentieth century, physicians limited the use of these drugs to treating cancer and end-lifepain. How then, did we end up in the current situation? To fully understand the proliferation of
opioid use during the previous two decades, it is necessary to examine the role of the
pharmaceutical industry and its relationship to the medical profession, as it is the interplay
between these entities that has had perhaps the greatest influence on healthcare in the U.S. today.
The modern pharmaceutical industry had its origins in two distinct strands of business,
wholesale drug manufacturers and science-based chemical companies (Chandler, 2009). In the
mid-nineteenth century, the ability to isolate compounds from plant-based alkaloids resulted in
the development of a number of new drugs, including morphine and codeine, which could be
manufactured in precisely specified doses on a wholesale basis leading to the rapid growth of
small apothecary businesses such as Eli Lilly and SmithKline (now GlaxoSmithKline). In tandem,
chemical manufacturers, (e.g., Merck and Pfizer), many of whom were producing dyes and other
chemical compounds, turned their attention to how their products could be utilized within a
medical context (Healy, 2012), and with the advent of hematological staining—utilizing dyes to
stain tissues for microscopic study—advances in synthetic organic chemistry swiftly translated to
advances in synthetic organic drugs (Chandler, 2009).
The first half of the twentieth century is considered the golden age of the pharmaceutical
industry. In addition to offering a means of protection against potentially life-threatening
pathogens through the development of new vaccines, the isolation of therapeutic agents such as
sulfanilamide11 and other antibiotics gave physicians the capacity to cure a range of infectious
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Sulfanilamide is the active ingredient of prontosil that protects against bacterial infections including
streptococcus.
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diseases rather than simply alleviate their symptoms (Tobbell, 2011). The outbreak of World
War II accelerated the need for newly developed drugs such as penicillin to be produced on a
massive scale. Mergers between fine chemical companies and wholesale drug manufacturers
effectively consolidated the pharmaceutical process by combining access to the raw ingredients
with the means for mass production. This structural shift served to solidify and increase the value
of brand name drugs as corporations cut out the broker and took over the drug manufacturing
process in its entirety, resulting in an increasing emphasis on marketing and sales (Hertzberg,
2009). As pharmaceutical companies continued to isolate new antibiotic agents, novel
therapeutic products were followed by “me too” drugs—those with very similar chemical
structures and similar effects to existing medications—which, in order to sell, required
sophisticated sales techniques to differentiate them from similar drugs produced by competitors
(Tobbell, 2011).
In tandem with these changes, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) was signed
into law by President Roosevelt in June 1938. Although it had been recognized by congress that
the existing Food and Drug Act (1906) did not offer adequate consumer protections, the new bill
was only finalized following a tragedy in which more than 100 people, many of them children,
were poisoned after imbibing Elixir Sulfanilamide. Responding to a request for sulfanilamide in
liquid form, Harold Watkins, chief chemist of the S.E. Massengill Company produced a new
compound dissolved in ethylene glycol, a toxic substance similar to antifreeze. With no
provision in the existing law requiring that all components of a drug compound be certified as
safe for human consumption, the preparation was tested only with regard to how it looked, how it
smelled, and how it tasted, and not for its potential toxicity (Wax, 1995). However, despite the
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scope of the tragedy, under the existing legislation, the FDA had no latitude for prosecution and
was able only to level a minor charge against the company related to misbranding.12
Enacted the following year, the FFDCA provided much improved protections for
consumers against potentially dangerous substances including a requirement that all new drug
components should be tested for proof of safety prior to release, with findings submitted to the
FDA as part of each new drug application. In addition, all the active ingredients were to be listed,
and false or misleading labelling was prohibited (FFDCA, 1938). Aside from providing better
protection for consumers, perhaps the most significant consequence of the FFDCA was to
increase the proportion of drugs that required a prescription. An amendment to the bill sponsored
by Senator Hubert Humphrey and U.S. Representative Carl Durham in 1951 further served to
cement the division between over-the-counter and prescription-only drugs, resulting in a shift
that would have a profound effect on doctor-patient relationships (Wax, 1995). Faced with
increasing monopoly within the pharmaceutical industry, patients became progressively more
reliant on their doctors to remain immune to the sophisticated marketing techniques employed by
drug companies to encourage use of their product (Healy, 2012).
Healy (2012) suggests that, despite the growing proliferation of prescription-only drugs
and the increase in marketing and advertising, until the late 1950s the medical profession was
largely able to maintain an adequate level of neutrality against the onslaught of branding and
marketing from the pharmaceutical industry. The American Medical Association (AMA)
operated its own laboratories to test new drugs, and only those products that had received the
AMA’s seal of approval were permitted advertising space in the association’s journal. Further

The company was charged with misbranding as the lethal product, labelled an “elixir” did not actually contain any
alcohol with the FDA contended the term implied.
12
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the AMA tended to favor generic formulations over brand name products, protecting patients
from the high price of many branded prescription medications.
Regardless of the increasing press interest in new, potentially life-saving drugs, the
medical profession also disapproved of direct-to-consumer advertising, and viewed such
marketing tactics as a throwback to the bygone days of patent medicines when quacks touted
worthless remedies to an unsuspecting public. Pharmaceutical executives too, were of the mind
that the industry should distance itself from direct contact with consumers and instead establish
relationships only with health care providers such as physicians and pharmacists (Tobbell, 2012).
However, as the publicity around new drugs intensified, the AMA began to view these popular
news articles as a surreptitious way for drug companies to promote new products by creating
consumer-led demand, shifting the balance of power between doctors and patients. In the
summer of 1952, a report by the AMA Research Committee included a scathing assessment of
pharmaceutical marketing practices, which they suggested were “to avoid the long but necessary
period of evaluation for a new method of treatment” (AMA Research Committee Report, 1952,
cited in Tobbell, 2012: 63). However, despite their initially strong stance against direct-toconsumer advertising, the AMA gradually conceded their position and, by the end of the 1950s,
developments in the wider political sphere, most notably the introduction of the Medicaid bill to
Congress, had the AMA scrambling for funds to fight the proposed bill. As the AMA sought
increased revenue from advertising, the standards required for a product to win the seal of
approval were relaxed and pharmaceutical advertising sales doubled (Healy, 2012). Indeed, by
1961, an editorial in the journal Science estimated that more than half the AMA’s annual budget
came from the pharmaceutical industry, which had produced 3,790,908,000 pages of paid journal
advertising (Harris, 1964, cited in Healy, 2010: 40).
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By the end of the 1950s, partly as a result of healthcare reform, drug companies were
under intense scrutiny from the government for their pricing and marketing strategies, and in
1959, a Senate subcommittee on antitrust and monopoly investigation led by Senator Estes
Kefauver was established to investigate the industry. Kefauver’s interest in the pharmaceutical
industry was piqued when his staffers discovered that several different brands of the same
antibiotic were being sold for exactly the same price, at a 1000 percent markup from the
manufacturer’s price, suggesting that pharmaceutical companies were conspiring to keep prices
high and bribing doctors to prescribe more costly, patented drugs (Healy, 2010). As described in
Tobbell, Kefauver and his team identified three mechanisms that permitted pharmaceutical
companies to monopolize the market: (1) the granting of patents with 17 years of market
exclusivity for new drugs; (2) the advertising and sales of products to physicians; (3) the ability
of companies through these marketing strategies to encourage use of brand name rather than
generic drugs (Tobbell, 2012: 92). The resulting bill, S. 1552, proposed a number of amendments
to the existing patent laws, including reducing the period of time new drugs could be exclusively
marketed to three years, and limiting patents to only those drugs that were significantly different
in terms of their molecular structure, and therapeutic effect, to other products already available
for sale. In addition, new safety standards were proposed that would expand the government’s
reach over the drug manufacturing and distribution process, including a provision that required
evidence not only that a drug was safe, but also that it was effective to treat a particular ailment.
The main objections to Kefauver’s proposed bill were largely centered on his proposed
reforms to the patent system and, in a sign of the times, many of the arguments against the bill
presented by its detractors were oriented toward the national fear of communism (Tobbell,
2012). Further, although initially well-received by some groups, the proposed amendments
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relating to drug marketing practices also met with resistance. Seen by many as an attempt to
undermine the free market economy and introduce socialized medicine, opponents conjured
images of a state-controlled healthcare system under which the autonomy of physicians would be
severely compromised, a view bolstered by other recently proposed legislation, including the
Medicare Act, which was deeply unpopular within the medical profession.
United against the bill, medical providers and the pharmaceutical industry solidified their
alliance and, by exploiting the deep-held fears of socialism while simultaneously lauding the
many recent therapeutic innovations, critics of the bill were effectively able to counteract the
negative publicity against the drug companies that Kefauver’s team had generated since the start
of the investigation. Central to this rhetoric was the assertion that curbs on patents and drug
prices would lead to a diminished capacity for research and stymie new drug discoveries. In
reality, many of the drugs developed during the pharmaceutical golden age, including
sulfanilamides and antibiotics, had been developed in Europe; of the drug discoveries that could
be credited to the U.S., the majority came from laboratories housed within academic institutions
that were government- rather than industry-funded (Tobbell, 2012). Further, while the industry
was cited to spend approximately six percent of its sales revenue on research, the Kefauver’s
report claimed that many of the top pharmaceutical companies spent “5 to 11 times as much in
advertising, promotional, and selling expenses” (Tobbell, 2012: 115).
The impetus that eventually pushed Kefauver’s bill through Congress (albeit in a watered
down form) was another drug safety scandal which played out on a global scale. Originally
developed in Germany, Thalidomide was marketed for a variety of ailments including respiratory
infections, insomnia, and anxiety. After it was discovered to have antiemetic properties, it was
also sold, often without a prescription, to pregnant women to alleviate morning sickness.
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Although never licensed for sale in the U.S., quantities of the drug were dispersed across the
country for testing purposes by Merrell Pharmaceuticals, with the expectation that it would soon
be granted FDA approval. Even as disturbing reports began to emerge about the drug effect on
fetus development, the drug continued to be distributed to doctors, and estimates suggest that
approximately 10,000 children, including 17 in the U.S., were ultimately affected by phocomelia,
a malformation of the limbs (Heaton, 1994). News of the Thalidomide tragedy altered the
political landscape and Kefauver’s bill was once again front and center as the vehicle for
industry reform. Rushed through the House and the Senate, the final legislation proscribed
further safety checks for drug toxicity and tasked the FDA with advertising control. In addition,
the bill strengthened the status of new drugs as prescription-only, required that manufacturers be
able to prove the efficacy of their product for a specific condition, and mandated controlled
studies to demonstrate drug-effectiveness (Peltzman, 1973). However, the pharmaceutical
industry had won an important battle, and reform of the existing patent laws was conspicuously
absent.
In his analysis of the pharmaceutical industry, Healy (2012) suggests that although
Kefauver’s bill seemed to provide a robust safety net, the reality has been very different. He
explains it in the following terms: “When a pharmaceutical company gets a drug on the market
for lowering cholesterol, for osteoporosis, or for erectile dysfunction, this now marks the point at
which the company begins to sell the condition, the point at which they can gear up to reengineer
the medical marketplace to suit their product” (Healy, 2012: 47). As I will illustrate in the
following chapters, a new emphasis on the treatment and marketing of “pain” as its own
syndrome, rather than a symptom of an underlying issue, along with new pain relieving drug
products has been an integral factor in the recent explosion of opioid prescribing in the U.S.
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Although the intention of Kefauver’s bill regarding the safety and efficacy of a drug was
to provide added consumer protection, results from randomized controlled trials turn out not to
be as impartial as one might think, even when they appear in prestigious medical publications.
Indeed, the integrity of clinical trials was thought to have been so severely compromised that in
2001, a dozen editors from some of the best-regarded medical journals across the globe
collectively printed a statement warning that the objectivity of the research findings appearing in
their journals was at serious risk (Abramson, 2004). Until the late 1970s, scientific research was
largely supported by the federal government; however, as funding from the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) began to wane, academic institutions were forced to look elsewhere for grants to
support their work, and pharmaceutical companies were happy to fill the void. In tandem with
these changes, in 1980, the Reagan administration passed the Bayh-Dole Act designed to
promote innovation by allowing small businesses and academic research facilities to take out
patents on inventions (including new drugs) stemming from government-funded research,13 The
main provision of this legislation was that biotech companies and academic institutes could
patent drug discoveries and thereafter license their products to the pharmaceutical industry for
development, while retaining a share of the royalties. Additionally, researchers and their
affiliated institutions increasingly owned equity in the companies to whom they granted these
licenses, resulting in an even greater imperative to turn their innovations into commercially
viable products (Angell, 2004).
In order to prove safety and efficacy, a new drug must undergo testing, usually in the
form of clinical trials, with results submitted to the FDA for review. In 1991, around 80 percent
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Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, inventors were obliged to hand over new drug discoveries to the federal government
which, by the time the act was passed, held 28,000 patents, only 5 percent of which had been licensed for
commercial use (U.S. GAO, Report to the Congressional Committees, 1978).
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of industry-sponsored clinical drug trials were conducted by researchers at medical schools or
teaching hospitals. However, in little more than a decade, that figure had dwindled to less than a
third (Abramson, 2004). The entities that have replaced academic institutions are independent,
privately run research organizations holding direct contracts with pharmaceutical companies that
are able to administer clinic trials in a fraction of the time it would take an academic institution
to perform the same task. A consequence of this is that the rigor associated with research
directed within an academic institution has been lost to the point that scientists conducting drug
trials “may have little or no input into trial design, no access to the raw data, and limited
participation in data interpretation” (Abramson, 2004: 96). Further, now that drug testing is so
carefully controlled by the companies that develop the product, it is uncertain whether negative
findings are likely to be published at all. For example, a review by the Swedish government of
all the known studies (whether published or not) relating to the efficacy of five new
antidepressants found that, from a total of 42 studies, half reported the new drugs to be
effective14 and half did not. However, of the half that did not, only six had been published
(Abramson, 2004).
Also pertinent to the current trends in opioid prescribing are the techniques
pharmaceutical companies use to sell their products. The amount of money the industry spends
on marketing has been referred to as a “black box,” from which it is difficult to extract verifiable
numbers, although it was estimated in 2001 to be a minimum of $19.1 billion per year, and
perhaps as much as $54 billion (Angell, 2004). Since the majority of drugs are only available via
prescription from a medical professional, doctors constitute the primary target for drug
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Although randomized controlled trials are required as part of the FDA approval process, there is no obligation that
drug companies compare the efficacy of a new drug with the best existing available therapy, and new drugs are often
only tested against a placebo. Thus, new drugs are often approved not because they are better than older (often
cheaper) products already on the market, but because they are better than no treatment at all (Angell, 2004).
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marketing, and a significant proportion of the marketing budget is directed with this in mind. In
order to encourage doctors to prescribe their products, pharmaceutical companies employ a
variety of techniques including sending armies of “detailing” men and women directly to
doctors’ offices to hand out free drug samples along with other giveaways,15 at an estimated cost
of $10,000 per physician, per year (Abramson, 2004). In a critical review of the impact of
physician-industry interaction on doctors’ practices, Wazana (2000) found that while both
residents and physicians purportedly held cynical views regarding visitation from detailers, there
was a lack of concern about how these visits may influence their practice. However, an
examination of the outcomes of these visits suggested a number of negative effects on
knowledge, attitude, and behavior including: “[the] inability to identify wrong claims about
medication . . . awareness, preference, and rapid prescription of a new drug . . . making
formulary requests16 for medications that rarely held important advantages over existing ones;
non-rational prescribing behavior; increasing prescription rate; [and] prescribing fewer generic
but more expensive, newer medications at no demonstrated advantage.” (Wazana, 2000: 378).
A second important marketing strategy employed by the pharmaceutical industry is to
reach medical providers through symposiums and lectures often delivered by well-respected
senior physicians considered “thought leaders” within the profession (Abramson, 2004). In order
to renew their license to practice medicine, the majority of states require that physicians earn
continuing medical education (CME) credits throughout their careers which can obtained by
attending approved meetings where educational components are offered relating to a variety of

The practice of “gifting” often starts in medical school and is amplified during residency and beyond. Giveaways
range from small tokens such as meals and penlights to medical equipment, including stethoscopes or textbooks, to
cash stipends and all expenses paid symposiums in prime locations.
16
Medical practitioners can request that particular medications be added to a “formulary”, a list of approved
prescription drugs that are covered at least partially by medical insurance plans. Where brand-name medications are
not included on formularies, patients may be liable for 100 percent of the cost.
15
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topics. However, some commentators have questioned these meetings’ funding sources and the
impartiality of the presented materials, given that a proportion of financing comes from the
pharmaceutical industry (Relman, 2003). Indeed, since the beginning of the 2000s, the
Accreditation Council of Continuing Medical Education (ACCME), the organization responsible
for overseeing CMEs, has endorsed more than 100 private Medical Education and
Communication Companies (MECCs) to deliver CMEs to physicians, which includes planning
the meetings, deciding the content of the teaching materials, and selecting thought leaders to
deliver the lectures (Angell, 2004). These firms, primarily contracted by the pharmaceutical
industry, then provide their educational curricula at no charge to hospitals, other CME sponsors
and physicians (Relman, 2001). However, marketing materials from one of the largest MECCs,
Concepts in Professional Education and Communications, leave no room for ambiguity about
their potential benefit to the pharmaceutical industry, as referenced in a report released by the
Public Citizen’s Health Research Group in 2000: “Medical education is a powerful tool that can
deliver your message to key audiences and get those audiences to take action that benefits your
product” (cited in Relman, 2001: 2010). Although new guidelines were instituted by the
ACCME in 2004, the pharmaceutical industry continues to support more than half the costs
associated with CMEs in the U.S. (Brody, 2009) and the questions regarding the professional
integrity of this practice endure.
Aside from physicians, another important marketing target is, of course, the person who
will ultimately ingest the drug prescribed by the doctor, that is, the patient. Direct-to-consumer
advertising (DTCA) has been a mainstay of the pharmaceutical industry for decades. However,
as a result of FDA requirements that drug advertisements fully disclose all potential side effects,
the 30-second television commercial format was largely impractical, and until 1997, drugs were
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mostly advertised on printed matter, a medium better able to accommodate this information
(Angell, 2004). In 1997, the FDA softened the regulations for television advertising and between
1996 and 2000, annual spending on DTCA tripled (Rosenthal et al., 2002). As previously
asserted by Healy (2012), medical advertising is adroit at selling not only a product, but a way of
life, and as Abramson suggests, pharmaceutical advertising quickly became adept at creating the
impression “not only that health and happiness can be achieved by using the right drugs, but that
drugs are necessary [emphasis in the original] for health and happiness” (Abramson, 2004: 151).
There is little doubt that DTCA is an effective tool, and in 2010 a national survey,
Consumer Reaction to DTC Advertising of Prescription Drugs, reported that a third of
participants had instigated a conversation with their doctor regarding a specific prescription
medication after seeing an advertisement for that drug (Prevention, 2010). This type of
interaction between doctor and patient has likely resulted in a subtle change to the relationship as
the success of an office visit may well be predicated on whether the doctor complies with his or
her patient’s request (Abramson, 2004). Indeed, as pressure mounts within the health system to
shrink costs by shortening the time spent with patients, and expanding restrictions on insurance
reimbursement limit the scope of therapeutic options, a prescription may be the most meaningful
outcome of an office visit. Moreover, as patients become more discerning as consumers of the
health care system (Stephens, 2010), supplying a prescription for a requested drug could
influence the type of feedback a doctor receives and ultimately affect future business (Lembke,
2012).
Finally, although drug companies are required to submit all the materials associated with
a new marketing campaign to the FDA to assess that the information intended for the consumer
is presented in a fair and balanced way, the number of submissions the FDA receives every year
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vastly outnumbers the number of staff they have available to review these materials. Thus, while
there is the appearance of checks and balances, the reality is that many of the advertising
campaigns that are found to be in violation of FDA guidelines will have already concluded by
the time the campaign has been reviewed (Angell, 2004).
My intention in providing an historical overview of both the use of opioids in the U.S.
and the industry that sells them is to relay to the reader that the current opioid situation we are
experiencing was not conjured from thin air. Rather, it is a continuation of the postwar consumer
culture in this country that has resulted in a restructuring of social institutions including the
medical system (Hertzberg, 2009). The following chapter will focus on the contemporary context
as it relates to our current understanding of pain, as well as actions by the pharmaceutical
industry that have precipitated the resurgence of opioid prescribing during the previous three
decades.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE UNDER-TREATMENT OF PAIN
“I have given a name to my pain and call it dog”
Nietzsche

Following the Harrison Narcotics Act (1914) and continuing for most of the twentieth
century, the use of opioid-based products for pain relief was severely curbed and largely limited
to treat cancer and end-of-life pain. The increased use of these medications since the mid-1990s
can be attributed in part to two coinciding events: 1) an emerging clinical focus on the undertreatment of pain; 2) the release and aggressive marketing of OxyContin®, a newly patented longacting opioid analgesic. The following chapter discusses each of these phenomena in more detail.
The conceptualization of pain has transformed through the ages. Previously regarded as
an independent entity, a “thing” rather than an experience or event (Bourke, 2014), pain has in
turn been closely aligned with theology, evolution, and disease, and often examined through a
philosophical rather than a physiological lens. Prior to the seventeenth century, pain, along with
other emotions and sensations, was thought to originate from the heart. As the dominant
metaphor of Judeo-Christian doctrine (Meldrum, 2003), pain was often understood to be “a
chastising communiqué from a Higher Being” (Bourke, 2014: 9) and an integral part of human
suffering. Pain was thus both physical and spiritual, and while members of the medical
profession used first opium and then laudanum to relieve their patients’ symptoms, pain was also
inflicted by doctors in procedures employed to realign the four humors, an imbalance of which
was thought to be the origin of disease.17

17

Prior to the nineteenth century, Humorism dominated the understanding of the human body. At its core was the
theory that the body contained four fluids—phlegm, black bile, yellow bile, and blood—acted upon by spirits known
as the natural, the vital, and the animal. In a healthy individual, each of the humors was perfectly balanced; however
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The middle of the seventeenth century saw a dramatic change in the understanding of
human physiology and the perception of emotions or sensations. Propelled largely by René
Descartes, who theorized a mechanistic view of the body, pain became one sensation in a vat of
possible neurophysiological responses to stimuli. Vividly illustrated in several of his treatise,
Descartes’ conceptualization of pain included diagrams detailing the sensory-motor system and
the principles of action-reaction, or reflex which he described as follows: “Just as, pulling on one
end of a cord, one simultaneously rings a bell which hangs at the opposite end” (Descartes, 1641:
27). Largely as a result of Descartes’ work, a new understanding of physiology emerged spurring
the Cartesian distinction between body and mind that formed the foundation of our
understanding about pain until the modern era (Bourke, 2014).
The division of mind and body was solidified at the beginning of the nineteenth century
with the advent of the “clinical gaze” (Foucault, 1963). A shift toward empirical enquiry meant
that rather than relying on existing systems of disease classification, symptoms were now
carefully observed prior to diagnosis. Foucault suggests that a consequence of this was a subtle
transformation in the way doctors communicated with their patients, and where a physician’s
inquiry once might have started with “What is the matter with you”, the clinical gaze provoked
the question “Where does it hurt?” (Foucault, 1963: xviii). While this approach stimulated many
medical advances, Morris (1991) contends that the clinical gaze objectified pain to such a degree
that pain not evidenced by the presence of visible lesions lost its authority. Thus over time, the
explanation for pain has become entirely medicalized. And yet paradoxically, even with the
enormous advances made in the medical sciences, pain—especially chronic pain—has reached
epidemic proportions (Morris, 1991). Indeed, estimates from the Institute of Medicine (2011)

a deficit or excess of any/all of the fluids could lead to physical and/or mental dysfunction. Realigning the humors
was attempted through a variety of often painful medical procedures including purging and bleeding.
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suggest that 100 million Americans experience chronic pain at an annual cost, including health
care expenses and lost productivity, of $560-630 billion.
More recently, pain has come to be understood as a multifold concept, and it is now
acknowledged not only that different causes of pain are felt in qualitatively different ways, but
that pain is subjective and may be dependent on social factors, independent experiences, and
emotional states (Morris, 1998). In 1976, the newly formed International Association for the
Study of Pain (IASP), convened a panel of medical experts who defined pain as “an unpleasant
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described
in terms of such damage” (Merskey, 1986). However, while this definition would seem to
attenuate the distinction between physical and emotional pain, some scholars question whether
this is the case. For example, Morris (1991) suggests that the division between physical and
mental pain continues to prevail, and while Bourke (2014) eschews the mind/body dichotomy,
she concedes that “the Cartesian distinction between mind and body is alive and well and does a
vast amount of ideological work for physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, the pharmaceutical
industry, and chronic pain patients today” (Bourke, 2014:12). Further, as Goldberg (2009) points
out, many ethnographies of pain among Western populations rely on the separation of mind and
body as the organizing principle for the interpretation and understanding of pain among affected
groups, including illness sufferers themselves.
The distinction between chronic and acute pain is an important one. Whereas acute pain
is typically localized, short in duration, and yoked to a known, underlying physical cause, such
as a broken bone or appendectomy, chronic pain persists beyond the expected time for healing of
an illness or injury and is thought to be a “pathologic process that results in aberrant signaling
from a previously injured location or site of trauma” (Dhesi and Hurley, 2002: 10). Further,
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while acute pain has a biological or evolutionary purpose to protect—individuals suffering from
congenital analgesia, with the resulting absence of pain, for example, typically injure themselves
frequently and have a shortened life expectancy (Goldberg, 2009)—chronic pain serves no
obvious function, and is often accompanied by suffering, depression, or demoralization (Jackson,
2005). Although the syndromes associated with chronic pain have been discussed within the
medical community across the ages, the absence of obvious injury or illness has meant that its
root cause has alternatively been seen as real or imagined. As the field of neurology has
expanded and specific diagnostic tests became more readily available to identify certain
ailments, “true” pain was seen as stemming from a “specific noxious stimulus” as opposed to
imagined pain, which condemned the sufferer as “malingerers or drug abusers” (Meldrum, 2003:
2742), and as Jackson suggests, “a lack of a visible mark is considered by some pain sufferers to
create the conditions for stigmatization” (2005: 340).
In the last 30 years, the emergence of pain as its own specialty has highlighted the extent
to which pain is under-treated, and as Bourke (2014) points out, in the 1970s, only 0.3 percent of
the content in text books related to oncology published in the U.S. tackled the issue of pain,
although the majority of people with cancer would certainly be likely to suffer pain at some point
during their illness (Bourke, 2014: 294). Using a political lens to examine the recent shifts in the
way pain has been conceptualized and treated, Wailoo (2014) recalls former President Reagan’s
1985 State of the Union address in which he stressed the need for a free market economy. He
suggests that the deregulation that occurred during the Reagan era diminished consumer
protection and weakened FDA oversight, both of which had become synonymous with
constraining the market and preventing people from receiving the pain relief they needed and to
which they were entitled. Under the watch of free market conservatives, proposed regulations for
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monitoring adverse drug reactions were scrapped, government oversight limited, and the FDA
pushed toward a faster system intended to promote rather than inhibit ingenuity (Wailoo, 2014).
The push for deregulation coupled with a shift in the perception of treatment and an
urging from specialists to treat pain as the “fifth” vital sign resulted in a rethink of the use of
opioid analgesics to treat chronic pain. Although opioid analgesics have always been prescribed
for malignant, end-of-life pain, use of these drugs for other types of non-cancer pain had been
limited since the Narcotics Harrison Act (1914) and subsequent Supreme Court rulings, which
resulted in the prosecution of thousands of physicians for prescribing opioids beyond the scope
of professional practice. However, bolstered by two widely cited articles suggesting that the risk
of complications from opioid therapy were minimal, pain advocacy groups urged an easing of
restrictions regulating the prescribing of these drugs.
The first of these articles, authored by Porter and Jick (1980), and published as a letter to
the editor in the New England Journal of Medicine, consisted of a single paragraph reporting
findings (but no analysis) from a study of patients who had received narcotics while being
treated in hospital. The authors stated that of the 11,882 patients who received opioids, there
were only four documented cases of opioid use disorder associated with those who had no
history of addiction.18 The second, authored by Portenoy and Foley (1986) and published in
Pain, provided findings from a study of 38 patients and reported that opioid analgesics could be
effectively used for the treatment of long-term pain with only minimal risk of psychological
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A subsequent bibliometric analysis of this letter conducted between the time of its publication and March 30 2017
identified 608 citations with a notable increase following the release of OxyContin ®, a long-acting opioid analgesic
formulation discussed in detail below. Of the articles that included a reference to the letter, many conveyed
incomplete information about the study, and some citations grossly misrepresented the conclusions of the letter. For
example, the study had involved opioid treatment to patients administered in the controlled setting of a hospital to
alleviate acute pain and not long-term opioid therapy as was often inferred. The authors of this analysis conclude
that despite the lack of evidence presented in the original letter, it was “heavily and uncritically cited as evidence
that addiction was rare with long-term opioid therapy” (Leung, P.T.M et al., 2017).
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dependence (“addiction”) or other negative health outcomes.19 Why these particular publications
had the impact that they did is difficult to ascertain, but both papers went on to be cited more
than 600 times, and their conclusions—that patients could be prescribed opioids with minimal
risk of developing an opioid use disorder—helped support the resurgence of opioid prescribing
in the U.S.
Recognizing that chronic pain was undertreated in many patients, in 1998, the Federation
of State Medical Boards of the U.S. issued new guidelines for the use of controlled substances,
relaxing the restrictions that governed the use of opioid analgesics for chronic non-cancer pain.
Endorsed by both professional medical associations and the federal government, including the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the move toward greater use of opioids for pain relief was in
keeping with the post-Reagan years in which deregulation had flourished.

The case of OxyContin®
The momentum for the improved treatment of pain coincided with the release of a new
semi-synthetic, controlled-release opioid analgesic manufactured by Purdue, a relatively small
pharmaceutical company purchased in 1952 by the Sackler family. The drug, brand named
OxyContin®, was developed by the company largely because the patent on an extended release
morphine pill, MS Contin®—which until the late 1980s had been their main source of revenue—
was about to expire, resulting in the loss of millions of dollars as cheaper, generic versions were
released onto the market. In an internal memo written in 1990 and recently published by the LA
Times, Robert F. Kaiko, vice president for clinical research wrote: “MS Contin® may eventually
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Dr. Portenoy went on to become a thought leader within the medical profession, heavily promoting the use of
opioids to treat chronic pain. In a video-taped interview with a medical colleague in 2010, Portenoy stated that he
“gave innumerable lectures in the late 1980s and 90s about addiction that weren’t true.” (Wall Street Journal,
December 2012).
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face such serious generic competition that other controlled-release opioids must be considered”
(Ryan et al., 2016). The result was OxyContin®, the active ingredient of which, oxycodone, is
derived from thebaine, an opioid alkaloid approximately 10 times stronger than morphine.
Although oxycodone has been in clinical use since 1917, the novelty and presumed
advantage of OxyContin® was its time-release mechanism which promised effective pain relief
for up to 12 hours, twice as long as the short-acting generic oxycodone formula. As with all
drugs, in order to receive FDA approval, Purdue were required to submit a new drug application
including results from completed clinical trials. Paradoxically, the FDA does not require that
new drugs be compared to the best existing therapies, and many trials are conducted by testing a
new product against a placebo. In one trial submitted as part of the approval package and
described in Abramson (2004), OxyContin® was tested against a placebo for pain relief following
knee replacement surgery. Divided into treatment and control groups, patients were either given
OxyContin® twice per day as a preemptive measure, or were given a twice-daily dose of a
placebo. Patients in both the treatment group and the control group were also able to request
additional pain relief,20 and the preemptive doses they were given were then tweaked depending
on their request for additional medication. The results of this study concluded that preemptive
use of OxyContin® resulted in improved pain control. However, as Abramson (2004) points out,
the study shows only that “treatment of moderate to very severe pain after knee replacement
surgery with preemptive doses of OxyContin® is superior to treatment with preemptive doses of
nothing.” (Abramson, 2004: 103). Nonetheless, in 1996, OxyContin® received approval from the
FDA and was aggressively marketed to doctors nationwide.

Patients who requested additional pain relief were give Percocet®, a quick acting oxycodone pill in a dose roughly
one sixth of the strength of the 24-hour dose of OxyContin®.
20
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OxyContin® was touted as a safe, long-acting pain medication for the non-malignant pain
market, and it was anticipated by both the FDA and Purdue that the controlled-release formula
would reduce the incidence of misuse and psychological dependence to the extent that the
original package insert stated the following: “delayed absorption, as provided by OxyContin®
tablets, is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug.” (Cicero et al., 2005: 662). Indeed,
pharmaceutical sales representatives for the company were trained to promote OxyContin® as
having a “less than one percent” risk of addiction (Meier, 2003: 99), an often cited statistic
stemming from the Porter and Jick (1980) letter referenced above. Utilizing a range of sales
strategies including all-expenses paid symposiums for prescribers and lucrative bonuses for sales
representatives (Van Zee, 2009), Purdue funded more than 20,000 educational programs relating
to pain-management in the six years following the release of the product (U.S. GAO, 2003). In
Massachusetts, Purdue donated $3 million to the Massachusetts General Hospital to support
educational activities, including continuing medical education, the curriculums of which had
been designed by Purdue to help doctors overcome their concerns about prescribing opioids,
specifically OxyContin®, for pain relief (Abramson, 2004). Further, through an agreement with
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), Purdue was the
only pharmaceutical company permitted to distribute selected pain management educational
materials, facilitating access to OxyContin® in hospitals (U.S. GAO, 2003).
To reiterate, oxycodone, the active ingredient in OxyContin®, is not a new drug; however,
the extended release formula with its promise of 12-hour pain relief made it attractive to
physicians for the treatment of chronic pain compared with generic short-acting oxycodone
formulas indicated to alleviate pain for a maximum period of six hours, as well as justifying its
considerably higher cost. But how effective is OxyContin®? A recent exposé by the Los Angeles
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Times suggests that, for many patients, OxyContin® does not work effectively for the full 12
hours, a fact the Times claims that Purdue was aware of, but have never acknowledged. Indeed,
following their review of 1000s of pages of documents, including internal emails and company
memos, the Times reports that, in response to their patients’ complaints, when doctors began
prescribing OxyContin® for a duration shorter than 12 hours, Purdue “mobilized hundreds of
sales reps to ‘refocus’ physicians on 12-hour dosing” encouraging medical providers to prescribe
stronger doses rather than more frequent ones (Los Angeles Times, 5 May 2016).
Further, despite Purdue’s assurances regarding the safety of OxyContin®, the mechanism
that enabled the dose to be time-released was not robust, and people using the drug soon
discovered that by rubbing or sucking the coating off the tablet and crushing, or dissolving the
tablet in water, the entire dose was immediately available, precipitating a potent high.
Regardless, sales exploded, and between 1996 and 2002, the number of prescriptions increased
from 316,786, valued at $44 million, to 7,234,204, valued at over $1.5 billion (U.S. GOA, 2003).
By 2004, OxyContin® was one of the most widely misused drugs in the U.S. (Van Zee, 2009).
The last decade has seen multiple law suits brought against Purdue and its affiliates,
sometimes with costly results. For example, in 2007, the company, along with three of their
executives, pled guilty to criminal charges that they had misrepresented the abuse potential and
risk of addiction related to OxyContin® and were instructed to pay more than $634 million in
fines (New York Times, 10 May 2007). Following the intense scrutiny of its product, in 2010
Purdue released a reformulated abuse-deterrent OxyContin® tablet designed to prevent the
medication from being crushed, chewed, dissolved, or otherwise tampered with. Although the
reformulation does seem to have reduced the incidence of OxyContin® misuse, data suggests that
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individuals who were using OxyContin® may have simply transferred to other types of opioid
analgesics (Cicero et al., 2012).
In their analysis of the problematization of the OxyContin® crisis, Whelan and Asbridge
(2013), report that findings from studies both in pain and addiction journals assigned
responsibility for the proper distribution of opioid analgesics to physicians, citing
overprescribing and a lack of follow-up or screening procedures for substance use issues. The
authors argue that by taking responsibility, physicians may be able to exert “clinical control
[emphasis in the original] over the problem, not merely clinical culpability; that is, if those who
treat pain are able to define and thereby ‘acknowledge’ the problem, they may also be
empowered to find ways to solve the problem as they have defined it.” (Whelan and Asbridge
2013: 406). However, this response presumes a lack of intentionality on the part of physicians,
and to date there remains limited understanding regarding how opioid-related corruption may
operate within the profession. While the role that doctors have played in prescribing opioids will
be explored further in Chapter 6, the 2010 OxyContin® formulation change and the subsequent
effect it had on the diverted opioid market will be explored in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER THREE: STUDY CONTEXT, DESIGN, AND METHOD

The data presented in this dissertation were collected as part of a qualitative interview
study conducted at the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
(NYCDOHMH) to examine opioid analgesic misuse in New York City21. The study aimed to
explore three key areas: (1) initiation into opioid analgesic misuse; (2) trajectory of use; and, (3)
mechanisms of diversion from medical to non-medical use. Qualitative methods were selected to
provide context to existing epidemiological data focusing on opioid analgesic prevalence,
morbidity, and mortality. Utilizing in-depth, face-to-face interviews, the purpose of this research
aimed to gain a deeper understanding of patterns of use and market dynamics from the
perspective of individuals with experience of opioid analgesic misuse, in order to explore
behavior that is often stigmatized among a hidden population.

Recruitment strategies
Because the study was conducted at NYCDOHMH, it was important that it be inclusive
of each of the five boroughs. However, epidemiological data also guided where to recruit
participants; for example, residents of Staten Island have the highest rate of unintentional drugpoisoning overdose involving opioid analgesics in New York City (10.7 per 100,000 residents),
four times higher than other boroughs (Paone, et al, 2014). Further, in 2010, Staten Island
residents had the highest rate of opioid analgesic prescriptions filled compared with the rest of
the city (Paone et al., 2012). Data also showed that residents of the wealthiest neighborhoods had
the highest rate of opioid analgesic-involved deaths in the city (Paone, et al, 2014). Thus, where

21

As co-investigator on the study, I was responsible for the overall design, implementation, and data collection.
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previous studies of persons who use opioid analgesics have often focused on street-based
populations (Lankenau et al., 2012a; Mars et al., 2014), who may be more visible and therefore
easier to access, this study aimed to reach a diverse sample not only geographically, but also
socioeconomically.
Persons who engage in what is considered to be deviant behavior (such as illicit
substance use) are regarded as part of a hidden population and therefore hard-to-reach (Magnani
et al., 2005). For this study, a number of different strategies were used to gain access to potential
participants. Initially, a colleague connected me with Maggie, a woman whose two adult children
had histories of opioid analgesic misuse. Maggie agreed to speak with me as a key informant,
and during my visit introduced me to Natalie, her 26-year old daughter. Natalie became the first
participant in the study and acted as an informal “gate-keeper” (Seidman, 2006) to those
members of her social network who also misused opioid analgesics. This scenario, during which
an individual enrolled in the study acted as gate-keeper to their social network played out
multiple times during fieldwork.
In some cases, finding a gate-keeper living in the community was not always possible,
and institutional alternatives were sought (see Flick, 2009). In neighborhoods that were difficult
to penetrate, staff from harm reduction programs and/or drug counseling services acted as gatekeepers to their clients and agreed to disseminate information about the study by displaying
posters in their waiting areas, or distributing fliers to clients who might be eligible for interview.
Posters and fliers contained information regarding the nature of the research, its confidentiality,
the approximate duration of the interview (1 hour), the amount of the honorarium ($30), and a
telephone number for interested persons to call.
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That the study was affiliated with NYCDOHMH likely facilitated this process, and
access to clients may have been granted with fewer hurdles than if the research had been
proposed by a non-governmental institution. However, government-funded research may also
have its pitfalls. Some of the agencies the research team contacted for help with finding
participants were also in contract with NYCDOHMH, and it is possible they may have felt an
obligation to assist in the research. Further, the fact that a City agency rather than an academic
institution led the study, could possibly have shaped some participants’ responses, as they may
have been suspicious of an underlying agenda. However, assuring anonymity through the waiver
of written consent is likely to have alleviated some of the unease participants may have had
regarding the government’s role in the research process.
In neighborhoods where no appropriate programs or services existed, posters were placed
in a variety of venue-based settings including, but not limited to: coffee shops, local restaurants,
and Laundromats. In addition to these strategies, street-based recruitment was conducted. This
involved visiting neighborhoods, or specific venues such as public parks or college campuses,
and administering a very short street-intercept survey to engage people in conversation regarding
the study and assess their eligibility to participate. Persons who completed this survey were
given a keychain flashlight as a token honorarium.
Recruitment to this study relied to a large extent on chain referrals also known as
“snowball” sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981), a technique commonly utilized in studies of
hidden-populations. This method requires existing study participants to refer individuals in their
social networks for interview, who in turn refer individuals from their own social networks, and
so on. In this study, participants were paid $10 for each successful referral. One limitation of
snowball sampling is that it can lead to selection bias, as members of social networks are likely
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to share some similar characteristics (e.g., sources of drugs). For example, individuals who most
actively referred to the study tended to be those entrenched in the street drug scene who typically
have few resources and to whom the possibility of earning a small referral fee is enticing. Indeed,
a study exploring how people who use drugs negotiated a more formal, but similar recruitment
procedure known as respondent-driven sampling (RDS) found that “an ‘underground’ stratified
marketplace of coupons and study-related services had cropped up.” (Scott, 2008). In this study,
limiting the number of referrals from each person to a maximum of five and receiving referrals
from many different “seeds” located in disparate neighborhoods minimized the risk of recruiting
homogenous samples.

Data collection
Data were collected via in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted and audiorecorded in private, semi-private, or public locations, usually chosen by the participant,
including: participants’ homes, coffee-shops, parks, cars, and rooms in community-based
organization. Although some of the interview settings turned out to be less than ideal in terms of
noise and seclusion, having participants select the interview time and location, and interviewing
where possible in situ, offered them some control over the interview process and enabled them to
select a space in which they felt comfortable to talk. Prior to the interview, participants
underwent a verbal consent procedure,22 including a detailed review of the study protocol, the
risks and benefits of participation, and the right to terminate their involvement at any time. No
identifying information was collected and the study was approved by the New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). A Federal

NYCDOHMH’s Institutional Review Board approved a waiver to collect written consent because of the sensitive
nature of the topics under discussion.
22
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Certificate of Confidentiality (CoC) from the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) was also
obtained to protect the identity of participants via audio recordings. Following the interview,
participants received an honorarium of $30 for their time.
The interview guide was semi-structured and incorporated questions intended to explore
participants’ experiences of opioid analgesic misuse, including: demographics; routes of
initiation and trajectory of use; pill acquisition; mechanisms of opioid analgesic diversion from
medical to non-medical use; and participation in the illicit opioid analgesic market. Utilizing a
semi-structured format meant that topics could be covered systematically while allowing
participants to answer in their own words (Kvale, 1996) resulting in a “purposeful” conversation
(Burgess, 1984; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This type of semi-structured format is particularly
useful for studies in which interviews are conducted by more than one person. Quinn suggests
that interviews are “the fullest and most decipherable records” researchers have (2005: 4) and
other scholars have noted that within their own work, the most comprehensive representation of
the prescription “drug-scene” was garnered from interviews with actors involved at a local level
(Inciardi et al., 2009a).

Sampling
Initially, interviews were conducted with individuals aged 18 years and older who were
resident in New York City, and who reported current or recent (within 12 months) opioid
analgesic misuse. However, as the study progressed, the eligibility criteria were expanded to
include current heroin users whose misuse of opioid analgesics had directly preceded their
initiation into heroin. This decision was based on emerging research suggesting that among new
initiates, pathways into heroin tend to start with opioid analgesic misuse (Inciardi et al., 2009b;
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Kuehn, 2013; Lankenau et al., 2012b; Mars et al., 2014), a trend that has significantly increased
during the past decade (Jones, 2013). Since trajectory of use was one of the key research
questions, it was important to include people who had transitioned from opioid analgesics into
heroin use as this has been a key area of concern among public health professionals. The 18-year
age requirement reflects the legal age at which research participants are able to provide informed
consent and, while it might have been possible to obtain a waiver to interview younger
participants, given that this was a retrospective study, it is unlikely that data collected from this
vulnerable group would have provided substantially different information than from older
participants reflecting back on their experiences.
Within these parameters, the sampling frame for this study developed as data was
collected and typologies began to emerge. Thus, sampling decisions were made “serially” and
based on previously collected data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This method of purposeful
sampling is a type of non-probability sampling that does not claim to be generalizable (Palys,
2008). In fact, some researchers have questioned the use of the term “sample” to describe
participants who are selected using purposive sampling, preferring instead to refer to them as
“panels” of individuals who have experienced a specific phenomenon or witnessed a particular
event (Weiss, 1994). As the study progressed, participants were purposefully selected depending
on several considerations, including both the extent of their involvement with opioid analgesics
and their previous drug histories, in order to capture the range of experiences relating to both
problematic and non-problematic use.
A total of 111 participants were consented into the study and interviewed. However,
following review of the interview transcripts, 18 were excluded from the final analysis for the
following reasons: the participants did not reside in New York City (n=2); they did not self-
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identify their use of opioid analgesics as misuse (n=2); they had only used heroin (n=5); they had
previously misused opioid analgesics but not within the previous 12-months (n=9).

Analytic procedure
The interviews, which lasted between 30 and 190 minutes, were audio-recorded,
professionally transcribed for analysis, and uploaded into Dedoose Version 7.0.23 (2016), a webbased tool to aid data management, coding and analysis. Additionally, following the interview, a
field note was written detailing the environment and setting in which the interview took place,
the method of recruitment, as well as the interviewers’ reflection on the interview process
(Emerson et al., 1995). The analytic process I utilized to make sense of the data presented in this
dissertation was heavily influenced by Guest et al.’s (2012) Applied Thematic Analysis. While
this method has many attributes in common with grounded theory and does not preclude
theoretical development, “its primary goal is to describe and understand how people feel, think,
and behave within a particular context relative to a specific research question” (2012: 13).
Through an iterative process, coding began with broad categories derived from the domains
incorporated within the interview protocol, for example, “first misuse of prescription opioids,”
“sources of opioid analgesics.” Careful reading of the data then produced inductive codes such as
“OxyContin® formulation change,” “OK to use pills,” and “pervasiveness of opioids.” Following,
codes were reviewed and refined, and organized into a hierarchy of themes and subthemes
generating a network of associations that guided the direction of the findings.
In order to minimize error or bias in the research process, Guba (1981) suggests four
guidelines relating to the “trustworthiness” of data. The first, credibility, encapsulates the idea
that the interpretation given to the data must resonate within the group from which it was
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gathered. During the data collection period, emerging observations were conveyed back to
individual participants serving as “member checks” (Guba, 1981: 80) to ensure that the findings
made sense to members of the population under study. The second principle, transferability,
suggests that although context cannot (and should not) be removed from the phenomena, where
there are “essential similarities” (Guba, 1981: 81) the data may be transferable. As analysis
progressed, themes were compared between groups of participants who presented with similar
characteristics—for example, those with similar demographics, social structures, or pathways
into use—to develop typologies or classifications that may form the basis of future hypotheses.
The third and fourth tenets, dependability and confirmability, were addressed by way of an “audit
trail” (Guba, 1981: 87). This involved keeping detailed records of the research process, including
transcripts, memos, and discussion notes, and frequently discussing the analytic process and
findings with colleagues to assess whether the approach I had taken was appropriate.

Ethical considerations
Given the sensitive nature of the topics and the fact that most drug use in the U.S. is
illegal, it was essential to protect the identity of participants. As previously described, the NYC
DOHMH IRB issued a waiver for written consent; individuals did not have to provide any
identifying details and could participate in the study anonymously. In addition, a Federal
Certificate of Confidentiality from the National Institute of Health was issued to the study to
protect participants against possible identification via the audio recording. By protecting
researchers and institutions from being compelled to disclose information that would identify
research subjects, CoCs help achieve the research objectives and promote participation in studies
by assuring confidentiality and privacy to participants. All research protocols, including the
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verbal informed consent script describing the risks and benefits of the study and the interview
schedule, were described to participants were approved by the NYC DOHMH IRB.
Study participants were 18 years of age or older, and therefore legally entitled to provide
their informed consent. After consent was obtained, participants were assigned a numeric ID
code which was used as a name for the digital file of the interview audio-recording and the
subsequent interview transcript. The electronic transcripts and digital audio-recordings of the
interview were stored on an end user device protected by a strong password. The findings
presented here are reported without identifying information, and all names reported are
pseudonyms.
Some researchers have questioned the ethics of paying cash honorariums to persons who
use drugs for their participation in studies relating to substance use and propose gift cards or food
vouchers as alternatives (Brody and Waldron, 2000). Proponents of cash payments, on the other
hand, argue that denying persons who use drugs cash payments is paternalistic and reinforces
negative stereotypes (Ritter et al., 2003). While gift cards or vouchers may be the only form of
compensation for research participants permitted by some grant-awarding bodies or institutions,
substituting cash payments simply because the participants are persons who use drugs does not
comply with the principles of respect and dignity that should be afforded to research participants
and those in this study were paid an honorarium of $30 in cash to compensate them for their time
and any out-of-pocket expenses they may have incurred as a result of their involvement in the
study.
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Sample characteristics
The final sample consisted of 93 participants: 33 women and 60 men with ages ranging
from 18 to 62 years. A full description of the sample can be found in Table 1 below. Of note are
the number of people who self-reported stable housing (84.9%), current employment (37.6%),
and educational attainment beyond a high school diploma or the Tests of General Educational
Development (GED) (59.1%). Samples from other recent qualitative studies of persons who
misuse opioids that have tended to include participants with greater housing instability, lower
educational attainment, and less employment (Lankenau et al., 2012a; Mars et al., 2014; MateuGelabert et al., 2015). In Chapters 4, 6, and 7, I utilize the full data set from all participant
interviews. In Chapter 5, I focus on a subset of participants who first misused opioid analgesics
prior to any subsequent use of heroin.

57

Table 1: Demographic characteristics of participants (N=93)
N (%)
93 (100%)

Total
Age (median, range)
Median
Range
Gender
Female
Male
Race/ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White
Non-Hispanic Black
Latino/a
Multi-racial
Native American
Sexual orientation
Heterosexual/Straight
Gay/Lesbian
Bisexual
Undecided
Educational attainment
Did not complete high school
High school graduate/GED
Further education
Borough of residence
Brooklyn
Bronx
Manhattan
Queens
Staten Island
Housing
Own home
Family home
Friend’s home
Sheltered/supportive housing
Street homeless
Employment
Full- or part-time
Student
Unemployed
Disability/unemployment insurance

30 years
18 to 62
33 (35.4%)
60 (64.5%)
57 (61.2%)
12 (12.9%)
20 (21.5%)
3 (3.2%)
1 (1.1%)
82 (88.2%)
6 (6.5%)
4 (4.3%)
1 (1.1%)
13 (13.9%)
26 (27.9%)
54 (58.0%)
26 (27.9%)
20 (21.5%)
15 (16.1%)
14 (15.1%)
18 (19.4%)
41 (44.0%)
30 (32.3%)
6 (6.5%)
14 (15.0%)
2 (2.1%)
35 (37.6%)
10 (10.8%)
31 (33.3%)
17 (18.2%)
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CHAPTER FOUR: PATHWAYS INTO OPIOID ANALGESIC MISUSE

As a result of the factors described in Chapter 2, the rate of opioid analgesic misuse in the
U.S. has increased dramatically. Results from the 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health
(NSDUH) reported that an estimated 4.3 million people aged 12 or older, representing 1.6
percent of the population, currently use opioid analgesics non-medically (SAMHSA, 2015). The
misuse use of these drugs now constitutes the second most common form of illicit drug use after
cannabis (SAMHSA, 2012). However, while prevalence has been well-documented, there is less
information about the context and circumstances in which individuals begin to misuse opioid
analgesics. This chapter explores the circumstances of initiation into opioid analgesic misuse,
examining both motivation and source of pills at the point of initiation, as it is only by
considering these factors in tandem that the etiology of opioid analgesic misuse can fully be
understood.
Previous studies of opioid analgesic misuse have tended to incorporate initiation events
into a broader analysis of trajectories of misuse with samples stratified by demographic subtypes
including age (Cicero et al., 2012; Funk et al., 2014), gender (Green et al., 2009), or university
enrollment (McCabe et al., 2009). Other research has focused on user characteristics such as
chronic pain (Liebschutz et al., 2010), drug use history (Daniulaityte et al., 2009; Wu et al.,
2010), or mental health issues (Dowling et al., 2006) as constraints for inclusion and analysis.
However, while identifying individuals’ trajectories of misuse, these studies often overlook the
circumstances of an individual’s primary initiation event. Further, collectively these studies are
based on survey data, which lacks the capacity for an in-depth exploration of the context and
circumstances of the drug initiation event.

59

Research reporting on the circumstances in which opioid analgesic misuse is initiated has
highlighted several factors. For example, Mui and colleagues (2014) found that participants
described the normalization of drug use in social settings; however, as their study focused on
several different categories of prescription medication in addition to opioids, including
stimulants and benzodiazepines, it is difficult to pinpoint whether normalization of drug use
related specifically to opioid initiation or was more aligned with other drug types. Similarly,
while focusing broadly on motivations for misuse of prescription pills, including opioid
analgesics, a mixed-method study by Rigg and Ibañez (2010) failed to capture the circumstances
of initiation. Other studies that have more closely examined initiation events have included
individuals who had a history of heroin use prior to first misusing opioid analgesics
(Daniulaityte et al., 2006; Rigg and Murphy, 2013) and as such are likely to have had a different
initiation experience than those who at the time of first misuse were opioid naïve. 23
In their review of prescription opioid misuse among adolescents, McCabe and Boyd
(2012) suggest that, to date, national surveys have omitted questions that might illuminate
motivations for prescription drug misuse. The authors subsequently propose four scenarios in
which adolescents may engage with opioid analgesic misuse: (1) using someone else’s
prescription medications to self-treat a medical condition; (2) using someone else’s prescription
medications for other motives; (3) misusing their own prescription medications to self-treat a
medical condition, and (4) misusing their own prescription medications for other motives.
However, having posited this framework, their later work differentiates predominantly between
medical misuse and nonmedical use defined as follows: “medical misuse is the use of prescribed

I use “opioid naïve” here to indicate that while members of this group may have previously taken opioid
analgesics under medical supervision, they had not previously misused any type of opioid including pain pills or
heroin and had not developed an opioid tolerance.
23
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opioids by a patient with a prescription for an opioid analgesic who uses the prescription in a
manner not intended by the prescriber;” whereas “nonmedical use of prescription opioids is
defined as the use of someone else’s prescription opioids” (McCabe et al., 2013: 1208), thus
within these definitions the organizing principle relates to the source of the medication, rather
than the intent of misuse. In keeping with McCabe and Boyd’s earlier framework, I would argue
that exploring motivation and source in tandem is crucial to better understand pathways into
opioid analgesic misuse.
For the purposes of this study, I defined opioid analgesic misuse as taking opioid
analgesics for the experience or feeling they caused or taking them in any manner other than that
prescribed by a doctor, including: taking medication beyond the cessation of pain; selfmedication for a different injury/health condition; or mixing medication with other substances
for euphoric effect. Initiation events as described by participants were organized with
consideration to the four-pronged framework put forward by McCabe and Boyd (2012), rather
than by the dual categories referenced in their later work (McCabe et al., 2013). Further, the
sample was stratified into two distinct groups: participants who were opioid naïve at the point of
first opioid analgesic misuse (i.e., new opioid initiates) (n=63); and participants who had a
history of heroin use prior to their initiation into opioid analgesic misuse (n=30). As referenced
earlier in this chapter, this distinction has often been overlooked in the literature but is important
to consider. Results from these disparate groups are therefore presented separately, with
differences in demographics shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: Demographics of new opioid initiates and experienced heroin users (N=93)
Total

New opioid initiates

N (%)
93 (100%)

N (%)
63 (100%)

Experienced heroin
users
N (%)
30 (100%)

30 years
18 to 62 years

22 years
18 to 58 years

45 years
28 to 62 years

33 (35.4%)
60 (64.5%)

22 (35.0%)
41 (65.0%)

11 (36.7%))
19 (63.3%))

Non-Hispanic White

57 (61.2%)

48 (76.2%)

9 (30.0%)

Non-Hispanic Black

12 (12.9%)

2 (3.2%)

10 (33.3%)

Latino/a

16 ( 17.2%)

7 (11.1%)

9 (30.0%)

4 (4.3%)
1 (1.1%)

3 (4.8%)
0 (0.0%)

1 (3.3%)
1 (3.3%)

82 (88.2%)
6 (6.5%)
4 (4.3%)
1 (1.1%)

54 (86.1%)
5 (7.9%)
3 (4.8%)
1 (1.6%)

28 (93.3%)
1 (3.3%)
1 (3.3%)
0 (0.0%)

13 (13.9%)
26 (27.9%)
54 (58.0%)

6 (9.5%)
19 (30.2%)
38 (60.3%)

7 (23.3%)
7 (23.3%)
16 (53.3%)

26 (27.9%)
20 (21.5%)
15 (16.1%)
14 (15.1%)
18 (19.4%)

23 (36.5%)
7 (11.1%)
7 (11.1%)
8 (12.7%)
18 (28.6%)

3 (10.0%)
13 (43.3%)
8 (26.7%)
6 (20.0%)
0 (0.0%)

41 (44.0%)
30 (32.3%)
6 (6.5%)
14 (15.0%)
2 (2.1%)

29 (46.0%)
26 (41.3%)
4 (6.4%)
3 (4.8%)
1 (1.6%)

12 (40.0%)
4 (13.3%)
2 (6.7%)
11 (36.7%)
1 (3.3%)

35 (37.6%)
10 (10.8%)
31 (33.3%)
17 (18.2%)

26 (41.3%)
10 (15.9%)
22 (35.0%)
5 (7.9%)

9 (30.0%)
0 (0.0%)
9 (30.0%)
12 (40.0%)

Total
Age (median, range)
Median
Range
Gender
Female
Male
Race/ethnicity

Multi-racial
Native American
Sexual orientation
Heterosexual/Straight
Gay/Lesbian
Bisexual
Undecided
Educational attainment
Did not complete high school
High school graduate/GED
Further education
Borough of residence
Brooklyn
Bronx
Manhattan
Queens
Staten Island
Housing
Own home
Family home
Partner/Friend’s home
Sheltered/supportive housing
Street homeless
Employment
Full- or part-time
Student
Unemployed
Disability/unemployment
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In this sample, the group I have termed “new opioid initiates,” i.e., those who had not
used heroin prior to their misuse of opioid analgesics, tended to be younger than the experienced
heroin user group with a median of 22 compared to 45 years. Members of this group were also
more likely to be white, and educated beyond high school. Data from national surveys shows that
opioid analgesic misuse is more prevalent among individuals who identify as white (4.6%) and
Hispanic (4.5%) as compared with those who identify as black (3.8%) (SAMHSA, 2011). In
contrast, in New York City, higher rates of heroin use historically have been associated with
black and brown communities (Frank, 2000). While this sample is not representative of the
broader population of people who misuse opioid analgesics, it is worth mentioning that despite
efforts, young black and Latino/a opioid misusers are under-represented in this study.

Initiating opioid analgesic misuse with the intent to get high (Non-medical initiates)
Non-medical initiates (n=44) typically began using opioid analgesics as part of a
trajectory of drug experimentation, often while in their teens, and following the use of other
substances such as alcohol and/or marijuana. Mostly, young, affluent, and white, many
participants in this group reported that prescription pills, including opioids and
benzodiazepines,24 were widely available in their social networks, and several spoke specifically
about a high school culture in which the non-medical use of prescription medications was
normalized to the extent they were considered equivalent to other “low-risk” substances.
Although for a couple of participants in this group, the source of pills was a prescription written
in their name and obtained as the result of illness or injury, the defining characteristic of nonmedical initiates was that they intended to misuse opioid analgesics for their psychoactive effect

24

Benzodiazepines (e.g., alprazolam, diazepam, and lorazepam) are central nervous system depressants often
prescribed for anxiety. Common brand names include Xanax®, Klonopin®, and Valium®.
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rather than to mitigate pain, regardless of whether the pills they first misused came from their
own prescription, or another source. As Eliza (white, aged 24), commented:

Everyone loves Percocet® and Vicodin®. They may do and it’s not super scary or
anything, and you know, prescription pills were really trendy and friendly in college and
even in high school. . . Like why I mean they’re friendly is that all these kids I went to
school with, their parents had them in their medicine cabinet while they were growing up,
and so, you know, everyone knew what they were and they were kind of naturalized.

The majority of participants who initiated opioid analgesics in a recreational context first
used opioid analgesics in the presence of someone who had already experimented with the drug.
Typically, these participants recalled that their interest in opioids had been stimulated by
references to opioid use found in popular culture (for example, the rapper, Eminem), or by
member(s) of their peer group who, having previously tried opioids, were able to speak to their
effect. Donna (white, aged 20), described how she initiated opioid analgesics with her best friend
when she was 15 years old.

We were at my house, and we were just sitting there, and I was asking her about it
because I had heard she was doing pills. And she was like, “Just try it, just try it, it’s
really not that serious. It’s just like alcohol, really just try it.” And she crushed, like half
of it, on my table and I sniffed it and I didn’t get sick. Like I’ve seen a lot of people when
they try it, they throw up. I didn’t get sick, I didn’t get anything. I just felt great . . . I
don’t remember being nervous. . . I just didn’t think, I didn’t think anything. I just did it,
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and then after that, the feeling of it overrode any thoughts of, I’m doing something
wrong, you know?

Witnessing, or hearing about a friend or peer’s reaction to opioid analgesics often served
to reduce the potential anxiety of a new drug experience, and as scholars have commented,
observing social group members engaging in a particular activity or action, including drug use,
can serve to normalize a behavior (Measham et al., 1994; Shildrick, 2002). Research has also
shown that many education-based substance abuse programs delivered in a school setting are at
best inadequate and at worst may serve to encourage drug experimentation. For example, studies
examining the efficacy of the Drug Abuse Resistance Program (commonly known as DARE),
found small negative effects in drinking and smoking potentially due to an over-emphasis on the
most extreme and/or damaging aspects of drug use (Werch and Owen, 2002; Sloboda, 2009).
Following, the risks associated with the misuse of pharmaceutical drugs that may legitimately be
supplied by a doctor often seemed overblown to patients. An example of this is Jason (white,
aged 21), who first tried opioid analgesics as a freshman in high school and recounted how he
became aware of pain pills after seeing other kids using them. Already a regular user of alcohol
and marijuana, Jason was “open-minded” about drugs and interested in having a new experience.

And I remember, I guess, a couple of the older kids in the school, they had little pills in
their hand, the little blue pills. And they were popping them. And I was just curious, like
What’s that? And they’re like, “Yo, this thing will fuck you up. This is a 30 [mg] right
here. These are the best.” And I was just like, “Alright, how much are they?” They’re
like “$20” I was like, “Alright” And they were like, “Yeah, but you got to take half first.
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You can’t take the whole thing if it’s your first time, blah, blah, blah.” And I remember I
took half. I went to class. It kicked in. I felt amazing! And about a minute after I felt
amazing, I got this overwhelming feeling I was going to throw up. I remember running
outside, running out from of the school and puking in front of the school.

Experiencing both positive and negative drug effects was a common theme among nonmedical initiates, and “first-time” narratives often included incidents of nausea or vomiting.
Although in some cases the sickness participants’ suffered acted as a temporary deterrent to
further opioid misuse, for most, the pleasurable effect of the high outweighed the unpleasant
consequences. Indeed, for some participants, vomiting as a result of opioid use became part of
their drug-taking culture, in a similar vein to suffering physical sickness as a result of excessive
alcohol use. Another advantage cited by some participants was that, compared with alcohol, they
could get high on pain pills and not lose control. That is, where other substances including
alcohol would cause them to “get stupid,” opioid analgesics allowed them to be fully aware of
their surroundings even when in the thick of an altered state.
The perceived social benefits non-medical initiates gained from misusing opioid
analgesics was an important factor driving their use and for some young male participants, the
heightened confidence engendered by opioid analgesics had the added dimension of enhancing
sexual performance. Indeed, in some cases, it was the possibility of increasing sexual stayingpower that piqued the interest of some participants to first misuse opioid analgesics. Reflecting
on the circumstances of his initiation, Joe (white, aged 20), recounted that the enticement of an
enjoyable high in and of itself would not have been enough to induce him to use these pills.
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However, when a friend told him that opioids would increase his sexual stamina, he became
interested in trying them.

The kid told me all about it. And at first the way I was put onto it was “Listen, if you take
half of one of these, or even a quarter, it’ll make you fuck like a...” excuse my language,
but it makes you last, and it makes you have really good sex. So that was the incentive to
take it the first time, because if he would’ve said “Oh, it’s going to make you feel good”
I’d be like “Nah.”. . . the incentive was “Keep a little quarter of the pill. Every time you
have sex, eat it and then you’ll fuck forever.” So I think that's a lot of the reasons why
people first started taking, but then it quickly grows from there. The second you feel that
opiate high and what it does to your body you like it, you really like it.

The potential for enhancing a sexual experience was not only true for young men. Grace,
(white, aged 23), who initiated opioid analgesics non-medically described how taking pills had
impacted having sex with her boyfriend.

[Opioid analgesics] make you horny too, so I used to like to have sex. . . It’s not like I
take a Roxy [oxycodone 30mg] and I need to [have sex], but when I’m with my boyfriend
or whatever, yeah, like it’s like the dick just doesn’t go down. It just stays hard and they
don’t come. It’ll take hours. And it makes your body so numb. So it’s like you could take,
you know, you want it as hard as they can give it.
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While improved sexual performance was a motivating factor for some participants’ initiation,
there is currently very little literature relating to this phenomenon. An exception is MateuGelabert and colleagues (2015) who found that some male and female participants in their study
of young opioid users reported enhanced sexual experience after taking opioid analgesics;
however, findings from this study did not link this to the initiation of opioid use per se. Indeed,
opioid use has typically been associated with decreased sexual functioning, especially among
individuals who use long-term and may have developed a substance use disorder (Deyo, et al.,
2013; Hallinan et al., 2008), and sexual performance as a driver for initiation should be
incorporated into any future public health prevention messaging.
Although most participants who initiated opioid analgesic misuse non-medically did so in
a social setting with the intention of having a shared drug experience, some first used while they
were alone. Natalie (white, aged 26) was 18 when she tried pain pills, and her pathway into
misuse began only after she had been selling oxycodone for several months. Working behind the
deli counter of a local store, Natalie encountered an old family friend who suggested she could
make good money selling Percocet®—which he would supply—within her peer network. Over
time, her customers’ enthusiasm for the pills she was selling piqued Natalie’s curiosity and alone
in her car, she tried one for the first time.

I was working in a deli and he [family friend] came into the store and someone at the
counter was talking about pills. That’s how he started the conversation. He was like,
“You could probably get rid of all these pills.” I didn’t want to work in the deli anymore,
I was getting ready to go to college, so I said “Alright, what do I have to do?”. . . He was
giving me maybe 500 in a zip lock bag. . . Perc 10s, and I was getting rid of them.
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Everybody wanted them. And then I got curious, like why does everybody want these
fucking things, so I did one and it was like the greatest feeling in the world, to me
anyway, you know. I didn’t like drinking, I didn’t like pot, so when everybody was doing
these things, I was doing nothing. Now, all of a sudden this pill, it kind of made you feel
like gummy in a way, like you were just waltzing around, happy, you know.

While the intent of individuals who first misused opioid analgesics in a recreational
context was to get high, the point at which members of this group first misused was often not
their first experience taking these drugs. Indeed, many had previously been prescribed opioid
analgesics for an illness or injury but at the time, had taken them as directed by the physician,
even if they had experienced some effect beyond the alleviation of pain. In his seminal work on
controlled drug use, Zinberg theorizes that when examining why and how people use drugs, three
factors must be considered, including: “drug (the pharmacologic action of the substance itself),
set (the attitude of the person at the time of use, including his personality structure), and setting
(the influence of the physical and social setting within which the use occurs)” (Zinberg, 1984: 5).
Thus an individual’s experience taking opioids prescribed by a doctor to treat pain is likely to be
qualitatively different from the same individual’s experience taking opioids supplied by a friend
in a social setting. An example of this phenomenon was recounted by Miranda (Latina, aged 30).
Prior to misusing opioid analgesics, Miranda had been prescribed opioids on two occasions; the
first after having her wisdom teeth pulled, the second having broken her collar bone. Although
Miranda acknowledged the relaxing feeling the opioids gave her while recovering from these
previous injuries, it was not until she took the drug in a social setting that she felt what she
described as a more “intense” effect.
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For some reason I guess, it seemed like it was different when… I think maybe ‘cause I
was older, and also ‘cause I didn’t have any pain and I wasn’t lying around. I was out
doing some things, like during the day, you know? We went out to see a concert, you
know, and regular things. That was like, yeah, it was weird. . . I guess I just noticed like
Oh wow, these things make you really high.

For Miranda, previous exposure to opioids in a medical context may have reduced the
potential anxiety associated with taking a new drug which can sometimes result in the user
experiencing a diminished or different drug effect. Further, taking opioid analgesics under the
care of a doctor without experiencing euphoria may have lessened her expectations of how she
would feel, contributing to a relaxed state that conversely enabled a more pronounced high.
According to Zinberg (1984), the decision to use an opioid is associated with anxiety relating to
all three of the determinants, drug, set, and setting. However, as illustrated by these descriptions
of initiation events, the stigma and potential fear of using opioid analgesics largely appears to
have been moderated by their widespread use for warranted medical treatment.

Sources of pills at the point of initiation
The majority of non-medical initiates, that is, individuals whose motivation to misuse
opioid analgesics was to get high, obtained the opioid analgesics they first misused from
members of their social network for free. This reflects findings from the NSDUH (SAMSHA,
2012) suggesting that 54 percent of people who report misusing opioid analgesics in the past
year obtained their pills from family and friends. The interpretation of these findings has often
been that many people acquire pills through one degree of separation from a prescription, that is,
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Person X receives a prescription for Percocet®, and subsequently Person Y acquires a pill directly
from her/him. Indeed, many public health campaign messages have been predicated on this
understanding and have included sustained efforts to educate the public regarding the safe
disposal of “leftover” medication, for example, the DEA’s National Prescription Drug TakeBack Day, where designated drop-off boxes are established on a few days of the year so that the
public may dispose of any type of unwanted prescription medications in their possession. While
tracing back sources of pills beyond participants’ own acquisition was not possible, data from
this study suggest that, in addition to obtaining pills for free from family and friends’
prescriptions, opioid analgesics were actively traded and sold beyond intimate social networks.
Moreover, for some non-medical initiates (n=5) opioid analgesic misuse occurred only after they
had begun selling pills in volume and for profit, which they had acquired from a dealer, and not
through their own or a family member’s prescription.
Only two individuals who first misused opioid analgesics with the intent of getting high
had used pills remaining from a warranted prescription written in their name, and in both cases,
they were encouraged to do so by members of their social group. Stephanie (white, aged 30),
first misused opioid analgesics in her early 20s with a prescription she received from her doctor
following knee surgery. Straight-edged25 for most of her school days, Stephanie had no idea that
her medication could be used for recreational purposes until encouraged by her roommates.

That was in college, and yeah, I was doing it really just to catch a buzz, and I just liked
the feeling that it gave me, and it relaxed me. [My friends] are the ones who kind of
introduced it to me. They were like “Oh, because you have Vicodin®, let’s take some.

“Straight-edged” refers to a philosophy of living that advocates abstinence from drugs including tobacco and
alcohol.
25
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Give us one.”. . . These were my roommates too, and we were all close, so I didn’t mind
giving them a couple, but yeah, they were pretty much the ones that introduced me that
you can take this when you’re not in pain and you’ll feel good. . . Telling me a different
way to use it.

For both these participants, their initiation into opioid analgesic misuse was distinct from
the treatment they received from their physician, occurring only after their pain had abated. In
cases such as these, encouraging physicians to adopt judicious prescribing guidelines, including
key messages advising the use of lower doses for shorter duration, may go some way to reducing
the pool of available opioid analgesic pills that are subsequently misused. However, there has
been tremendous resistance to these types of guidelines from industry-funded groups, such as the
U.S. Pain Foundation, which cautioned that future access to pain medications could be limited as
a result.

Medical initiates
In contrast to non-medical initiates who first misused opioid analgesics to get high, the
intent of medical initiates (n=19) was to alleviate pain. The majority of participants in this group
first misused pills from their own prescription written to them to treat a warranted illness or
injury, either while still under the care of a physician or with surplus pills left over from a
previous prescription. Less often, participants in this group had acquired the opioid analgesics
they first misused from a close family member to self-treat acute pain such as a headache or
sprained ankle and, in contrast to the non-medical initiates described above, it is notable that no
medical initiates had obtained the pills they first misused from friends.
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For individuals who began misusing opioid analgesics while under medical supervision,
first misuse often occurred early in their course of treatment. A typical example is Mike (white,
aged 34) who, at the time of interview, had been misusing pain pills for more than 10 years and
had recently transitioned to heroin. At age 22, Mike tore his bicep tendon, an injury that rendered
him unable to continue his daily gym workout schedule. To treat the pain, he was prescribed a
30-day supply of oxycodone with acetaminophen which he started misusing a couple of days
later. Although Mike initially increased his dose because of the pain, he also enjoyed the feeling
the pills gave him. He recalled:

. . . I was in very good shape and the gym was my life. Like I was taking steroids, I was in
very good shape and [after the injury] I couldn’t work out. And I felt so depressed
because I felt like everything I worked for got taken away, and I couldn’t go to the gym. I
couldn’t do what I wanted, what I loved. . . I took them because of the pain, but like I
said, I was depressed, so I was taking more than I actually needed. And I liked the
feeling. I liked to be able to just go to sleep. . . I liked the feeling but I wanted more of it
obviously, I just, you know, I did feel the pain go away, but I liked the warm feeling, that
relaxed feeling. . . It put me to sleep so I wouldn’t have to think about the position I was
in, that I couldn’t work out. So that was mainly it. Like I would wake up, take [opioid
analgesics], and go back to sleep. I was, I think very depressed. . . Because [the injury]
took away what I loved. I was a gym rat. I was in the gym all the time. I was very into my
health, you know, plus I was taking a lot of steroids. I started taking steroids when I was
16, and I was very into it. I was very vain if you want to say. To take that away from me
depressed me.
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Similarly, Neil (white, aged 22), began to misuse opioid analgesics following an accident
in which he broke both his ankles. Only 14 years old when the accident occurred, Neil was
prescribed opioid analgesics for several months to ease the pain associated with his injuries.
During the course of his treatment, Neil’s mother kept careful track, and administered his
medication as directed by his physician. However, when his ankles healed and the prescription
ran out, Neil experienced symptoms of opioid withdrawal that prompted him to seek out pills
from other sources, including hospital emergency rooms where he would present with fake
symptoms in order to receive pain medication. He described his trajectory below:

First they gave me Tylenol 3 codeines and then after that they upped me. I think they
were five milligram Percocets®. . . I was prescribed for a couple of months because I was
in a wheelchair, then I was on crutches and then I had a cane. . . I couldn’t stretch my
legs, I had cramps, I remember waking up in the middle of the night screaming in pain
because I had a leg cramp that I couldn’t get up and stretch, I couldn’t walk it off. So I
was just sitting there for like half an hour just in terrible pain until my medication finally
kicked in because I’d woken up in the middle of the night. And then from that point, I was
just hooked. . . My mom tried to wean me off of it. And I was doing okay but I was living
in [Anonymous], and it wasn't like it was difficult to find [opioid analgesics]. So, I'd say
probably by the time I was 16, a Junior in high school, I was taking it regularly even
though I didn't need it. I was going to hospital telling them I had… [I] went to the
hospital once, told them that I had a testicular torsion and I went to like four different
hospitals to get medication from them.
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For Mike and Neil—both of whom ended up misusing opioid analgesics on a daily basis
for extended periods of time—the etiology of their substance use disorder was arguably
iatrogenic. However, during the current opioid crisis, cases of “iatrogenic addiction” have
largely been sidestepped in the literature, and as Beauchamp and colleagues (2014) suggest, no
recent articles that allude to this phenomena have “explicitly called for a disambiguated
determination of the role of inadvertent iatrogenic addiction as opposed to the role of intentional
misuse and diversion” (Beauchamp et al., 2014: 2023). Further, although the meaning of
“iatrogenic” appears straightforward, there is a lack of consensus among clinicians regarding the
constitution and processes that result in “iatrogenic addiction.” Indeed as Ballantyne suggests, “it
seems that iatrogenic addiction is simply what the reporting person says it is” (Ballantyne, 2006:
1249). In my view, this lack of willingness on the part of much of the medical community to
fully acknowledge and/or take responsibility for the current opioid crisis is deeply troubling.
Musto (1984) suggests three categories relating to iatrogenic addiction following the
prescribing of psychotropic substances, such as anxiolytics or opioid analgesics, including: (1)
inadvertent addiction, when a doctor prescribes a substance that is not yet known for its addictive
properties; (2) negligent addiction, when a doctor prescribes in response to a patient’s request or
desire for a psychotropic medication, or to maximize his/her business in a competitive health
delivery system; (3) intentional iatrogenic addiction, which includes the prescribing of opioids
for end-of-life or cancer pain. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, although some physicians do
engage in practices that could be deemed negligent, current prescribing trends—determined in
part by aggressive pharmaceutical marketing, a recent emphasis on patient satisfaction surveys
which typically include an assessment of pain relief, and changes in the administration of health
care (Beauchamp, 2014)—have given rise to another category that Musto’s typologies fail to
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address, including patients who are prescribed opioid analgesics as a result of a warranted injury
or illness and become dependent on these drugs as a result of inadequate screening or treatment
follow-up. Thus, while iatrogenic addiction is often only considered in light of chronic pain
therapy because of the increased risks from prolonged exposure, treating patients with opioids
for acute pain may also result in misuse and dependence (Beauchamp et al, 2014).
Anna (white, aged 35), illustrates how the routine prescribing of opioid analgesics for
acute pain may result in downstream substance use issues. Anna’s first experience with opioid
analgesics followed a diagnosis of kidney stones, for which she was prescribed Percocet® 5mg.
Initially she took the medication as directed, but after the condition had resolved, Anna used the
remaining pills on an occasional basis to treat other minor ailments such as headaches and joint
pains. Following weeks of sporadic use, Anna came to realize that in addition to alleviating her
pain, opioid analgesics engendered a feeling of wellbeing, and she began to take a pill simply to
enhance a quiet night in front of the television. While contemplating when she had first made the
connection that opioid analgesics did more than alleviate her pain, Anna said:

. . . It was within a couple of months afterwards. I can’t really pinpoint a moment, but I
think part of it too was that even with the pain, the pain would be gone, and I’d be like
“Oh, I feel fabulous!” You know, so it was kind of concurrent. [The pills made me feel]
relaxed. I think also at that point because it was converging at the time when I stopped
working, I had a lot of anxiety about what the future was gonna hold, what am I doing, so
it just… everything relaxed. And I’m an anxious person by nature so this idea that my
head was not running was the best part of it, besides the fact that I just sunk into this
wonderful slumber, like a body slumber kind of thing.

76

When her initial prescription ran out, Anna requested, and was given a second
prescription from her doctor to treat the joint pain she was also experiencing, which she then was
able to renew each month. However, by now Anna was taking multiple tablets a day and
recalled: “It got to the point where I would go to work [high]. I mean I’d be on conference calls
and this and that. No one ever saw. It was always like I just had my own little secret happiness.”
Anna continued to receive a prescription from her doctor every month for almost a year. Because
she took more than the prescribed dose, she consistently ran out of medication before her next
prescription was due. However, unlike other participants, she did not seek out opioid analgesics
from an additional source or ask her doctor for additional pills, but rather held off refilling her
prescription until the appropriate time had passed.26
A second category of medical initiates includes individuals who did not have their own
prescription, but who obtained pills from someone for the purpose of self-treating acute pain.
While McCabe and colleagues (2013) define this scenario as “non-medical” use, I argue that
since the intention of use is to treat pain, when considering pathways into misuse, this group
should be incorporated under the medical rubric. The initiation experiences of these individuals
tended to be very different from those initiating non-medically in that pills were typically used at
home, often when the person was alone, and in every case were acquired from close family
rather than friends. Jordan (white, aged 21), whose mother was prescribed opioid analgesics for
chronic back pain describes his initiation event:

26

Medical providers ought not to provide a patient with a refill for a Schedule II medication without an in-person
office visit. Presenting to a doctor before the duration of a filled prescription has passed, i.e., receiving a 30-day
opioid prescription, but requesting a refill prior to a 30-day period, is considered by many practitioners to be a
warning sign that a patient is misusing their medication.
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I had a really bad migraine. And I asked my mother where the ibuprofen was, that I have
a bad headache. She said it was upstairs on the dresser. And at that time, she was getting
Percocet® 10mgs, the yellow ones. And they sort of look like ibuprofen. And I had a
headache. I didn’t even look at the bottle, and at that time, she wasn’t hiding her
medication because I wasn’t stealing them at that time. And I went up and I didn’t even
look at the bottle, I just saw a big bottle of pills which I assumed were ibuprofen and took
two of them. And I was watching a movie. And in about 20 minutes my headache
completely went away and I started to feel better. And in about five or ten minutes from
then, I felt great. I got a euphoric feeling from my stomach emanating throughout my
whole body. I couldn’t even feel my legs. And when I was smoking a cigarette it was just
delicious, you know. And I was like, What the fuck? I was like, I feel amazing! and I
looked at the bottle and it said Endocet®27 10 milligrams. And I said Oh shit! you know,
these are hers. I heard kids in my neighborhood talk about them and how they get you
high, and that was my introduction to prescription opiates.

Although the circumstances of initiation for members of this group differed, the
commonality of their experience was that they had first misused opioid analgesics to treat pain
without the intention to get high. However, many medical initiates went on to misuse opioid
analgesics for the positive emotional feelings they experienced when taking the medication and,
as I shall illustrate in the following chapters, some went on to drug-seek, often exaggerating or
prolonging symptoms in order to obtain or continue receiving prescriptions from their doctors.

27

Endocet® is the brand name of an opioid analgesic containing acetaminophen and oxycodone, similar to Percocet®.
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A weakness in the literature relating to the use and misuse of opioid analgesics and
highlighted in this chapter, is the lack of clarity surrounding definitional terms. In a systematic
review of terminology describing prescription drug misuse, abuse, and related events (MAREs),
Smith and colleagues (2013) critique the myriad definitions of MAREs currently used by
scholars and propose a set of standardized classifications to assess MAREs that occur in clinical
trials and post-marketing adverse event surveillance and monitoring. These classifications relate
closely to the medical and non-medical initiate groups presented in this chapter. For example, the
authors conclude that the term “misuse-event” should be defined as “any intentional therapeutic
use of a drug product in an inappropriate way” (Smith el al., 2013: 2291) and contrast this with
“abuse-event,” which is defined as “any intentional, non-therapeutic use of a drug product or
substance, even once, for the purpose of achieving a desirable psychological or physiological
effect” (Smith el al., 2013: 2292). Accordingly, the initiation event of participants categorized
above as non-medical (recreational) initiates would, under this classification system, be defined
as an “abuse-event” whereas the initiation event of participants categorized as medical initiates
would be considered a “misuse-event.” However, while the authors’ attempts to solidify some
clear definitions are laudable, facets of these definitions remain ambiguous. For example, in their
definition of misuse-event, it is unclear what constitutes “inappropriate” use, and whether the
source of the pills is a factor. Additionally, as Sullivan (2013) points out, the parameters of
“therapeutic” versus “non-therapeutic” use also remain unclear. Further, a recent announcement
for public comment from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) titled Changing
the Language of Addiction (ONDCP: October 4th 2016), challenges the use of stigmatizing
language, including the term “abuse,” which has been identified by scholars to be strongly
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associated with negative judgment and punitive measures (Kelly et al., 2016), and may
perpetuate the stigma related to substance use.
Definitional ambiguities such as those highlighted above also draw attention to the
limitations of large national surveys such as the National Survey of Drug Use and Health
(NSDUH), conducted on an annual basis with a sample of approximately 70,000 randomly
selected individuals aged 12 or over. Embedded in the survey are questions relating to opioid
analgesic misuse which read: “Now we have some questions about drugs that people are
supposed to take only if they have a prescription from a doctor. We are only interested in your
use of a drug if: (1) the drug was not prescribed to you; (2) you took the drug only for the
experience or feeling it caused.” (NSDUH, 2013) While this measure informs trends, the paucity
of information relating to the context and circumstances of “misuse” limits the interpretation of
these findings, and future iterations should consider ways in which motivations for use could
best be explored in a closed-ended format (Zacny and Lichtor, 2008). Additionally, while the
intent to misuse may be clear at the point of initiation, it is likely that motivations for continued
misuse will change over time. For example, Luke (white, aged 30), first misused analgesic
opioids because the opportunity arose and he was curious:

I took Vicodin® a couple years ago just to take it, just to see how, what it did to me
and…[it] kind of made me more talkative a little bit. . . just kind of relaxed. Made me feel
good, but I could see how people can get really into them. But at the same time, it wasn’t
something that I was like “Oh, I need to try this again. I need to do this again” it was
more just like I had a friend at work that had an extra one and was like, “You want one
of these? Let’s try it.”
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However, following his initiation event, Luke’s continued sporadic misuse of opioid analgesics
was to alleviate pain as he underwent a complicated series of tattoos across his back.

[I] took them just to kind of take the edge off. Doesn’t take the pain completely away, but
makes it a little bit more tolerable . . . I have a friend who they were prescribed to his
grandmother. She doesn’t take them, so he got a couple of those from her for me
specifically, with the intent of me using them for my tattoo.

Another example of how drivers of misuse may change over time is exemplified by Preston’s
narrative. A committed athlete, Preston (white, aged 24) had suffered multiple injuries during his
sporting career for which he had been prescribed opioid analgesics. During his teenage years,
these medications had been carefully monitored by his mother. However, when he went to
college and moved into the highly competitive arena of division two college sports, Preston
found opioid analgesics were misused widely both for injuries and recreational pursuits. He
describes the circumstances of his initiation into misuse in the excerpt below:

We were in our townhouse. And we were all sitting around and a kid pulled out a bottle
and unscrewed it. Tossed one to a friend, tossed one to a friend. Looked at me and I put
my hands out. Tossed one to me and he was like, “You should probably break that in half,
bro. I know you don’t take these so you should probably break that in half.” So I broke it
in half, took it, 20 minutes later, he’s like, “You’re turning white, bro.” He said “bro” a
lot, I know. Not me. He said bro. He was like, “You’re turning white.” And I was like
“Really? Yeah, my stomach’s a little off.” And he was like, “Just wait a second, maybe

81

you need something to wash it down.” He brought in a beer and then also a glass of
water. I chose the glass of water thankfully. Drank almost the whole glass of water,
within a minute ran to the bathroom and threw it all up. And they were all laughing,
“Light weight.” And they were like, “Don’t worry, bro”. . . It was fun being with my
friends. And it was fun, I felt like I was getting in with the older guys, which sounds
stupid. I felt like I was being accepted as a young player.

Following this event, Preston continued to misuse opioid analgesics but mostly to
alleviate pain sustained from injuries rather than for recreational purposes. Pills were freely
available, provided to players by team coaches with minimal oversight, and players were
encouraged to take them in order to quickly get back into the game. Indeed, within sporting
circles, opioid analgesics were often referred to as “silver bullets” because they allowed players
to remain on the field even when injured. “At halftime it was a drug clinic inside the
locker. . .You would go into a back room, you would go into the coaches little room and they
would open a drawer and there would be bottles, bottles, bottles, OxyContin®, Vicodin®,
Percocet®.” Preston continued to misuse opioid analgesics sporadically until the untimely death
of a friend resulted in him using pills to self-medicate his emotional rather than physical pain, a
shift that led to a sharp increase in use:

I was so sad. I was crying all the time. And they like man, they were looking at each other
like, “What do we do with this kid” Quick fix. Quick fix. They were always called the
silver bullet. I hate that term because it’s like a bullet. So the silver bullet was the pills
that we would take. Pain medication and antianxiety medication.
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Preston’s narrative raises an important distinction between the nature of physical and
emotional pain, and while this bifurcation has been discussed extensively by pain scholars (see
Goldberg, 2009 and Bourke, 2014), it is under addressed within the clinical sphere. A study
conducted by Boscarino and colleagues (2010) examining long-term opioid therapy in primary
care patients found that a significant variable associated with opioid use disorder was a history of
depression, and other studies suggest that mood disorders are a factor in long-term opioid use
(Halbert et al., 2016). Further, in their commentary on the function of long-term opioid therapy
for non-cancer pain, Sullivan and Ballantyne (2012) astutely ask “What are we treating with
long-term opioid therapy” and suggest that often, opioid therapy is used to alleviate “total pain
includ[ing] physical, psychological, social, emotional, and spiritual elements. . . or what one of
our primary care colleagues recently termed terribly sad life syndrome [emphasis in the
original]” (2012: 433). While the majority of participants in this study did not associate their
initiation into opioid analgesic misuse with a desire to alleviate depression, many spoke of how
opioids served to “numb” emotional pain and as Jordan thoughtfully remarked:

There’s something that draws me to opiates. . . There’s just something about the euphoric
feeling and the calm that it gives me and the confidence that I feel from it. . . and I feel
very euphoric and I love that. . . I’m not blaming this completely on it, but when I was a
kid, I wasn’t ever starving, but my father was an alcoholic and my mother had a lot of
anxiety issues and money problems. She was a compulsive spender. And I just went
through some rough patches in childhood. And from the time I did my first prescription
opiate to the last time I used heroin, it just helps numb emotions that otherwise are
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constantly playing on my mind along with the fact that it makes me feel great and
confident.

Jordan’s perspective highlights the point that although the opioid crisis has been welldocumented in terms of mortality and morbidity, there has been little sociological exploration as
to why so many individuals have developed a dependence on opioids. Opioids can certainly be
risky drugs with a high potential for misuse, and increased exposure to these medications has
doubtless played a part. Yet, there is a paucity of analysis regarding the macro sociocultural and
political factors that have resulted in the current opioid crisis, or an effort to explore problem
drug use using an alternative paradigm to that situated within the context of individual
responsibility. Thus, when epidemiologists and clinicians cite statistics suggesting that 100
million Americans suffer from chronic pain (Institute of Medicine, 2011), a valid question might
be why is this so? Additionally, as Alexander (2008) has attempted to do in his book, The
Globalization of Addiction, efforts should be made to reflect on problem substance use as “a
latent human potential that expresses itself universally under particular social circumstances”
(2009: 2), rather than simply as an individual or pathological issue.

Experienced heroin users and initiation into opioid analgesic misuse
As referenced in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, previous studies examining
the etiology of opioid analgesic misuse have often failed to distinguish between participants who
were opioid naïve at the point they initiated opioid analgesic misuse, and those who had
previously used heroin. To reiterate, opioid analgesics and heroin have similar pharmacological
and physiological properties; both are central nervous system depressants that bind to the mu
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receptors in the brain, blocking the perception of pain and resulting in a calming or euphoric
effect. In this study, 30 participants reported their use of heroin preceded their misuse of opioid
analgesics, and while many scholars have commented on the trajectory of opioid analgesic use to
heroin (Jones, 2013; Mateu-Gelabert et al., 2015), few have referenced that the relationship
between these different opioids is often bidirectional (c.f. Lankenau et al., 2012; Rigg and
Murphy, 2013).
The experienced heroin users in this study had typically been using heroin off and on for
many years; they tended to be older than participants in the two groups described above with a
median age of 45 years, compared with 28 years for non-medical and medical initiates combined.
Years of entrenched, often poly-substance use meant that for most experienced heroin users,
pinpointing the first time they misused opioid analgesics was often impossible. Further, opioid
dependence as well as chronic pain issues tended to blur the distinction between the non-medical
and medical contexts of initiation as described earlier in this chapter. For example, for some
experienced heroin users, the first time they misused opioid analgesics was when they were
anticipating, or already were in acute heroin withdrawal. Pain relating to symptoms of opioid
withdrawal, which may include stomach cramps, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, chills, and muscle
aches, can be intense. Often, by the time a person has developed a physical and/or psychological
dependence on opioids, alleviating these symptoms is referred to and conceptualized as “getting
straight” rather than “getting high” in that taking opioids simply will serve to restore a level of
functionality, rather than produce a euphoric effect. Thus, in these circumstances, the line
between non-medical or recreational use and medical use cannot always be clearly delineated.
Becky (white, aged 28), first started experimenting with heroin when she moved to New
York City from Albany in her early 20s. For the first few years, heroin was not her preferred
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drug and she used only sporadically. However, after engaging in an intimate relationship with a
man who was regularly using, Becky’s own consumption increased. She recalled:

I didn’t have a real problem with [heroin] until when I was [in NYC] and I did it here
and there, but then I met this guy that I’m with now—this was three years ago—he was
using a lot, so what he would do is make a lot of money every day and then we would cop
in the afternoon and go home and get high. And that’s when… he had really good heroin,
somewhere he was getting it in [Anonymized]. It was really good, like nothing I had ever
done before.

Previous literature has documented that women often initiate substance use with male
intimate partners (Eaves, 2009; Hser et al., 1987), and although Becky’s degree of agency
regarding her drug trajectory was not specifically explored during her interview, what is clear is
that her boyfriend, Dave, was the primary drug locator and purchaser for the two of them and
was instrumental in Becky’s initiation and eventual preferential switch to opioid analgesics. It
was he who had the connection to the heroin supply and on a day when their usual dealer proved
unreliable, Dave sought out an alternative source of opioids in the form of oxycodone pills,
which he then taught Becky how to administer via injection.

It was a day that we couldn’t cop or something, or they didn’t have the dope he wanted,
so he knew somebody that had pills – I don’t think he knew what kind until we met up
with the person but…he got them and he said we’ll do these instead, you know, we won’t
be sick. . . So we did those and I just remember the high was a lot longer and better and I
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asked him why, and he was telling me that because the pill, it’s not like a bag of dope
that’s been stamped on and stuff added to it.

Following her initiation, oxycodone became Becky’s opioid of choice, although she reported that
market constriction in the months preceding the interview had led to a scarcity of these drugs,
with the result that she had reverted predominantly back to daily heroin use. Becky’s preference,
however, was in contrast to most other participants in this group, who maintained their
preference for heroin and, who presented with the choice, would rather use heroin than opioid
analgesics.
In addition to staving off withdrawal, another scenario in which experienced heroin users
sometimes used opioid analgesics was to mitigate the effects of stimulant use, most often, after
smoking crack. For people who are polysubstance users, a typical pattern is to first use a drug for
its stimulant effect and subsequently use opioids or other central nervous system depressants to
level out the high. While some people use heroin and cocaine or crack simultaneously, a practice
known as “speedballing,” others prefer to take the drugs consecutively. Perry (black, aged 49),
who had been using cocaine and heroin for many years, described how he had recently learnt
about opioid analgesics while in an in-patient drug treatment program where he was being
treated for crack and alcohol use.

I was in a program in [Anonymized], a 28-day rehab, and I met a lot of people in
[Anonymized]. And this one lady was telling me “Oh, I can get you a script…” And I
really wasn't taking the pills. I wasn't on it. This is like maybe last year. I’m not taking
the pills. I knew what the feeling was, but. . . I'm like “Damn, man, take Oxys? Man,
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that's how some serious people OD [overdose]. I mean, they're ODing, they're dying. . .
I'm like [don’t] fuck with that.”

Perry’s initial apprehension regarding the potential risk of opioid analgesics differs from the
majority of other participants in this study, who perceived opioid analgesics as qualitatively safer
than heroin. However, after further conversation with his peers in drug treatment, Perry’s
concern about the risk of overdosing dissipated and when the opportunity arose, he tried a
Percocet® tablet: “‘Yo, man, this is Percocet®. This ain't that other shit [heroin]. You ain't sniffing
it. You know you ain't sniffing this shit.’ All right. Give me one.” Since this experience, Perry
had regularly taken Percocet®, and at the time of interview, was trying to get a prescription of his
own with the intention of both using the pills himself, and selling a proportion to generate extra
income.
While a history of heroin use prior to opioid analgesic misuse is the organizing principle
of this group of participants, some had ceased using heroin for an extended period before
initiating opioid analgesic misuse. Martin (white, 45 years), first developed a problem with
heroin when he was 15 years old, stopping only after he was sentenced to a lengthy prison term.
On his return to the community, Martin suffered a neck injury, but knowing he would be
vulnerable if he used a narcotic-based analgesic, he declined the opioid prescription suggested by
his doctor. Martin avoided opioids for several more years until he was offered oxycodone by a
co-worker in the construction industry.

88

. . . Working in the union, pills were very, very big. Just from people having sore backs,
sore this, sore that. Everybody that worked in my union had something or another for
pain, but the Roxies [oxycodone] were very big . . . We used to eat those all the time.

Shortly after he began misusing oxycodone, Martin was again injured on the job, this time
breaking three vertebrae in his back. On this occasion, he did not reveal his substance use history
to his physician and accepted an opioid analgesic prescription knowing he could use it to get
high. Martin did misuse his prescription and within a couple of months, was once again using
heroin. For participants in this group, substance use issues often complicated their relationship
with health care providers and several spoke about their ambivalence to disclose current or
previous opioid dependence out of fear they would be stigmatized and denied care. As Martin
commented:

No, I did not [disclose my history]. No I wasn’t telling them anything, because then [the
doctor] wouldn’t do it. I knew what I was getting involved with probably. But they
were—I don’t know why. I was just in a lot of pain, and you know, I didn’t want to tell
them to jeopardize them not giving [the medication] to me. So, I didn’t tell them about my
past. No.

Similarly to Martin, many experienced heroin users in this study had complicated
medical histories including painful physical symptoms that could be alleviated by opioid
analgesics. As previously stated, members of this group were, on average, in their mid-40s
(range 28 to 62 years) and for older participants especially, years of using street drugs had
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resulted in a variety of painful ailments, including: injuries from fights or accidents and chronic
diseases such as diabetes, arthritis, and HIV/AIDS (Davis and Johnson, 2008). Determining the
most effective therapeutic solution for people who have a history of opioid use disorder is not
always straightforward (Passik and Kirsh, 2004). Further, when mental health issues are also a
factor, the problem of pain becomes even more complex, adding another layer of ambiguity to
the definitional problems raised in this chapter regarding what constitutes “misuse,” and
highlighting the difficulties of delineating the experience of physical and emotional pain.
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CHAPTER FIVE: SOURCES OF OPIOID ANALGESICS

In the previous chapter, I described pathways into opioid analgesic misuse including the
source of pills participants had used at the point of their initiation. This chapter will examine
how participants obtained opioid analgesics on an ongoing basis, and explore the processes of
pill acquisition among two different user groups: those who developed a physical dependence to
opioid analgesics and those who did not. For the purposes of this analysis, I have excluded
participants categorized as experienced heroin users described in the previous chapter (n=30), as
members of this group were often opioid dependent prior to their involvement in opioid
analgesics and typically misused these medications on an ad hoc basis, often as a substitution for
heroin when supplies were scarce. Thus, the relationship to the opioid analgesic market of
experienced heroin users differed from participants who first developed an opioid dependence on
pain pills as, at the point these individuals were dependent on opioid analgesics, their demand for
these drugs was inelastic.28
Previous research on illicit prescription drug markets suggests that medications, including
opioid analgesics, originate from filled prescriptions that are then diverted through a variety of
sources. The concept of diversion is often used to describe a broad range of processes which may
include: supplies of medication prescribed to one person being used by others; taking medication
in a way other than directed (i.e., sniffing or injecting pills that are meant to be consumed orally);
or amassing quantities of pills that are prescribed to be taken on a daily basis (Bell, 2010). One

28

Elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of the quantity demanded in response to market conditions such as
price, which in an illegal market can be driven by a variety of factors, including risk of enforcement. The demand
for any good, including drugs, tends to be more elastic if there are alternative products available, or if the product is
not considered a necessity. In this context, opioid dependence results in inelasticity of demand as individuals must
either obtain drugs, or go through painful withdrawal.
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of the most prevalent forms of diversion referenced in the literature is medication sharing within
familial and social networks. For example, in a mixed-methods study with young adults
conducted by Daniulaityte and colleagues (2014), 88 percent of their sample reported they had
ever received opioid analgesics for free, and almost a third (30%) had not paid for the majority of
pills they had consumed in the previous six months. Further, almost half their sample reported
having obtaining pain pills from a relative at least once, and, for 12 percent, this remained their
primary source. In contrast, while 47 percent had ever misused opioids from their own
prescription, only four percent reported prescribed medication to be their primary source in the
previous six months, and the prevalence of doctor shopping29 was also low. Moreover, for those
who did regularly pay for pain pills (53%), sellers were often found within existing social
spheres and participants rarely reported purchasing drugs from strangers.
These findings are in contrast to other research. For example, Inciardi and colleagues
(2009b) reported that obtaining opioid analgesics via doctor shopping was a common practice
among their sample. Additionally, participants in this study described an illicit opioid market that
was fueled via pill brokers—middlemen who recruit and maintain a list of individuals willing to
obtain prescription pain pills either with or without a warranted medical reason with the intention
of selling the entire supply—as well as “script docs,” medical providers who are known for
prescribing opioids beyond the scope of professional care.
It is possible that some of the differences in the composition and operation of opioid
analgesic markets between these studies relate to the patterns of use, specifically the elasticity
and inelasticity of demand, among the participants included in each of the samples. For example,
in the study conducted by Daniulaityte et al., (2014), in which findings described an opioid

In Daniulaityte et al., study, doctor shopping was defined as “receiving prescriptions from one or multiple
physicians without a legitimate medical reason.” (Daniulaityte et al., 2014: 201).
29
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analgesic market largely facilitated by medication sharing, the sample consisted of individuals
who were not dependent on illicit opioid analgesics at the time the interviews were conducted,
and who reported no lifetime dependence on opioids. Conversely, the sample included in Inciardi
et al’s., (2009b) study, in which participants described a more open drug market involving a
variety of actors, was recruited from two residential substance use treatment programs and is
therefore suggestive of more entrenched opioid use.
To date, few studies have explored sources of opioid analgesics as pegged to particular
patterns of use, with notable exceptions including analyses of the National Survey on Drug Use
and Health (NSDUH). In 2014, the NSDUH reported that 68 percent of persons misusing OAs
obtained their pills from family or friends (SAMHSA, 2014); however, recent secondary
analyses of these data indicate that, while many individuals do obtain opioid analgesics from
friends or family, patterns of acquisition were related to frequency of use. Indeed, few
respondents who reported daily misuse obtained opioid analgesics from these sources; rather,
they accessed medication through prescribers or street markets (Jones et al., 2014). These
findings mirror an earlier study by Ford and Lacerenza (2011), whose analyses of NSDUH
(2008) also suggests a strong association between frequency of use and sources of diversion.
This chapter seeks to extend these findings by exploring how participants reporting
different patterns of use acquired the drugs they misused. The data presented below is limited to
the 63 participants whose opioid analgesic misuse preceded use of other opioid drugs (i.e.,
heroin) stratified into two groups: (1) those who reported experience of opioid dependence; (2)
those who did not report experience of opioid dependence. Across the groups of dependent and
non-dependent participants, demographics were fairly homogenous as demonstrated in Table 3.
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Table 3: Demographic characteristics of participants in the dependent user and nondependent opioid user groups
Demographic characteristics

Total
Age
Median
Range
Gender
Female
Male
Race/ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic/Latino/a
Multi-racial
Educational attainment
Did not complete high school
High school graduate/GED
Further education
Housing
Own home
Family home
Friend’s home
Shelter
Street homeless
Employment
Full- or part-time
Student
Unemployed
Disability/unemployment
insurance
Type of initiate
Recreational (non-medical)
Medical

N (%)
63 (100%)

Dependent users
N (%)
44 (100%)

Non-dependent users
N (%)
19 (100%)

24 years
18 to 58 years

25 years
18 to 58 years

24 years
18 to 38 years

22 (34.9%)
41 (65.1%)

13 (29.5%)
31 (70.5%)

9 (47.4%)
10 (52.6%)

49 (77.8%)
2 (3.2%)
9 (14.3%)
3 (4.7%)

36 (81.8%)
2 (4.5%)
6 (13.7%)
0 (0.0%)

13 (68.4%)
0 (0.0%)
3 (15.8%)
3 (15.8%)

06 (9.5%)
19 (30.2%)
38 (60.3%)

5 (11.4%)
16 (36.4%)
23 (52.2%)

1 (5.3%)
3 (15.8%)
15 (78.9%)

28 (44.4%)
26 (41.3%)
4 (6.4%)
3 (4.7%)
2 (3.2%)

16 (36.4%)
21 (47.8%)
2 (4.5%)
3 (6.8%)
2 (4.5%)

12 (63.2%)
5 (26.3%)
2 (10.5%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)

26 (41.3%)
10 (15.8%)
22 (34.9%)
5 (8.0%)

15 (34.1%)
5 (11.4%)
20 (45.5%)
4 (9.0%)

11 (57.9%)
5 (26.3%)
2 (10.5%)
1 (5.3%)

28 (63.6%)
16 (36.3%)

16 (84.2%)
3 (15.7%)

44 (69.8%)
19 (30.1%)
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Trajectories of use for dependent users
Among those respondents (n=44) who reported developing an opioid dependence, 28
were recreational initiates and 16 medical initiates. As illustrated in Chapter 4, the majority of
recreational (i.e., non-medical) initiates sourced the opioid analgesics they first misused from
members of their peer network, in most cases for free. In contrast, medical initiates tended to
first misuse pills obtained from their own prescription or from the prescription of a close family
member. In the medical initiate group, no participants reported paying for the pills they first
misused. Whether participants initiated opioid analgesic misuse for recreational or medical
reasons, the trajectory toward opioid dependence followed a similar pattern consisting of several
key transition points described below.
For those who initially began misusing dual-entity pain medication such as Percocet® or
Vicodin®, which contain both an opioid compound and acetaminophen,30 the move to a higher
strength, single-entity pill containing only one opioid compound with no other active ingredient,
was often a pivotal point along the trajectory toward opioid dependence (Harocopos et al., 2016).
Somewhat paradoxically, the motivation to switch to a single entity formulation often centered
on the concern that the overconsumption of acetaminophen found in dual-entity compounds
could be damaging to the liver or stomach, especially as the number of pills consumed per day
increased in light of growing tolerance. The most popular pill used by participants in this study
was a generic short-acting oxycodone formula available in 30mg tablets. Known colloquially as
“oxy’s,” “roxies,” or “blues,” these pills were widely used by most people in this study and by

Percocet® and Vicodin® are dual-entity formulations containing oxycodone and hydrocodone respectively, and
acetaminophen. These dual-entity medications are typically found in doses of between 2.5mg/325mg to
10mg/325mg, with the first number indicating the strength of the opioid and the second, the acetaminophen. Singleentity formulations, such as Roxicodone® and Zohydro®, are most commonly prescribed in higher strength doses
starting at 10mg and above.
30
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the time participants acknowledged they were opioid dependent, the majority specifically were
seeking out this formulation.
The switch from a dual-entity formulation to a higher strength, single-entity formulation
was often followed by a change in route of administration from oral to intranasal use. Although it
is possible to crush and sniff dual-entity tablets, participants generally described experiencing an
unpleasant “burning” sensation as they inhaled the drug. However, sniffing single-entity
formulations was less disagreeable and, for individuals in this group who became dependent on
opioid analgesics, all but one favored intranasal use as their primary route of administration.
Philip (white, aged 25), described his preference for sniffing single entity formulations.

I didn’t start sniffing pills until later, when I started with the roxies, ‘cus you’re not
gonna sniff Perc 10s, like. You know what I mean? It’s like sniffing an aspirin. You
know what I mean, but it’s really different, like it’s really weird. Like, I think that they
made these roxies to be able to make them to sniff, because they taste great. They don’t
burn your nose. It’s like they’re meant to sniff. Like, these doctors, like, whoever made
these things, they knew that that would be able to be done with it. Like, you know what I
mean, like try and sniff a Perc 10, like have you ever broken a Perc 10? You see how
much chalk and powder is in there? It’d probably taste disgusting. Probably burns your
nose, right? But a roxy just has, like, this sweet taste to it, and it just has, like, this great
drip to it, like it comes down like the bag is great. I don’t know what it is about those
things. It’s great. You don’t even feel nothing.
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Although more experienced peers had counseled some participants that intranasal use
would enable them to experience opioid effects at an accelerated rate, others described a more
organic process in which repeated exposure to a specific behavior inured them to the practice
without the need for direct encouragement. Intranasal use, therefore, was often normalized
within friendship groups by a process of diffusion and not necessarily pegged to peer pressure.
As Chris (white, aged 22), who first misused pills when he was 17 explained:

. . . I mean at this point, like I was a neighborhood kid that hung out at the park, knew
everybody from the neighborhood so I mean this was becoming an epidemic. Everybody
was taking them. So it wasn’t… I was always hanging out with other kids that were doing
[opioid analgesics], kids that were already sniffing them when I was still eating them, so
it wasn’t like they had to teach me. I’d seen them do it every day. They would crush up
the pill, roll up a bill and sniff it, and that’s it. And at the beginning, like I said, it was
just because it hit you faster, but then, when I one day went to just eat one and it didn’t
hit me, I didn’t understand why, so now I realized, OK, I just upgraded to the next level
and now I have to just continue sniffing them.

The majority of participants who developed a physical opioid dependence via the use of
opioid analgesics discussed the transition points as detailed above. However, within this group,
knowledge of the risk of dependence varied and even among those who were cognizant of the
possibility, there was often a disbelief that it might happen to them. Recall Joe, who first used
opioids to enhance his sexual experience. The following excerpt provides a rich description of
his trajectory toward daily opioid use and his reluctance to acknowledge the associated risks.
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Even sniffing [opioid analgesics] I went a long while only doing quarters and halves [of
tablets], but once you start sniffing it, there's much more of a bang. There's much more of
a rush, and it slowly—I wouldn't say it was overnight, like “You know what, forget the
sex aspect of it. I'm just going to start taking it to feel good”—it slowly morphed into
“You know what, I'll just take it today. I'm not going to have sex today, but I'm just going
to take it today because I want to feel good” or “I kind of have a headache today. I'm
going to take a little bit just to feel good.” And slowly but surely I started seeing myself
not skipping days as often, or instead of doing it one day and skipping two days I would
do it two days and skip one day. And slowly but surely that built up to taking a quarter or
a half a day, but I would always skip days. And then it only took about one or two weeks
where I literally said, I remember even saying this, I said “Fuck it. Who cares? I'll be
fine.” And I sniffed a half, and then I sniffed a half that night. And then it became “Okay,
I'll only do it on weekends.” Then it became “Okay, I'll only do it at nighttime.” Then it
eventually came to “Okay, I'll only do it in the mornings and at nighttime. This way I can
wake up and feel good.” Then at that point you're addicted whether you like it or not,
whether you realize it or not too, because that's a big thing. A lot of kids become
addicted, and they don't even realize their dependence. That's how it gets you; that's how
it gets you.

Thus, among both recreational and medical initiates who became opioid dependent, a
common thread was the belief that they would not be adversely affected by their misuse of OAs
and further, that they would be insulated by the negative outcomes of extensive drug use. For
example, Donna recalled that when she first tried opioid analgesics she was not worried about
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the consequences because she simply did not believe she was vulnerable: “I’m not really afraid
of much. I wasn’t afraid. I always thought like, I’m better than… like nothing is going to… you
know what I mean?” Although this may partly be due to the fact that opioid analgesics are often
considered safer than other types of street drugs, this sense of invincibility continued even as
participants’ opioid use became more entrenched. As Joe reflected:

Nobody thinks they’re going to withdraw. “Ah, I’ll be fine,” duh, duh, duh. I remember
the first time I felt withdrawal. I was trying to be mind over matter because I’m a
perfectionist by nature. I like to do things perfectly. I like to make sure everything is
right, so I tried to be mind over matter, like “I’m stronger than this, this can’t take me
over.” And it was impossible-feeling. It felt so impossible.

Previous research has noted that among networks of people who use drugs, discussions
involving the negative consequences of risky substance use rarely occur. For example, a study
exploring the social networks of drug injectors during the height of the AIDS epidemic, found
that conversation topics within circles of people entrenched in drug use were generally onedimensional (centering predominantly on drug acquisition), and rarely included exchanges
relating to the potential risks associated with some drug-using practices (Freidman et al., 1999).
As Jack (white, aged 19), commented:

Nobody’s gonna tell you “Oh hey, take this, but if you start doing it for two months
you’re going to get sick every day until you take it.”
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For some participants, the realization they had become opioid dependent occurred only after they
had experienced withdrawal symptoms for the first time, and for those with a steady supply of
pills, this was often months after their drug-taking had escalated to daily use. As David (white,
aged 28), recalled:

For the first year maybe year, or two years, I didn’t know that it was physically
addicting. I didn’t know that if I didn’t take them today, I wouldn’t feel good, because I
was taking them every day. . . At least within the first year, nobody talked about [opioid
withdrawal], I don’t think. A lot of people didn’t know. There was a lot of newcomers,
and they were just like, “Hey, I could get them,” and we were all talking about getting
them and taking them, but we were never talking about not taking them.

Early signs of “dope sickness,” including symptoms such as aching limbs, an upset stomach, or a
runny nose, were often first attributed to a viral or bacterial infection, and even after being
advised by peers that they were likely in opioid withdrawal, some participants only accepted this
as true when symptoms disappeared following further dosing. Danny (white, aged 21), described
his dawning realization that what had started as casual, recreational use more than two years
previously, had resulted in opioid dependence.

First when I felt sick and my friend told me what it was I was like “There’s no way, no
way.” Mentally, I didn’t want to believe it. So for like two hours, I was sitting downstairs
miserable, sick. And then I went upstairs and I did one and all of a sudden I got these
goose bumps and I felt phenomenal, I felt great. Then I realized it’s because of the pills.
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However, within other networks, opioid analgesic misuse was so ubiquitous that symptoms
relating to opioid withdrawal were not only acknowledged, but also an accepted part of the pilltaking culture. Thus, in the same way that opioid-induced vomiting was considered a minor
inconvenience during initial experiences of misuse, for some, the symptoms resulting from
physical dependence were both expected and inevitable. Jason (white, aged 21), explains:

I didn’t think it was a problem. I just felt like, this is what happens . . . This is the way
that…you want to do these pills, all right. You’re gonna go through withdrawal. And it
was just like a normal thing. Like everyone I was involved with, my whole circle of people
were doing them. It was just part of the lifestyle . . . To be honest, I don’t remember the
exact first time [experiencing withdrawal symptoms]. But I just know people told…I
knew, I guess I knew before I went through them from other people that went through
them and said, “This is what’s going to happen. You’re going to feel sick, you’re going to
feel shitty.” And I was prepared for it.

In this study, 31 of the 63 participants who had not used other opiates prior to misusing
opioid analgesics eventually initiated heroin. An often cited factor for this shift was a notable
constriction of the opioid analgesic market resulting in rising prices and falling availability.
Thus, as pills became more expensive and harder to obtain, heroin, a cheaper opioid alternative,
was seen as a viable option. While most participants who initiated heroin continued to use opioid
analgesics intermittently, for many, heroin became their primary drug. The data below are
therefore focused on sources of opioid analgesics as participants moved toward growing opioid
dependence, and shifted from having an elastic to an inelastic demand for opioid analgesics.
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Sources of opioid analgesics for dependent users
The majority of participants who became opioid dependent were in social networks that
facilitated ongoing use. For example, of the participants who had initiated opioid analgesic
misuse in their teens, many described a milieu where opioids and other prescription medications,
such as benzodiazepines and sleeping aids, were widely available. Indeed, descriptions from
many individuals in this group suggest that opioid use was pervasive in their communities and,
when describing trajectories toward opioid dependence, the ease by which participants were able
to access pain pills was a common theme. For example, Harry (white, aged 44), first used opioid
analgesics following a work accident that left him with several crushed fingers. As his hand
healed, his doctor prescribed him dual-entity pills containing oxycodone and acetaminophen.
Although he used his medication as directed, Harry enjoyed how he felt when taking the pills
and, once they were finished, was able to easily find an alternative source of opioids through
word-of-mouth.

I asked people I knew if anybody knows where to get them. Everybody seemed to know.
Everybody seemed to know “Yeah, that guy is selling them. That guy is selling them.”
Everybody was selling them. . . All of them were going to doctors, getting—making
believe they were hurt, getting prescriptions and selling their prescriptions. It was
actually like a lot of illegal doctors that were doing it . . . The doctors had to have known
all that was going on because my doctor, when the cast came off and everything, stopped
[prescribing]. These guys, for some reason, never stopped.
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Similarly, when Mike, who had received successive opioid prescriptions for many months
following surgery on a torn bicep, could no longer get refills from his doctor, it was
straightforward for him to find diverted medication from sources close to him:

I just knew people, I had one person. I don’t know where he got it from but he always had
a lot of Vicodin®. And I think that he was getting it from somebody at a pharmacy. . . And
it was just, I knew like… [Anonymized] is a very small community I want to say, and a lot
of people know other people. It’s like three degrees of separation in [Anonymized]. And
back then I was going to clubs, I knew a lot of people and I was very social. And you get
to know, like whose got what.

For those who had started misusing opioid analgesics recreationally, and had initially
acquired their pills from a source other than their own prescription, the easy acquisition of pills
through close social networks was also a central component in the telling of their trajectory
toward opioid dependence. Indeed, at the time many of these participants initiated opioid
analgesics misuse, their narratives indicated that the illicit pill market for diverted pills was
robust and largely unhampered by later initiatives implemented to constrict diversion, such as
changes to existing drug formulas and the introduction of prescription monitoring programs
(PDMPs).31 For example, Donna, who at the time of interview had been misusing opioid

31

In 2010, Purdue, the maker of OxyContin, a long-acting opioid analgesic available in high doses, reformulated the
medication with the intent of making the time-release mechanism more robust and unable to be tampered with. In
2013, the I-STOP (Internet Tracking System for Overprescribing) came into effect making it mandatory for medical
practitioners to look up patients in the PDMP prior to prescribing schedule medications II to IV. These types of
initiatives changed the market for diverted opioid analgesics considerably and are discussed further in Chapter 7.
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analgesics for approximately five years, described a community awash with opioids where
connections to people who were able to supply her with the pills she sought were easily made.

I know it’s harder now. [Until recently] it was very easy to get them, and I never—I
always knew at least 10 people that I could try, and get through them or someone that
had [opioid analgesics], so if someone didn’t have it, they could get it. I never really had
a problem getting them. It would all be from neighborhoods in [Anonymized]. . . And my
close friends, my best friend that was using, too. So whoever she knew, she brought in
people and you just knew people.

While it is not possible to know with certainty where others in the community acquired their
pills, several participants described buying opioid analgesics directly from individuals who
themselves were receiving a prescription from a doctor. These types of exchanges between close
community members have not been well documented in the literature, and studies exploring
sources of diverted opioid analgesics often lack nuance with respect to the relationship between
buyers and sellers, who typically are categorized simply as “dealers,” a catch-all term to denote
persons selling illicit drugs. The relationship between buyers and sellers, therefore, often remains
poorly defined, and where some “dealers” might be known only to the buyer in the context of
their drug use, many of the participants in this study described acquiring opioid analgesics from
people well-known to them in their community.
The following excerpt from Luis (Latino, aged 40), demonstrates how opioid analgesics
were diffused within community networks and illuminates the social bonds that often existed
between participants and the person from whom they purchased their drugs. Luis first misused

104

opioid analgesics following a tooth extraction seven years previously and, when his prescription
ran out, reached out to an old friend residing in upstate New York whom he had known for more
than 25 years.

I spoke to a friend of mine and he told me that he could get more. . . And I started making
excuses on why I needed it, like I would tell my friend, “Hey, my leg is hurting. My tooth
is still hurting. Can I have some of yours?” “Sure, no problem” . . . I don’t know where
he was getting them. He was buying them in the street, that much I know, [and] then
reselling them and taking them himself . . . That went on for about a year, and then I
started finding people on my own because I got tired of driving upstate . . . I knew an
older woman [Alice] that would get [opioids] because she had problems with her back.
And then she kind of, she would sell them to me very cheap. She would sell them to me,
about 240 pills for 70 bucks, the five milligrams. She would get a whole bottle of 240 a
month [and] she wouldn’t take them. She had back problems, but she didn’t like the way
they made her feel actually. . . [I’ve known her] since I was a kid.

Luis purchased Alice’s prescription every month, and sold any surplus pills to his upstate
friend, from whom he had previously acquired pills, often at no cost. A growing awareness of the
potential ill-effects from the acetaminophen in the dual-entity formulation, however, led to a
drop in demand for these pills, prompting Luis to find an alternative supply. His next source was
an “older gentleman,” also within his community, who offered to sell Luis his monthly
prescription of 60 tablets of 10mg oxycodone for $120, an arrangement that continued for about
a year until the man’s arrest (on charges unrelated to drugs), necessitated Luis finding another
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source. Again, within his community, Luis approached a family friend and retired doctor who
wrote him several months’ worth of prescriptions for 120 tablets of 10mg oxycodone, which he
filled at the pharmacy with cash payments. Thus, Luis was able to sustain a supply of diverted
opioid analgesics for many months, even years, without ever having to negotiate with
community outsiders, a situation that he suggested contributed to his growing dependence:

I could always get them whenever I wanted. Maybe it wasn’t the 10mg, it was the 5mgs,
but they were always available one way or another. Like, if I couldn’t get them, a friend
could get them, you know? Always somebody knew where to get them. . . It was like 10,
15 of us that would take them and, worst case scenario, I would drive upstate, there was
always [opioids] up there.

Buying, selling, and trading opioid analgesics within close social networks was a
prevalent theme among participants in this study, and for those who became dependent, easy
access to opioids within friendship groups helped sustain regular use and likely increased the risk
of developing an opioid dependence. However, while medication sharing is widely cited in the
diversion literature, most of the sharing described by participants in this study was in fact
transactional in nature, and persons selling their own prescriptions made sizeable profits by
doing so. For example, an insured patient receiving a prescription for 120 tablets of 30mg
oxycodone stood to make up to $2400 net profit, minus the cost of a co-pay, if applicable. Thus,
for many participants, the people supplying the opioids, the “dealers” as they would be classified
under the law, were typically the mothers, fathers, sisters or brothers of people within the local
community. As Donna suggested: “The pill dealers could be anyone’s mom. I mean, I have
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gotten pills from peoples’ moms. Whoever has a script, those are the pills dealers, you know,
anybody.”
The close nature of the social bonds between sellers and buyers was also articulated by
Sonia (white, aged 18), who had first misused opioids with her brother when she was 13 years
old, and had recently transitioned to heroin. Deliberating on the relationship she had with many
of the people she acquired drugs from she commented:

I feel like we all grew up together basically. There was a few that, you know, I just used
as a drug dealer, but a lot of dealers were my close friends, a lot of my dealers. Like I
said, we all grew up in the same neighborhoods, all the pills were really in
[Anonymized].

When referring to themselves or their peers, some participants often prefaced their
comments with qualifying statements regarding their appearance (“presentable”), their
background (“good family”), or their socioeconomic status (“well-off”), attributes that were also
extended to the people they bought drugs from. On the other hand, when talking about people
who were drug-involved and outside their social network, participants were often quick to
emphasize social differences, as Natalie did when recounting a story about a person she bought
drugs from after she had become opioid dependent: “He was obviously no good. I would never
talk to him sober, you know. But as a drug dealer, he was great.” Recall that Natalie had sold
opioid analgesics within her social network even prior to her own initiation. Her assessment of
her dealer’s character, therefore, is unlikely to be attributable simply to the distinction between
user and seller, but rather is a thinly veiled comment on racial and/or class differences.

107

Opioid analgesics then were not only widely available within participants’ locales but
also could be sourced from community insiders without the trepidation of acquiring drugs from
someone considered “other.” Further, in tight-knit communities where relationships between
doctors and patients were well-established, obtaining an opioid prescription from a doctor was
typically straightforward, because patients were community insiders and, as such, beyond
suspicion of medication misuse or diversion. Thus, in many communities, growing demand was
met with local supplies stimulated by the increasing number of people obtaining and diverting
prescribed opioids written directly to them, as reported by Jordan:

. . . Really the majority of [pills] is from people that worked, you know, middle class
families that worked, that got hurt, that either sell their whole script or half their script.
That’s a big percentage of people in working middle class neighborhoods.

An interesting comparison to the narratives describing the close social networks within
which many participants acquired and used their drugs comes from Jonathan (white, aged 28),
who had been misusing opioids for around five years. In the months before his interview,
Jonathan had been getting high with a friend from his neighborhood who, having recently tried
crack for the first time, suggested to Jonathan that together they drive to an area of town known
for its semi-open drug market to purchase more. He described the experience as followed:

I was constantly on drugs, so I didn’t even care, like yeah, let’s go, I don’t give a fuck.
I’m from [Anonymized], I live here. [My friend’s] like, “We’ve gotta go to [name of
project].” I’ve never ever really been there, like there’s no reason to go there. No one
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has family from there, you’re not gonna date anyone from there. It’s like you don’t go
there. It’s like any ghetto, you don’t go there. . . So we parked on one of the side streets
and a guy came up to the window and he’s like “Yo, what the fuck’s going on? Why the
fuck you guys over here?” And we’re like whoa, very aggressive, and we’re like “Hey
man, listen, just trying to get high, just trying to get high, we can’t find this shit anywhere
else, you know, we got money, let’s do a deal.”. . . We got with one guy, you know, and
then these guys they’re never… they’re not very reliant, you know, they sleep and they’re
up all night, but we want to get high at 10 in the morning, so we then had to go fish again
for another guy, daytime guy, nighttime guy, one guy wasn’t around, he was going
upstate, like they’re all, these people just… they’re like living this vagabond lifestyle. . . .
It’s not like the white drug dealers, the pill kids. They’re always around. They’re more…
consistent.

It is not within the scope of this dissertation to comment on the racialization of drug use
and the way in which the prescription opioid crisis has further revealed the divergent approaches
to drug policy depending on the racial and/or ethnic identity of those involved. However,
Jonathan’s portrayal of his crack-purchasing activities is instructive in that it reinforces the
notion that for many of this studies’ participants, there was no need to leave their own
community to acquire the drugs they wanted, or for those residing in predominantly white,
middle-class neighborhood, to cross boundaries “that [would] lead them from the imagined
safety of the suburban and rural white community and [expose them] to the violence that
supposedly characterizes the inner city drug markets” (Netherland and Hanson, 2016: 677).
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While social network analysis previously has been utilized to explore behavioral health
risks, especially relating to blood-borne infections associated with substance use, such as HIV
and viral hepatitis (Friedman et al., 1999; Klovdahl et al., 1994; Pivnick et al., 1994), and more
recently to assess risk of gun homicides in high-crime communities (Papachristos and Wildeman
2014), problem substance use per se is often still considered at an individual level. The narrative
descriptions of some participants regarding the ubiquitous nature of opioid use among their
communities suggests that greater exploration of what Pivnick and colleagues (1994) term an
“inter- and intracommunity problem” might yield new insights into the proliferation of opioid
misuse within particular geographic locales. As previously discussed, the pharmaceutical
industry undoubtedly contributed to the current opioid issue by promoting prescribed opioids for
widespread use. However, utilizing a network approach might help shed light on why some
communities appear to be more vulnerable to widespread opioid misuse than others.
As participants who eventually became opioid dependent moved toward entrenched use,
many sought out more cost effective ways of accessing pills, which often involved finding a
doctor from whom they could obtain a prescription, and/or selling opioid analgesics to fund their
use. Accounts given by participants in this study suggest that between the years 2008 to 2012,
the street price of opioid analgesics increased significantly. Thus, while a 30mg oxycodone tablet
had once sold for $8 to $12, by the time fieldwork was conducted in 2013 and 2014, a single
30mg oxycodone tablet cost an average of $20, with prices as high as $25 reported.32 Given that
participants who became opioid dependent were generally consuming a minimum of three, and
sometimes as many as 15 tablets a day, the financial burden of their escalating use was often
extremely high. The majority of participants in this group reported that on one occasion at least,
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As with many types of sales transactions, the price quoted for a single unit (in this case a pill) would typically be
discounted if a customer bought multiple units at a time.
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they had received a prescription directly from a doctor with the intention of misuse, and the
mechanisms by which they did so are discussed further below.
For those individuals who had initiated opioid analgesic misuse with pills from their own
prescription while under the care of a physician (n=16), attempts were often made to draw out
their symptoms for as long as possible with the hope that the physician would continue to
provide opioid therapy. For example, Mason (Latino, aged 24), first received pain medication
following an accident when he was 17 years old. Knocked off his bicycle by a car, he suffered a
back injury and was given a prescription for 7.5mg oxycodone/acetaminophen tablets. After a
month of treatment, Mason, who by this time had started to misuse his medication, complained
to his doctor of continuing pain in the hope he would prescribe something stronger: “I felt really
good. . . I think I was still in pain, but that kind of numbed everything. I liked that feeling.”
Following, the doctor wrote him a monthly prescription for 120 tablets of 30mg oxycodone and
Mason was able to obtain opioids prescriptions from medical providers for several years before
he transitioned to heroin. Mason’s medical history relating to his injuries leant legitimacy to his
request for ongoing pain medication, and if he thought one doctor suspected he was misusing or
knew he had given a “dirty” urine sample,33 he simply found another. Mason estimated that in
three years, he had received prescriptions from five different doctors: “Some of them I got drug
tested and I knew I was dirty, so I just wouldn’t go anymore. I would just find a new pain
management doctor. It was very easy to find a new doctor.”
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Patients who receive an opioid analgesic prescription for more than three consecutive months typically are
considered “chronic” opioid users. In such cases, physicians often utilize urine analysis screening to monitor
whether the patient is actually using the medication prescribed to them, and to check for the presence of other
substances.
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Mark (white, aged 35), was also first prescribed opioid analgesics for his back following
a car accident in 2007. Now opioid dependent, Mark had been able to get prescriptions from
various doctors over the years because of his extensive medical history. However, like Mason, it
had become difficult for him to distinguish if he continued to need pain relief for his physical
injuries, or because he enjoyed the feeling of the medication, and when asked directly if he was
taking his medication to get high, Mark responded: “I think so. I believe so, because I like the
coping mechanism. Sometimes you just want to get away, and it like relaxes me really.”
The ambivalence expressed both by Mason and Mark over whether their continued use of
opioids was driven by their physical pain, or another sensation they gained by taking the
medication, was echoed by other participants who had also suffered serious injuries. Further,
once an individual had developed a physical opioid dependence, the distinction between the pain
relating to their original injury and the pain they experienced as a result of opioid withdrawal
(which can include severe muscular aches) was also difficult to differentiate. Paula (black, aged
52), who had been prescribed opioids for seven months following a shoulder injury, described
the dilemma of her growing opioid dependence:

. . .My body’s used to [opioid analgesics] now. . . If I miss it, I get nauseous. I feel
nauseous, yeah, like to throw up. And then I start hurting real bad. It seems like the pain
will come more from that.

For some participants, the stack of medical records they had accrued as a result of a
warranted medical injuries enabled them to obtain opioid prescriptions on an ad hoc basis. For
example, Lucas (white, aged 28), had been misusing opioids off and on since the age of 17. In
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his early 20s, he suffered a motorcycle accident, treatment of which had generated a thick
medical file documenting a serious leg injury. When he moved to New York a few years later,
Lucas had not used opioids for several months: “It was on and off, on and off. I’d be clean for
about three months, and then I would dip and do it for a week.” However, when he arrived in the
city, short of money he knew he could generate by selling opioids, he went armed with his
medical records to his local doctor’s office and requested a new prescription.

The doctor's office, you came into.. the first one, it was the closest one to where I lived in
[Anonymized] which was the craziest thing, and I went in there and I said simply, “Hey
I'm blah, blah, blah, I'm just looking for a physician to continue my medication” and a
nurse sees you first, not the doctor. And she goes, “Okay, what is the medication?” I go,
“It's OxyContin® 80.” So she starts writing this thing and she goes, “How many times a
day?” like it's nothing in the world. Three times a day, okay, is there anything else? I was
like, “Sure, 90 of Xanax® 2 milligram.” So she just wrote it out, you know and just not
thinking or whatever . . . And she lays it there for the doctor to sign. The doctor came in
the first time, just signed it, you know, he was in a hurry. The second time of course when
I come in there, he kinda saw and he was like, “Whoa, this is very strong, blah, blah,
blah.” So, he wanted to always taper 'em but I would always discourage him, look, you
know, this is how much I used to be on and this is working for me now, can you wait and
I would probably spin it and he prescribed me that for a year.

The previous two decades have seen a tremendous upsurge of prescriptions for opioid
analgesics to treat chronic pain; however, the efficacy of long-term, or chronic opioid therapy,
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has come under increased scrutiny (Martell et al., 2007; Papaleontiou et al., 2010). A 1997
consensus statement by the American Pain Society and the American Academy of Pain Medicine
supporting the use of opioids for non-cancer pain asserted that the risks of maintaining patients
on long-term opioid therapy were low, and that endeavors to curb diversion should not limit
prescribing (Von Korff et al., 2011). However, there is little evidence to support long-term
opioid therapy and few studies have been conducted to determine the efficacy of opioid
treatment over time. Further, in 2009, a review of the evidence for an American Pain Society and
American Academy of Pain Medicine clinical practice guideline concluded that current
recommendations for treating chronic non-cancer pain were based on findings in which
important research gaps were subsequently identified (Chou et al., 2009b)
While there is still relatively little research detailing the rate of opioid use disorder among
patients receiving long-term (chronic) opioid therapy, some studies have indicated that this
phenomenon is not uncommon (Van Korff et al., 2011). Boscarino and colleagues (2010) report
that among their sample of primary care patients receiving long-term opioid therapy, 26 percent
were estimated to be misusing their medication. Further, findings from a study among patients
receiving long-term opioid therapy for low back pain suggest that more than half (56%) of
patients progressed to problematic opioid use (Martell et al., 2007). These figures are wildly
divergent to those previously reported in support of opioid therapy. For example, a letter to the
editor of the New England Medical Journal—often cited by thought leaders espousing the
benefits of opioids in the 1990s and early 2000s—suggested that the risk of addiction among
patients treated with opioids amounted to less than 1 percent (Porter and Jick, 1980), a statistic
widely referenced by the pharmaceutical industry when promoting the use of opioids to treat
chronic pain.
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In considering patients who initiate opioid analgesic misuse as a result of a warranted
illness or injury and prolong symptoms in order to extend their supply, Lembke suggests we
examine their behavior through the “new cultural norms concerning the nature and meaning of
pain,” and the role of “illness narratives” in supporting patients to perpetuate their use of these
medications (Lembke, 2016:40). She argues that in modern times, pain is considered anathema,
and the current view that has yoked the experience of physical and/or mental pain to neurological
damage that may result in increased susceptibility for future pain, has helped stimulate the recent
increases in opioid prescribing.
It is paradoxical then, that treating current pain, as well as mitigating the risk for future
pain might, conversely, incur other lasting consequences. Opioid induced hyperalgesia (OIH) is a
syndrome in which sustained opioid use has the effect of creating greater sensitivity to pain
(Chang et al., 2007). Studies in both humans and animals have shown that, over time, some
people who take opioids on a regular basis, whether their use is medical or non-medical, may
experience worsening pain, unexplained pain, and/or pain at sites distant from the underlying
injury or surgery (Angst and Clark, 2006; Chu et al., 2006). While OIH has been referenced in
the medical literature since the late 1800s, the incidence of this syndrome is unknown (Varney
and Bebarta, 2013), and there is currently a dearth of research in this area. However, the use of
opioids for chronic, non-cancer pain has likely resulted in increased rates of OIH, and individuals
embarking on long-term opioid use may end up exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, their
symptoms (Angst and Clark, 2006).
Many participants who became opioid dependent but did not have a medical history that
warranted opioid therapy also found ways to obtain prescriptions from doctors and, within closeknit communities, information about physicians inclined to write for opioids was a commodity in
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and of itself. These doctors’ details were often traded within networks of people misusing
opioids on the understanding that the pills garnered from the first few prescriptions would be
divided between the patient and the person providing the information quid pro quo. The range of
oversight provided by the prescribing physicians varied enormously. Broadly speaking,
participants described two types of medical providers; (1) prescribers who to some extent were
complicit in prescribing beyond the scope of professional practice, a phenomenon that will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6; (2) prescribers who were unwittingly misled by patients
seeking opioids.
For those participants who set out to mislead a physician in order to obtain an opioid
prescription, a common strategy was to present bogus medical records indicating a medical need
for pain treatment. Jason, who initiated opioid misuse non-medically, and did not have a
warranted medical reason to get his own prescription, explained how easy it was to fabricate the
necessary documentation:

I had a friend that said, “I can make you a fake MRI.” Guess he had a typed-up paper of
a real MRI and just changed the name on the top, changed the date, whatever he had to
do. And I . . . had to pay him for that, pay him for the doctor hookup because he showed
me what doctor to go to in the city. And then I had to give him, let’s say, 50 pills the first
time I picked up my prescription, too. And then, boom, I gave him that. And now I’m
hooked up with my doctor.

While details of the various schemes utilized by participants to get prescriptions differed slightly,
the consistency between their stories was striking. Chris, who resided in a different borough than
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Jason, and also began using opioids non-medically, provided a similar account of how he was
able to procure his own prescription:

First you have to go to a doctor’s office, usually people will tell you which doctors to go
to. It all starts with a doctor who's willing to give you a script. Before that, you go and
you get an MRI and it's usually like a fake MRI, you know, that shows you tore a ligament
in your leg or something like that. You know, the doctor sees that, he'll give you the
script then you go to the pharmacy and you get it filled and that's it. . . [I got the doctor’s
information] through someone else who sold drugs on the outside. . . The way it worked
is he gave me the information and then he got X amount of the script. So if it was for 180
pills, you know, I would split it with him. [It] cost me $150 for the fake MRI, I got that
from the same person that sent me to the doctor. I guess he was using them for other
people and he gave one to me, I think it was just all the same one. . . I guess [the doctor
is] covered on his end because he’s taking this MRI, he’s looking at it whether he knew
or not that it was, you know, a non-legit MRI, I don’t know. The way he acted about it
was that, you know, he saw it, he goes “OK” and he prescribed me the medication.

In a commentary published in the New England Journal of Medicine, Lembke (2012)
considers factors that might lead doctors to prescribe to patients who they may be aware are
either misusing their own medication or diverting it to non-medical use. Aside from the support
of pain as the fifth vital sign and the push for physicians to act compassionately with regard to
their patients’ subjective experience of pain, Lembke suggests that ubiquitous patient satisfaction
assessments, coupled with increasing numbers of websites that encourage patient evaluation of
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doctors, could result in physicians turning a blind eye to patients’ drug-seeking behavior. Poor
reviews are likely to result in loss of earnings, and unfavorable comments stemming from a
refusal to prescribe pain medications are to be expected given the current zeitgeist in the U.S.
that “all suffering is avoidable” (Lembke, 2012: 36), and any type of physical or mental pain
ought be alleviated with medication. Further, she suggests that until substance use issues are
given the same credence as other chronic diseases and reimbursement for treating problem
substance use is adequate, prescribing opioids to their patients may seem like the easiest course
of action (Lembke, 2012).
In cases where aberrant prescribing is identified, a paradigm often used to characterize
the physicians under scrutiny is the “4D” model, first presented at the White House Conference
on Prescription Drug Abuse in 1980, and subsequently adopted by the American Medical
Association (AMA) (Lowinson, 2005). The 4Ds categorize prescribers as “dated,” “duped,”
“disabled,” and “dishonest.” In brief, dated refers to physicians whose training is no longer in
line with standards of practice; duped describes physicians who have been deceived by patients
attempting to obtain medical services or prescriptions under false pretenses; disabled relates to
physicians whose judgment is compromised by their own illness, substance use, or other
behavioral issues; and dishonest refers to physicians who are complicit in prescribing controlled
substances fully aware that they are likely to be misused or diverted (Council on Scientific
Affairs, 1982).
Several commentators have suggested the “4D” framework is problematic, especially
when considering doctors who fall into the duped category. For example, Jung and Reidenburg
(2007) question the extent to which a physician should be held accountable for prescribing
opioids to a deceitful patient, citing a study in which even criminal justice personnel failed to
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ascertain if someone was lying.34 They argue that physicians operate with a “truth bias”
(Burgoon et al., 1994, cited in Jung and Reidenburg, 2007: 434) and work from the premise that
their patients’ complaints are genuine. Further, the authors reference several studies
demonstrating that a physician’s ability to identify “standardized patients”—that is, individuals
who have been trained to mimic the symptoms and experiences of specific medical issues for
training and research purposes—is often lacking.
The premise of Jung and Reidenburg’s disquiet is that if a physician is duped by a
patient, this may be taken as substantiating a claim that they were prescribing beyond the scope
of professional practice. However, in an earlier article by the same authors, they demonstrate
that: “When adequate documentation exists in the medical record, the risk of civil, criminal, or
administrative action being taken by the DEA against a physician for prescribing opioids for a
chronic pain patient is small” (Jung and Reidenburg, 2006: 353).35 The stipulation regarding
“adequate documentation” is all important here and exemplifies the issues with the existing
model: being duped does not reflect the behavior of the physician her or himself, but focuses
instead on the behavior of the patient for which a physician should not be held accountable.
However, as Jung and Reidenburg point out, providing a doctor engages with the patient and
their medical care in a meaningful way, they are unlikely to be targeted for prosecution or
administrative sanction (Jung and Reidenburg, 2006).
While obtaining a prescription under false pretenses (i.e., drug-seeking) was fairly
common among participants who became opioid dependent, the practice of visiting multiple

Results from this study can be found in: Ekamn, P., and O’Sullivan, M. (1991). Who can catch a liar? American
Psychology, 46, 913-920.
35
Jung and Reidenburg’s research showed that in the 2003 and 2004 study period, of the 963,385 physicians
registered with the DEA, there were only 47 arrests and 56 revocations of registration.
34
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doctors for concurrent opioid prescriptions, or doctor shopping, was reported only sporadically.36
Barry (white, aged 35), who had been misusing opioids for more than 15 years explained how he
had once had three doctors simultaneously prescribing Percocet®.

At one point I had three doctors. One was in Long Island, one was in Queens, and the
other one was in Brooklyn. The Brooklyn guy knew I was trying to get something. The
Queens guy kind of suspected, where he kind of wanted to drop me because he felt like I
was, but he couldn’t prove it, so he couldn’t really drop me because of that, and the Long
Island guy, he was my doctor from the beginning. He had no idea about anything. He
thought he was the only one. And then work comp would pay for one—they would pay for
the Long Island one—Medicaid would pay for the Queens one, and then I’d pay out of
pocket for the Brooklyn one.

However, with the recent institution of the New York State Internet System for Tracking Over
Prescribing, or I-STOP bill written into law in August 2013 and discussed in detail in Chapter 7,
many participants commented that obtaining prescriptions from multiple prescribers in the same
month was no longer feasible.
In addition to obtaining opioid prescriptions directly from a doctor, a few participants
described other strategies for acquiring pills from medical providers. Generally, these schemes
were more convoluted and involved a greater degree of prevarication than a personal visit to the
doctor. However, the substantial profit that could be made from multiple prescriptions was a
powerful incentive. In their description of prescription drug diversion in Miami, Florida, Inciardi
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While there are multiple definitions of the term, for the purposes of this analysis, doctor shopping was categorized
as obtaining an opioid analgesic prescription from more than one doctor in the same month.
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and colleagues (2007) use the term “pill broker” to describe a person who steers individuals to
obtain prescriptions from a doctor in order to then sell them. Jack, described a similar scheme in
which he organized a group of friends and acquaintances to visit doctors for opioid prescriptions,
furnishing them with the cash to pay for the office visit and dividing the pills once the
prescription was filled.

A couple of my friends have [physical] problems. And I know a person who knows a
doctor so I get my friends into the doctor and they break me off [share the resulting
pills]. . . It was me and my one friend, it was our gig. My one friend knew the three
doctors because he had prescriptions for himself because he was doctor shopping. And I
know kids that have—a lot of them have legitimate problems. Car accidents, sport
accidents, torn rotator cuffs. . . I go with them to the doctor, or my boy will go with one of
them to the doctor. And we’ll sit there, they’ll get the prescription, we’ll go with them to
fill the script. And then they break us off. . . I take half for three scripts, and then I take a
quarter for every other script. So the first three times they go, say they get 180, I get 90 of
them the first three times. Then I’ll get a quarter of them, so I’ll get 30 of them. But that’s
for every time they go.

Similarly, Danny, who started selling opioid analgesics in high school before ever misusing
himself, was also operating as a pill broker. In his tight-knit community, it was easy for him to
find people to go to the doctor on his behalf and he commented: “You pay them four or five
hundred dollars and… they’ll do it happily.” Reflecting on the time he was engaged in selling he
said:
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[I sold pills] probably like two or three years. I probably would’ve never stopped selling
if I didn’t get arrested [on a misdemeanor assault charge], I was making too much. I
mean I was still a boy and I was pulling in more than what my father was mak[ing]…I
was making like twelve, thirteen hundred dollars a week and I wasn’t doing anything for
it. I was just going to school and then I would come home and sit on my ass and then
come outside and meet somebody. You know, I was meeting somebody that are taking six
pills, that’s $60 profit right there, and that was recurring itself [sic], you know, every 10
or 15 minutes. My phone would be blowing up so much that I would have to put my
phone on vibrate.

While participants noted that the I-STOP legislation, had made it considerably more difficult for
one individual to obtain prescriptions from multiple doctors, the schemes described by Jack and
Danny involved multiple individuals visiting one or several doctors making them much more
difficult to detect.
The procedures for obtaining opioid analgesics above were described by participants
whose trajectory of misuse resulted in opioid dependence, and by the time members of this group
had identified their use as a problem, all were either purchasing pills, misusing pills from a
prescription written in their own name, or selling pills to fund their use. Indeed, the majority had,
at some point, actively engaged in selling opioids, not just on an ad hoc or sporadic basis, but as
a substantial money-making venture. Participants’ narratives suggest that within their
communities, a wide range of individuals were involved in the diversion of opioid analgesics
resulting in a diffuse market from which many people could profit. More than half (25 out of 44)
the participants who reported opioid dependence, also reported they had, at some point, and to
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varying degrees, sold pills themselves. Further, reports suggest that among this sample, the vast
majority of diverted pills were generated from prescriptions written by medical providers which
were then redistributed throughout communities.
Research has shown that individuals who “redistribute” prescription medication, perceive
the risk associated with such behavior to be lower than the risk associated with the distribution of
illicit drugs (Harris et al., 2015). Indeed, using enforcement for possession as a proxy for risk,
data show that Americans are substantially less likely to face arrest for possession of prescription
medications as they are for possession of illegal drugs. For example, in 2009, the arrest rate per
100,000 was 15.6 for the illegal possession of pharmaceutical drugs, compared to 72.8 for the
possession of heroin or cocaine ( U.S Census Bureau, 2009, cited in Netherland and Hanson,
2016), despite the considerably higher rates of prevalence for the use of prescription drugs.

Sources of opioid analgesics for non-dependent participants
In contrast to the participants described above, participants (n=19) who, at the time they
participated in the study, had not developed an opioid dependence, did not tend to be immersed
in social networks that facilitated ongoing misuse. The fact that their demand for pain pills was
not driven by a physical or psychological dependence meant that typically, pills were acquired in
a less deliberate and more opportunistic way.
Phoenix (multi-racial, aged 23), described how her use of opioids tended to be
circumstantial, and her narrative mirrors findings from Daniulaityte and colleagues (2014)
highlighting medication sharing among family members. Phoenix had first misused hydrocodone
when she was aged 13, with a pill she took from her mother who was on long-term opioid
therapy following a childhood bout of polio. She did not remember anything positive about that
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experience, but over the next several years, sporadically took and/or was given opioids from her
parent’s prescriptions to treat incidental pain and “because I was bored.” Following a wisdom
tooth extraction when she was 17, Phoenix received her own prescription for hydrocodone and
although she used it as directed, on this occasion, she enjoyed the opioid effect and continued
taking the remaining pills after the pain had subsided. However, once the prescription was
finished, she did not seek out an alternative source, and the pills she had intermittently continued
to misuse since then had almost exclusively come from leftover pills from her own or her
father’s warranted prescriptions, or her father’s. Occasionally, she obtained pills from a friend,
and several months previously, while working as a babysitter for a family in New York, she
taken a couple of hydrocodone tablets from their medicine cabinet.
Phoenix’s opioid misuse was tied to accessibility and she acknowledged that while she
does not seek out pills to use, she will take them whenever she happens upon them. However,
beyond a cursory look for opioids when visiting her father, she had not made an effort to find a
regular source or previously paid for diverted opioids.

When I’m at my dad’s house, I’ll look around, but I wouldn’t go try and buy it unless…
the only time I’ve sought anything out was when I had gone to the doctor and they had
done a minor surgery, but it wasn’t extreme enough for them to give me anything for pain
afterward. And I was in pain and I asked my boyfriend to find any one of these [types of
opioid analgesics], but nothing came of it. But that’s because I was actually legitimately
in pain and I was taking eight ibuprofen a day and it wasn’t working.
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The details relating to Phoenix’s narrative—obtaining pills from the family medicine cabinet,
misusing extraneous pills from warranted prescriptions, and pilfering pills from other people’s
medicine cabinets—have been highlighted by scholars, policy makers, and the media as being an
integral part of the opioid problem. However, while leftover pills surely account for a proportion
of opioid analgesics that are misused, the distribution of this excess medication is probably so
diffuse that individuals who become opioid dependent and require a steady supply are driven to
find an alternative source.
Like Phoenix, some participants who did not become opioid dependent suggested that
their patterns of use were, at least to some degree, governed by access. George (white, aged 25),
had been misusing opioids since he was 18 and, along with his ex-girlfriend, had experienced
periods of more or less frequent use. For the previous year, George had been purchasing opioid
analgesics from an individual who sold a variety of drugs including marijuana, ecstasy, and other
pharmaceuticals such as Xanax® and Adderall®. In contrast to the in-network transactions
described above, George’s relationship with his dealer was purely transactional, and he did not
interact with him in any other context aside from drug purchases. However, acquiring drugs from
this source was so easy and convenient, the frequency with which George misused opioids
increased:

So I started seeing him maybe once every other week for a few months. And then it was
around March or April where he would just essentially—what it worked out to be was he
would just text me whenever he got Percocet because he wouldn’t always have it,
because it goes really fast. And so he’d just text me and be like “Hey, I have tens, or I
have 30s” . . . And a lot of it was just the really simple convenience of it all. It’d be like
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he’s going to come and meet me at my house after I get off work. Like it was just really, it
wasn’t a hassle for me.

George typically saw his dealer once a week and tended to limit his spending to no more than
$100 in a single transaction. However, although he was using pills more frequently than
previously, how much he used was still determined by the amount his dealer could supply him
with, and at no time did he seek out an alternative source.

It pretty much stayed that way for like the next five months which it was probably about
three or four times a week. And then, you know, with some fluctuation. I mean sometimes
there’d be two week where I wouldn’t at all because he wouldn’t have anything. . .[Then]
I would definitely get frustrated because [taking opioids] became this routine, this habit.
I would get frustrated that I wasn’t able to, like I couldn’t leave work and go and have
this relaxing evening. Specifically, what I would do, I just got into this habit of when I’d
take them, I would just sit. I was living in a place at the time that had a front porch that I
could sit on. And I would just sit out there and read all night. Not all night, but just like
read later into the night, just chain smoking. And so yeah, that continued when they were
available, right up until I moved out of that place. And no it’s like I don’t really have
access to that guy anymore. I don’t live near him.

Despite his use of the word “habit,” George did not report the he had ever become opioid
dependent, and following his move to a new neighborhood, he had not purchased opioids from
his dealer for around six weeks. Reflecting on his recent abstinence from pills, he said: “I would
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argue that’s because of lack of access, not like complete strong resolve on my behalf.” While it is
not possible to characterize the interconnection between access and patterns of use, it is
noteworthy that individuals who did not become opioid dependent had more limited means of
acquiring these medications and did not tend to seek out alternative sources that could provide
them with a more consistent supply. Further, in contrast to those who became opioid dependent,
no participants in this group reported ever selling opioid analgesics.
Recall Anna, a medical initiate described in Chapter 4. Initially prescribed for a
warranted medical condition, Anna asked for and received consecutive prescriptions from her
doctor which she misused every month. Provided only with a low dose, and low median day’s
supply, she always ran out of pills before it was time for her to refill her prescription, but Anna
was not in a social group that facilitated ongoing opioid misuse, and rather than find another
source, she waited until she could refill her prescription from her doctor without raising
suspicion. Anna commented:

It’s funny ‘cos I thought, well, I’m not gonna go doctor shopping, and I’m not gonna try
and find some street connection, like I just thought, I’ll have to wait until it’s time. And
there was a part of me that was relieved too. Because during the time, at least for me, the
experience was, during the time that I’m on these pills, I wasn’t telling anyone, and I’m
not a secretive person by nature so I was very uncomfortable with that and I always felt
like I was not in control, but I couldn’t not take them, so if they were there, I had to take
them, so I had a lot of relief when they weren’t there any more, like I don’t have to keep
doing this, alright, good, let me get back to normal.
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Despite her sense of relief when she had finished her supply for the month, when the time came
to renew her prescription, Anna visited her doctor for a refill on the very day she was able. Anna
continued misusing her opioid prescription in this way for more than a year, facilitating a pattern
of use which resulted in periods of enforced abstinence, and as with some of the other
participants in this group, it is possible that her reticence to seek opioid analgesics from an
alternative source safeguarded her from becoming dependent.
Although there were some similarities in the sources of opioid analgesics between
dependent and non-dependent users, the difference in acquisition between these groups related
predominantly to the consistency of access and/or volume of pills that these provided. While
non-dependent participants tended to acquire opioids on an ad hoc and opportunistic basis, those
who became dependent reported communities and social networks that facilitated ongoing use.
Thus, for participants in the latter group, any changes in the dynamic of the illicit market are
likely to have had a substantial effect and will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER SIX:
DOCTORS AND OPIOIDS: A CONTINUUM OF PRESCRIBING OVERSIGHT
“Doctors pour drugs, of which they know little, to cure diseases of which they know less, into
patients, of whom they know nothing.” Voltaire

For most of the twentieth century, among the medical community, the use of opioidbased analgesia was restricted to end-of-life and cancer pain, with many doctors eschewing these
medications for fear of the potential negative consequences. However, a focus on the inadequate
treatment of pain in the late 1980s stimulated by professional bodies such as the American Pain
Society and American Pain Foundation,37 coupled with a marketing blitz of new formulations of
opioid-based products from the pharmaceutical industry, resulted in a profound attitudinal shift
among physicians regarding the use of opioid analgesics for acute and chronic, non-cancer pain
and an explosion in the rate of opioid prescriptions. For example, in 2006 there were 47 million
opioid analgesic prescriptions38 dispensed per calendar quarter in the U.S., increasing to 62
million in the fourth quarter of 2012 (Dart et al., 2015); on an annual basis, these figures equated
to enough medication to provide a three weeks supply to every adult in the U.S. (CDC, 2014).
Increases in the number of opioid prescriptions have been concurrent with increases in
the number of people misusing these medications and while a proportion of the opioid analgesics

37

The American Pain Foundation (APF), an advocacy group for pain patients, strongly supported the use of opioid
analgesics for non-cancer pain suggesting that the risk of developing an opioid use disorder when using these
medications was minimal. In 2012, ProPublica launched an investigation into the entities that funded this group and
found that in 2010, 90 percent of the foundation’s funding originated from the pharmaceutical industry. The
investigation also revealed that the organization had lobbied against federal and state proposals to limit the use of
opioids, and that several of the foundation’s board members had financial ties to drug companies (ProPublica, May
2012). As the U.S. Senate Finance Committee announced an investigation into the pharmaceutical companies that
manufacture opioids and the groups that advocate for them, the APF announced it was disbanding with immediate
effect due to “irreparable economic circumstances.”
38
This data includes prescriptions written for six types of opioid analgesic medication including: oxycodone,
hydrocodone, hydromorphone, fentanyl, morphine, and tramadol.
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that are ultimately misused are diverted from the supply chain prior to being dispensed, law
enforcement data from New York City suggest that the loss of opioid analgesics from
manufacturers or distributers is low (NY/NJ HIDTA, 2015). It is likely, therefore, that the
majority of opioid analgesics that are misused or diverted into the illicit market originate from
prescriptions written by doctors (Davis and Carr, 2016; Volkow and McLellan, 2016).
The usefulness of opioid analgesics as a pain medication is undisputed, and both
morphine and codeine are included on the World Health Organizations’ Model list of essential
medicines (WHO, 2015). However, opioid analgesics are risky drugs and physicians have a
responsibility to prescribe them carefully and in a manner that will “first do no harm.”39 Much of
the previous literature relating to the diversion of opioid analgesics has focused on the role of
drug-seeking patients (Davis and Johnson, 2008; Inciardi and McElrath, 2011), and while there
has been some attention on cases of egregious overprescribing often in relation to clinics branded
“pill-mills,” there has been less discussion about the range of prescribing practices and patient
oversight among physicians. As referenced in the previous chapter, while some doctors seemed
unaware that their patients were seeking opioids with the intention to misuse and prescribed
within the scope of professional practice, other physicians appeared to be complicit in their
patients’ drug-seeking behavior, performing only perfunctory examinations, and often requiring
payment in cash.
There is relatively little research relating to the sanctions or consequences imposed as a
result of aberrant prescribing practices. In their review of the forensic implications of opioid
prescribing, Rich and Webster describe a legal hierarchy of professional behaviors in medical
practice, stating that only physicians whose conduct is “demonstrably outside the bounds of

Often thought of as part of the Hippocratic Oath, primum non nocere or “first do no harm” appears in another
work written by Hippocrates, The History of Epidemics.
39
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minimally acceptable clinical practice” should be criminally prosecuted, and that other forms of
transgression including “distinct pattern[s] of negligent practice or one or more instances of
gross negligence or recklessness in patient should be adjudicated by the licensing authority”
[emphasis in the original] (Rich and Webster, 2011: S63). Thus, even in cases where negligence
has been shown, the authors argue that criminal proceedings are not appropriate and that
discipline should be meted out by state medical boards.
According to Freidson (1970), one of the defining characteristics of professional
occupations is a high degree of autonomy or self-regulation, and since medical boards were
established in the late nineteenth century, these bodies have been responsible for both granting
and revoking licenses permitting physicians to practice medicine. In her excellent ethnography of
a medical licensing and disciplinary board, Horowitz observes that: “The licensure movement
contributed to the creation of a powerful medical community with a self-justificatory discourse,
organizations to meet its needs, ethical codes, and training institutions for its members”
(2013:48). Indeed, once established, medical boards helped shape the image of the doctor as
altruistic, ethical, and capable of self-policing and, for many years, state courts left physicians
almost entirely to deal with their own affairs, with the result that even a conviction from a
criminal court did not necessarily result in a physician losing her or his license (Horowitz, 2013).
By the second half of the twentieth century, however, a shift toward more progressive
politics coupled with a growth in consumer advocacy groups called into question what was
essentially a closed system of internal oversight prompting medical boards to open their doors
and, for the first time, permit layperson representation. By allowing outsiders in, medical boards
gained some much needed legitimacy, but their continued failure to discipline their professional
members has remained a point of contention, and it has been argued that as a self-interested
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group, there will always be a reluctance to expose the bad apples within (Horowitz, 2013).
Indeed, as Jung and colleagues point out, at the time they conducted their review of US
physicians disciplined for criminal activity: “medical licensing boards in thirteen states and
jurisdictions do not consider a felony conviction related to the practice of medicine to be
sufficient grounds in and of itself for board review, hearing, or action.” (Jung et al. 2006: 1).
Further, among physicians convicted of a drug-related offense including criminally prescribing,
using, or possessing a controlled substance, only 54 percent had their medical licenses revoked,
surrendered, or suspended (Jung et al. 2006).
The “4D” model introduced in the previous chapter is often used as a basis to determine
sanctions against doctors under scrutiny for their prescribing of opioids and other scheduled
medications; however, as discussed, not all the categories correspond to the physicians’ own
behavior and concern about being “duped” may unnecessarily compromise the professional
responsibility a doctor has to trust their patient. An alternative method for evaluating the actions
of physicians in relation to their prescribing of opioids is to examine their professional conduct
during patient interactions, including the degree to which they manage, oversee, and document
the treatment plans of the individuals to whom they prescribe opioids. In this study, a typology
emerged to describe the continuum of oversight related to prescribing practices including four
categories I have termed: flagrant, loose, routine, and judicious, each of which is discussed in
more detail below.
At one end of the continuum were flagrant prescribers who prescribed widely to anyone
with the necessary means to pay, often only accepting cash for office visits. Levels of criminal
involvement within these medical clinics varied, and while some doctors appeared to be working
independently, other clinics attracted a host of players including pill brokers and middle-men
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working onsite to steer patients and organize prescription pickups. Participants who had received
prescriptions from flagrant prescribers described an office environment bustling with patients
waiting to be seen, and reported that in the course of their brief interaction with the physician
they had received little to no care. Often referred to in the media as “pill mills,” these doctor’s
offices or clinics seemed to be well-known within the drug-using community, and while data
from the PDMP indicates that these types of prescribers are relatively few in number, they are
likely responsible for hundreds of thousands of diverted pills.
In clinics where a broader criminal element was involved, “patients” were sometimes
recruited by pill brokers simply as entities to whom the doctor could write prescriptions. A
typical scenario would proceed as follows: a patient receives cash from a pill broker to cover the
cost of an office visit, with the expectation that s/he will then fill her/his prescription either with
a valid insurance card or a further cash advance. Once filled, the pill broker appropriates the
entire prescription (typically 180 pills) in return for a cash payoff. Kelly (white, aged 49),
provided the following account of how she and her friend were recruited by a pill broker to get
opioid analgesics from a doctor in the Bronx:

[Last summer], we didn’t have a lot of money and we went to Astramed,40 and we were
given $300 cash to go in and see [the doctor] and then offered another $500 to get the
prescription for oxycodone and aspirin and something, and [the doctor] had to write two

40

My decision to de-identify the clinic described by Kelly in the above excerpt is deliberate. Two months prior to
Kelly’s interview, the owner of Astramed, Kevin Lowe, was indicted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern
District of New York along with 24 other individuals including doctors, clinic staff, and pill-brokers who were
described as overseeing “crews of ‘patients’ sent into the clinics for medically unnecessary prescriptions” (USAO,
New York Southern, 15-115). The indictment charged that the clinic unlawfully distributed more than five million
oxycodone tablets over a period of three years. Following a trial in 2015, the owner of the clinic was sentenced to 12
years for conspiracy to distribute narcotics. The 24 individuals also arrested had previously pled guilty to the
conspiracy. Given that the case has been disposed and the defendants found guilty, I do not feel that it is in breach of
research ethics to reveal the name of the clinic.
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prescriptions, so we did that. . . The [Anonymized] gave us the money order for $300. I
would go in, hand it to [clinic personnel], because they watched you like hawks because
if you walked out with that $300 money order, the [Anonymized] was going to kill you. So
you had to give that to [clinic personnel] and then the doctor would come, ask you a
couple of questions and then just write the prescription. . .

With prescriptions in hand, Kelly and her friend were escorted to a car and driven to multiple
pharmacies, where they attempted to get the prescriptions filled. However, each time the doctor’s
details were entered into the system, the respective pharmacists refused to provide them with the
medication, and Kelly concluded: “The doctor was flagged. Totally flagged. He popped right up
on the computer, ‘I’m sorry, we can’t fill this.’” While Kelly and her friend were eventually
taken home, the pill broker held on to their Medicaid cards, and a week or so later, the cards
were returned to them along with $500 cash, leading Kelly to believe they had found a willing
pharmacist and, either fraudulently utilized their insurance cards, or paid for the prescription in
cash.
Kelly’s depiction of Astramed was echoed by another participant, Paula, who had been
misusing opioids for several decades and had also received unwarranted prescriptions from the
clinic, although not at the behest of a pill broker. In her narrative, Paula reproached the clinic for
“gypping people” as the doctor not only charged patients a $300 cash fee for the office visit, but
additionally billed Medicaid for the same service. She was further indignant about the pill
brokers steering patients to the clinic as, for an extra fee, these individuals often jumped the line,
their “appointments” given priority:
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My niece told me about [Astramed], but I didn’t like that place anyway. I was going to
stop going there anyway, because they had some guys from down here coming in there
running the place. They was putting their people in and getting…and at first it was $200
to get in, then after that they changed to $300. But then the guy would bring in people
from down here. They paid them $100 to put them ahead, but we had appointments! . . .
And we was sitting there and we got appointments, and then after a certain amount of
people, then he [the doctor] didn’t want to take nobody.

In addition to the prescribing practices reported above, participants described doctors
who wrote prescriptions for individuals with whom they had no direct contact. While this
practice was corroborated across several participants’ accounts, the mechanisms involved,
including the role played by the doctor, were less clear as most of these individuals had provided
their name to others to get a prescription on their behalf, rather than obtained the prescription
themselves. As Jordan explained:

Like I said, I had a friend that I just gave him my name and social and everything, and he
got me a prescription twice a month, and I would get about. . . I never had to [go to the
doctor]. . . He had a croak doctor.41 . . He was getting a lot, he was cashing a lot. He got
me two of like 180 oxycodone a month and we split it down the middle. I got like 70-ish.
Well, I guess it’s a little more in his favor than down the middle because he’s doing most
of the work, but I got 70 [from] each. . . And I would go to a pharmacy, and you know the
people, yeah, sometimes I’d pay cash, sometimes I’d use insurance etcetera, etcetera . . .

41

‘Croaker’ or ‘croak’ is a slang term used to describe a doctor willing to prescribe for monetary gain.
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You know it’s a funny thing because I’m like a young kid in like a Yankees cap, you know
what I mean? It’s obvious that I’m like 17 years old and that I’m not walking with a cane,
that I shouldn’t be getting this much powerful pain killers, but it’s going on. I don’t know.
I’m showing a legitimate script, you know, if they called the doctor [he would verify it].

Similarly, Philip reported how his doctor sometimes issued prescriptions for opioid analgesics to
patients who would then present with a different identity and receive further prescriptions for the
same medication. He described the office setting as follows:

You should have seen it. It was like homeroom, like you would see all your friends from
school in there. It was like homeroom in there. Like, it was all young kids in his waiting
room. And then you would have kids going in with other IDs, like with their older
brother’s IDs. This guy was so stupid that he didn’t even realize that it was like the same
person, and write the script to a different name. Like, that’s how stupid this guy was.

The scenario described above is indicative of how the “4D” model might be used to characterize
a physician as having been duped, and exemplifies why any taxonomy developed to explain
cases of aberrant prescribing should focus on the action of the physician rather than the intent of
the patient. While in Philip’s estimation the doctor was too obtuse to realize he was writing
prescriptions to the same person, it is not possible to determine the degree to which he was
complicit in providing drug-seeking patients with opioids. However, whether complicit or not,
the fact that he was incapable or unwilling to keep adequate records to effectively document his
patients characterizes him as a flagrant prescriber.
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In contrast to the above examples, Mark, who had first used opioid analgesics following a
serious back injury sustained in a car accident eight years previously, had received prescriptions
written to other people directly from his doctor. Unlike Philip who considered his prescriber to
be witless, Mark interpreted his physician’s actions as benevolent and further suggested that in
providing him with prescriptions written in others’ names, his doctor was in fact rewarding him.
He explained:

I had found my doctor’s prescription book and it was all… and I could have tooken it
[sic] and I know how to forge and all that because it’s been… but I was real honest about
it and I gave it back to him. He’s like, “You know, you’re the first person I’ve ever seen
give it back to me.”. . . That’s why he gives me whatever I want, whenever I want it.
Yeah, he’ll look out for me because he knows that I looked out for him, because he could
have got into trouble for that. . . but he does look out for me every now and again. He’ll
give me some for different people, like I’ll tell him somebody else’s name and all that. He
will do it for me. He looks out for me.

Within this analytic framework then, flagrant prescribers are those who make little or no pretense
of selling prescriptions for cash, engage in practices that are blatantly fraudulent, and/or maintain
such haphazard medical records that they are unable to, or uninterested in distinguishing the
patients to whom they prescribe. Although some of the practices in this category are similar to
“loose” prescribers positioned further along the continuum of oversight and described below,
what differentiates flagrant prescribers is the scale of their transgression which may result in the
distribution and diversion of thousands of pills. Indeed, an indictment in May 2017 involving
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three Brooklyn pain clinics charged that in a five year period doctors prescribed in the region of
6.3 million opioid analgesic pills to patients via medically unwarranted prescriptions.42
Most participants in this study who reported they had received a prescription as a result
of drug-seeking behavior had done so from physicians I have categorized as “loose” prescribers.
While the parameters separating these typologies are sometimes blurry, loose prescribers
typically exercised a greater degree of medical oversight than doctors operating pill mills.
Moreover, while the majority of practitioners in this group also only accepted cash payments,
visits usually involved a degree of doctor/patient interaction before a prescription was issued
including, but not limited to: urine toxicology screens, on-file MRI requirements, and cursory
physical examinations. However, these processes were generally understood by participants to be
an effort to provide a veneer of legitimacy to the doctor should they come under scrutiny, rather
than as standards of good practice, referred to by one participant as “CYA” or “cover your ass.”
Will, first introduced in Chapter 4 described how, when he could no longer get pain pills
from his regular doctor, he switched to a new provider who supplied him with opioid
prescriptions for cash.

[When] I stopped with that doctor, I wound up going to another doctor in New Jersey
who would basically write me whatever I wanted. . . Cash. All cash, no insurance, $300
[per visit]. . . At first, [he wrote me] 240 30 mg OxyContin® , I mean oxycodone. . . And
he would give me 60 2mg Xanax®. . . I went to him, I want to say for about two years

42

The indictment, which was the culmination of more than three years investigative work, included three primary
care clinics, Parkville Medical Health, LF Medical Services of NY, and PM Medical, the first two owned by Dr.
Feygin, and the third by Dr. McClung. According to the charges laid out by the office of New York City’s Special
Narcotics Prosecutor, the clinic owners were using oxycodone prescriptions as incentives for patients who agreed to
submit to medically unnecessary tests and procedures which were then billed to Medicaid and Medicare for amounts
totaling more than $24 million.
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because then things started getting… when I first went there, I was getting 240 [pills]
then he switched it where I’d have to see him every two weeks and he would give me 120
each. And then a little bit after. . . He would give me two scripts. I would see him once
and he would post-date the script. And it was funny too because he would urine test me to
make sure [the oxycodone] was in your system. But I remember a couple of times I came
up positive for cocaine and he would just be like, “Come back when you’re clean.”43 And
I think that happened once or twice. . . And he had a folder on me and he had all my XRays and all my paperwork from the previous doctors. . . I brought it in. I had all my
medical records.

Leaving the doctor’s office one day, Will was pulled over by the DEA and questioned
extensively about the doctor’s practice, including the medical procedures he underwent during
the visit. After confiscating the prescriptions he had just received, the DEA officers let him go
with a warning not to alert the doctor that he was under investigation. Will did not visit the
doctor again, turning instead to the street market for his supply. He later discovered that the
doctor had indeed been arrested.
Within the loose prescriber group, there was some variance among physicians’
prescribing practices, and while it is difficult to perceive the motivation driving doctors operating
pill mills as anything other than pecuniary, the intent of some of the doctors in this group
appeared to be more complex. Recall Grace, a 23-year old who had begun misusing pills non-

43

It is considered good practice for medical providers who prescribe opioid analgesics on an ongoing basis to
randomly conduct urine analysis on patients to ensure that (a) the drug they are prescribing is being ingested by the
patient and not diverted; (b) that the patient is not using any other type of substance.
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medically. At the time she was interviewed, Grace had recently connected with a doctor from
whom she was receiving monthly prescriptions for oxycodone. She explained:

I just heard about this doctor. What he does is he takes people, and a lot of his patients
have legit pain, but people like me, we just go in there and we tell him, “I don’t have
neuralgia or anything. I’ve been taking these for years. I take ten a day.”. . . I was on his
waiting list. I waited for a month or two. And then [the office] called me. I had to put
down $100 deposit just to get the appointment. I got the appointment. Went in with $250
[cash], told him my fucking story. I told him I used to get [opioid analgesics] prescribed
from other doctors, that I’ve been in car accidents, that I have a bad back and that’s why
I started taking them, blah, blah, blah. He asked me if I used to get them prescribed, but
he pretty much took my word for it, you know, no MRIs, no other copies of prescriptions.
He just took my word.

During her initial visit, however, the doctor also informed Grace that he would, over
time, slowly reduce the number of pills he prescribed, telling her: “The plan is to get you off
these things.” At the time she was interviewed, Grace had been seeing the doctor for four month.
Following her initial visit, he had prescribed 180 oxycodone 30mgs tablets to her for a 30 day
period. The next month, he wrote her the same prescription, but at the third visit, had reduced the
number of tablets to 165, and most recently, she had also received a prescription for 165 tablets.
Had this pattern continued, the physician theoretically would have tapered Grace’s opioid
analgesic prescription in what one might argue to be a medically appropriate manner. When
asked her opinion about the doctor’s intent, Grace said: “I think he’s a drug dealer. He’s a drug
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dealer that makes a lot of fucking money.” However, her later comments reflect the complexities
involved in the characterization of pain, and if one examines the doctor’s behavior with this in
mind, his actions could be interpreted through a more compassionate lens.

. . . It is pain, because when you’re on [opioid analgesics] you really do get pain. You
wake up in the morning, you’re sick and you’re in pain but it’s [withdrawal pain]. The
pain is brought on by yourself. You brought on the pain because you’re so reliant on
them and numb, so when you’re not on them, fucking anything hurts. Exactly, the pain is
from nothing, but it is real pain.

Similarly, Philip described a scenario whereby after his pain management doctor was shut down,
he visited his primary care doctor who prescribed him 60 oxycodone tablets, despite, and likely
because he was aware that Philip had an opioid use disorder, and was suffering acute symptoms
of withdrawal. Philip recalled:

. . . I went in there sick. I was sitting there and sweating. He was like “Are you alright?”
I was like, “No, I’m not alright.” I’m like, “I haven’t had a fucking blue [oxycodone
30mg] in like three days, I feel like I’m gonna die. It’s like I can’t even move, I can’t go
to work.” He was like, “I can give you sixty, here.” I mean he knows I take 220 a month.

While Philip’s primary care physician prescribed him small amounts of oxycodone on more than
one occasion, he also encouraged Philip to find another pain management clinic, and
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additionally, advised him to consider medication-assisted treatment, such as buprenorphine, a
partial agonist used to treat opioid use disorder often referred to by the brand name Suboxone®.

He’s suggesting Suboxone, he’s suggesting weaning myself off. He was always that nag
in my ear. He was a good doctor, but he was still giving them to me,‘cus he knows like
when you’re sick. That’s the only thing about these drugs, like opioids are great when
you’re doing ‘em, but when you’re not doing it, it is a fucking nightmare. . . you’re sitting
there throwing up shit and it is just the worst fucking thing when you don’t have that shit.
It is just the worst feeling in the world.

The descriptions of flagrant and loose prescribers provided by some participants align
with the concept of “script docs” similar to those referenced by Inciardi and colleagues (2009).
However, as illustrated above, while some of these physicians’ practices were clearly
incompatible with the Hippocratic principle, the intent of others was less obvious. In recent
years, there have been a number of highly publicized prosecutions of doctors indicted for
offenses involving opioid analgesic prescribing, ranging from drug distribution to felony
murder44, which several commentators have argued has led to a “chilling effect,” resulting in
some patients finding it hard to access much needed pain medication (Reisman et al., 2009).
To be considered criminal behavior rather than simply professional negligence,
prosecutors must establish that the U.S. Controlled Substances Act has been violated and that a
physician knowingly distributed a controlled substance they knew to be such “outside the usual

44

For example, in 2009, Richard Morgan, DO., was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute and to possess
with intent to distribute oxycodone and sentenced to 14 years incarceration, followed by three years supervised
release; and in 2007, Noel Chau, MD., was convicted of felony murder after one of his patients died of an accidental
drug overdose as a result of consuming the pills Dr. Chau had prescribed.
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course of medical practice.” A general standard often applied by the courts is whether the doctor
was acting in good faith that the prescription they issued was for a warranted medical purpose.
However, when considering the latitude that physicians have within the law, it is important to
remember that prescribing opioids for “detoxification treatment” or “maintenance treatment” is
not considered to be a legitimate medical purpose (Code of Federal Regulations: 21 CFR
1306.04). Prosecutors have laid out several indicators relating to actions questioning the notion
of good faith including: failure to follow professional procedures (e.g., taking a comprehensive
medical history, conducting a thorough physical examination, or formulating a proper treatment
plan) and suspicious circumstances (e.g., long lines of patients waiting to be seen, short length of
consult, and receiving payment in cash only). However, the volume of opioids prescribed, as
well as the dosage, have also been examined, and it is perhaps these indicators that have caused
the most tension between medical practitioners and law enforcement.
Despite the considerable media coverage of doctors who have been prosecuted for
opioid-related offences, research conducted by Goldenbaum et al., (2008) found that between
1998 and 2006, criminal or administrative charges and/or sanctions relating to opioid analgesic
prescribing were not very common. Indeed, over the study period, only 986 cases were
identified, representing 725 individual physicians or approximately 0.1 percent of the total
691,873 patient-care physicians active in 2003: of these, just over a third (n=335) involved
criminal cases, and the remainder (n=651) involved administrative cases. Further, the study also
challenged the assertion that it is largely pain management doctors who are targeted by law
enforcement (Libby, 2006), as these specialists accounted for only 3.5 percent of the physicians
involved in the identified cases (Goldenbaum et al., 2008).
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Reidenburg and Willis (2007) also found that criminal prosecutions against doctors were
fairly rare. In their review of indictments and/or trials of doctors across the U.S. for opioid
offenses over a two year period, they identified 47 cases involving 53 physicians, and in only 32
instances was the charge based on the overprescribing of opioids. However, despite the low
incidence of cases, the authors question the appropriateness of bringing criminal charges, and
argue instead that cases of aberrant prescribing first should be investigated by state medical
boards rather than law enforcement entities, in order to determine whether criminal action is
justified.
According to Libby (2006) doctors specializing in the treatment of pain face a
professional dilemma in that they may be sanctioned for under- as well as overprescribing.
Critical of what he sees as a renewed impetus to prosecute doctors suspected of writing
medically unnecessary opioid analgesic prescriptions, Libby suggests that “red flags,” such as
those detailed above, are arbitrary and often have no bearing on criminal behavior. The
American Medical Directors Association (AMDA) address the criminalization of medical
practice in resolution D95 (1995) which states that “a definition of criminal neglect should
combine elements of intention and recklessness with a departure from the standard of care.”
However, factors that constitute criminal neglect may be ambiguous and criminal cases against
physicians are difficult to prosecute. Further, even cases in which criminal convictions are
secured, state licensing bodies may not suspend or revoke a physician’s license to practice.
Along the continuum from loose prescribers are “routine” prescribers. These are
physicians who may be writing warranted prescriptions for opioid analgesics, but who do not
necessarily institute careful follow-up, or consider alternative strategies for managing ongoing
pain. What is distinctive about routine prescribers is their simultaneous adherence to standards of
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medical practice, while engaging in high-dose or long-term prescribing with little
acknowledgment of the associated risks, and little use or exploration of non-opioid pain
management strategies. Recall Will, who described his experience with a loose prescriber earlier
in this chapter. A medical initiate, Will started misusing opioid analgesics from a prescription
provided to him by a routine prescriber following an acute injury. Initially prescribed 60 pills of
7.5mg Vicodin® (hydrocodone and acetaminophen), he started to misuse within a few days of his
injury; however, refills were written as a matter of course and when he complained of continuing
pain, his doctor switched him to a higher strength formulation with no discussion about the
potential risks. He provided the following account:

I remember they gave me refills, and a few times I had gone to refill it before it was time
because I was taking so many. I had friends that [used opioids] so a couple of times I had
to buy them off the streets until my prescription filled. So yeah, I was doing a lot and they
kind of… when I started going to physical therapy, my surgeon stopped giving me the
Vicodin®. When I started doing the physical therapy, I was like “I need something
stronger,” and he gave me morphine sulfate.

The fact that Will had been seeking to fill his prescription early ought have alerted the doctor
that he was not taking the medication as directed and stimulated a discussion about his need for
ongoing medication, the risks of dependence, and/or options for alternative pain relief. However,
because Will presented with a legitimate injury, and additionally, suffered some further
complications during his treatment, he was prescribed opioids on an ongoing basis in absence of
any probing, or further assessment.
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Another example of a participant who was routinely prescribed opioids is Anna first
introduced in Chapter 4. Anna initially received opioids in the emergency department following
an acute condition, and while following up with her own doctor a couple of days later, was
prescribed approximately 20 tablets of 5mg Percocet®, which she gradually used up over time to
treat incidental pain. Recognizing that she enjoyed their effect, when she switched doctors after
moving to a new borough, she requested a refill of her Percocet® prescription, and after a general
medical examination and brief discussion about the joint pain she sometimes felt, was provided it
without question. Over the next year, Anna visited her doctor regularly to refill her prescription
and during that time does not recall having one conversation about the risks posed by opioids.
Indeed, the only opioid-specific reference Anna remembered is when her doctor mentioned the
increased scrutiny she felt doctors had come under for the prescribing of these medications:

. . . What she said was “You know, they’re really coming down on this stuff,” and she, I
don’t remember her exact words, but the impression she left, and I think what she meant
to say was that she thought it was inappropriate that doctors were being overly
scrutinized and she goes, “You know, I have like an elderly woman and she’s in a lot of
pain, and you tell me I can’t give her this?”. . . So whether or not she doesn’t understand
the risk, or the addiction potential. I think also she thought at least in my case, I wasn’t
coming back two weeks later, or making up a story. . . and I look normal, you know, I go
to work. Like I don’t think... so I just feel like between the way I presented. . . I think she
was a little dumb, but I also think there weren’t necessarily signs to make her think there
was a problem. I can’t say she’s to blame, or she’s some kind of irresponsible prescriber.
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Despite the attention that opioids have garnered over the previous decade, and the steady
increase in overdose deaths involving opioid analgesics across the US, doctors have continued to
prescribe these medications at a surprising rate, including to treat conditions for which evidence
of their effectiveness is questionable or even non-existent (Manchikanti et al. 2010; Chaparro et
al., 2014). While the confluence of events described throughout this dissertation, including the
intense marketing strategies by pharmaceutical companies and a focus on treating pain, played an
important role in persuading physicians to broaden their use of opioid-based analgesia for
chronic, non-cancer pain, it is disconcerting that amidst all the publicity regarding the public
health consequences relating to opioid use, the number of opioid prescriptions written by
physicians has not fallen substantially.
A contributing factor is the lack of education concerning pain management provided to
physicians as part of their medical training. In their survey of medical schools across the U.S.
and Canada, Mezei and Murinson found that many were not providing their students with any
meaningful instruction on this topic, and concluded that pain education across the U.S. was
“limited and fragmentary” (Mezei and Murinson, 2011: 1199). These findings are mirrored by
results from a survey conducted with 246 medical residents in which almost two-thirds rated
their medical school training to assess patients with non-cancer chronic pain as “fair” or “poor”
(Yanni et al., 2010). Further, while research has shown that a large proportion of opioid
prescriptions are written by family or internal medicine physicians (Volkow et al., 2009; Chen et
al., 2015), a study conducted by Keller and colleagues demonstrated that more than a third of the
primary care physicians they interviewed felt that the medical education they had received
centering on chronic pain had been unsatisfactory (Keller et al., 2012).
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In tandem with this deficit is the lack of training within medical schools on substance use
disorder. Estimates suggest that in the U.S., approximately 40 million people, 16 percent of the
population, are affected by a substance use disorder, more than heart disease (27 million) or
diabetes (26 million), and yet while 82 percent of physicians feel “very prepared” to identify
diabetes, only 17 percent feel the same way about detecting risky use of prescription drugs
(National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, 2012, cited in Lembke, 2016), and fewer
than 1 percent of practicing doctors identify as addiction specialists (Lembke, 2016).
The difficulty for physicians treating chronic pain in patients who may also be
susceptible to substance use disorders is exemplified by Darren (white, aged 39), who began
misusing opioid analgesics approximately 15 years ago. When he was 19, Darren was involved
in a car accident which resulted in four herniated discs. For the next five years he suffered
chronic back pain until he started dating a nurse practitioner who suggested he try Percocet.
Darren enrolled in the practice where she worked and, following an examination from the doctor
which included some unspecified tests as well as an MRI, he was prescribed Endocet® 10mg, a
dual-entity oxycodone-acetaminophen formulation. Recalling the first time he used this
medication, Darren enthused:

I remember being at work and my back was killing me. I had this bottle of pills that I had
gotten from the doctor. It was very cold out. It was in the middle of January and I
remember popping two of them. I remember being up on the ladder, speaking to one of
my friends. We were cracking some jokes and everything, and all of a sudden, I felt a very
warm sensation inside. The pain had just gone right away and I felt almost like, very
stoned, like feeling like you were high, on weed shall we say, but not as intense as being
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stoned. Just like a really good feeling. I felt good. I felt like all the pain had gone away. I
felt very energetic, very talkative. I noticed I was kind of over-talking. I’d be telling a
story, kind of chewing someone’s ear off basically, feeling really good. It was a really
good experience. It was like being reborn again basically for me, because I was in such
agonizing pain before, that my whole life was based on being uncomfortable all the time.

For the next five years, Darren was somewhat stable on his medication, although often
took more than he was prescribed at the weekends for recreational purposes, especially to
compensate for the fact that he had stopped smoking marijuana at the behest of his girlfriend, the
nurse practitioner who had first suggested he try opioid pain medication. However, stopping
smoking was easy for him as long as he had his pills and he describes how opioids diminished
his desire to use other substances.

She didn’t want me smoking weed anymore. But actually, I didn’t mind because I had
found the ultimate drug, those drugs. I quit drinking, I quit smoking weed, I even quit
smoking cigarettes. I quit everything. I didn’t want to do anything else. Those pills were
perfect. They were a necessity for me. I could get up and be excited to pop some pills in
the morning, to get up and go and, “All right, let’s go to work. I can’t wait to have a cup
of coffee and go build a house.” It put me in a great mood. I could talk all day on the
phone with clients and sell jobs. I could be on the job working like superman. I would
work and do more than four excellent carpenters could never do in a day. I just became
superman. It was amazing. I was overly intelligent—I can’t even explain it. It was like a
whole other world. It was great.
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Typical of many participants who became dependent on opioid analgesics, Darren’s use
became more intense following his initiation of oxycodone 30mgs, a single-entity, higher dose
opioid analgesic introduced to him by a friend in a non-medical setting. The first time he took
one, he snorted it alongside the person who gave it to him, and was immediately taken by the
faster onset. He subsequently requested that his doctor switch him to these higher dose pills
saying that his tolerance to his original prescription had grown to the extent that he was having to
take more than directed in order to achieve the same level of pain relief.
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), when opioids are used
repeatedly over time, tolerance is likely to develop with the result that a person no longer
responds to the drug in the same way they did when they started the medication (NIDA, 2007).
Tolerance is a well-known phenomenon among physicians and, in and of itself, may not be a
marker that a patient is misusing their medication or developing an opioid use disorder. Thus,
adjusting Darren’s prescription to a higher dose single-entity formulation pill may have seemed
like a medically sound response. Indeed, when Darren first asked about oxycodone, his physician
responded that because of the extra doses Darren had been taking, it was probably a good idea
for him to switch, in order to minimize the potential damage from the large doses of
acetaminophen he had also been ingesting in the dual-entity formulation. Darren was prescribed
15mg oxycodone tablets for approximately 18 months, before again requesting a higher strength
dose, at which time his physician moved him onto oxycodone 30mgs. He says of this later
request:

I was kind of scared to tell him that I was taking more than prescribed because I was
worried that he was going to cut me off, thinking that maybe I was abusing them. So I
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kind of beat around the bush for a while with that. I ended up getting the guts up to just
be honest with him. So, he respected that and he boosted me up to the 30 milligrams.

Although Darren was by now almost exclusively using his medication intranasally, his
doctor routinely continued to prescribe opioids to him with little oversight. However, around the
time of the Medford, Long Island pharmacy shooting in which four people were killed during a
robbery of prescription opioids, and perhaps as a consequence of that event, Darren’s doctor
instituted urine toxicology testing within his practice and, the first time he was screened,
Darren’s urine came back positive for cocaine. He explained:

What happened was I had done a line of cocaine at a party one night which I don’t really
do cocaine at all. I did a couple of lines in high school, but didn’t really care for it. It
wasn’t a big thing for me. But what happened was, I went to a party, did a line of
cocaine, was going in to get my prescription for the month and for some odd reason, they
had asked me to do a drug test that day. . . So what happened was he basically said
“Sorry, we can’t help you anymore, we don’t know what to tell you.” I said, “What do
you mean? How can you do this? I’ve been taking these things so long, can you give me
something like a little less or wean me down off these things?” I was like “I can’t go cold
turkey. I’m going to get very sick. I’m going to go through withdrawals.” And they were
just coldhearted and said, “No, there’s nothing we can do for you.” So they just sent me
out of there, cold turkey.
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For Darren, the consequences of this positive drug screen were dire and, having received
opioids from his physician for more than 10 years, he suddenly found himself cut off from the
drugs to which he had become dependent. Perhaps in part because of the intense scrutiny on
opioids following the pharmacy shooting, Darren was unable to find another doctor willing to
take him as a patient on chronic opioid therapy and began buying pills from the street market. As
the pills became increasingly more expensive and difficult to find, Darren was introduced to
heroin, initiating use approximately two years prior to his participation in this study.
While Darren was clearly in substantial pain from his back injury, from the outset he also
experienced positive feelings as a result of the opioids he was prescribed beyond the alleviation
of pain. The acknowledgment that some patients will experience euphoria from opioid analgesics
even while taking them as directed for a warranted medical reason is rarely mentioned in the
literature. Indeed, the assertion that opioids might engender positive feelings in “legitimate”
patients is entirely contrary to the strategy employed by pharmaceutical companies and pain
advocate groups to minimize the risks that taking opioids may present. This juxtaposition
between alleviating pain as a valid effect of opioid use, and experiencing pleasure as an invalid
effect of opioid use reflects the puritanical reaction to substance use steeped in U.S. culture.
Thus, the same object (an opioid pill) can be ascribed very different meaning, not only as a result
of where it is placed (Lovell, 2006), but also how it is experienced.
Despite his misuse, Darren’s narrative of the years he was prescribed opioids was littered
with references of a functional life including work, social occasions, and relationships, and it was
only after his doctor cut off his supply that his situation began to deteriorate. Following the loss
of his prescription, Darren’s primary focus became the acquisition of opioids in order that he
might stave off withdrawals which, because of the continuity of his prescriptions, he had never
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previously experienced. The consequence of Darren’s physician cutting off his medication were
immense, and his life quickly deteriorated.

. . . Ninety percent of my day was going on the phone calling drug dealers, trying to find
a way that I could find pills and the other ten percent of the day was going back and forth
to the bank or going and getting another check or a deposit from another homeowner to
make sure that I had enough money to cover myself for the week to go buy pills. It was
ridiculous. So basically, all my concentration on work and making sure my guys were
doing what they were supposed to be doing on the jobs all just started to go downhill. My
business really took a toll. I also started falling behind on my mortgages. I started falling
behind on my shop rent. . . My fiancée ended up leaving me which was very
heartbreaking for me ‘cuz I really cared for her. Basically, my life fell apart. It really did.
The last three years of my life, everything that I’ve worked for the last 20 years has all
pretty much gone away from the pills, from having to buy the pills and spending all that
stupid time looking for them.

Given the existing laws prohibiting doctors to prescribe opioids for the purpose of
detoxification or maintenance, Darren’s physician may have felt he had little choice but to cut
him off. However, his actions both in facilitating Darren’s chronic opioid therapy and in ceasing
to prescribe to him resulted in serious consequences for his patient. According to Lembke
(2016), doctors who discover their patients have been deceiving them suffer from what she terms
a “narcissistic injury,” the reaction to which is often “reflexive and hostile.” She argues that the
opioid crisis has resulted in the medical profession suffering a “collective” narcissistic injury, the
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backlash to which is that many providers now entirely refuse to prescribe opioids, a situation that
has created a cadre of “opioid refugees,” namely patients unable to find someone who will treat
them (Lembke, 2016:109).
Without doubt, there are a substantial number of people in the U.S. who experience
chronic pain, and current prevalence rates across the adult population are estimated to be around
11 percent (Nahin, 2015). Contrary to the message promoted by the pharmaceutical industry,
while evidence supports the efficacy of opioids for short-term use (APS-AAPM 2009), data for
the efficacy of more long term use (typically for 3 months or more) is scant (Chou and Huffman,
2009). Several city and/or state health departments across the country have released voluntary
prescribing guidelines to medical practitioners suggesting limiting the daily supply of opioid
analgesics for acute pain in order to avoid a pool of surplus medication which may ultimately be
misused, and most recently, the CDC issued guidelines for primary care physicians who are
treating chronic pain in outpatient settings (Dowell et al., 2016).
There is some evidence to suggest that direct messaging to health care providers via
public health detailing (one-on-one educational visits) results in increased knowledge and
prescribing behavior change. For example, a detailing campaign conducted by the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene that reached 1069 health care providers in Staten
Island,45 demonstrated “an association with improvements in health care provider knowledge
about opioid prescribing recommendations, and suggested a decrease in the rate of high-dose
prescribing.” (Kattan et al., 2016: 1436). These types of interventions may prove to be an
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In 2013, when the public health detailing targeted physicians in Staten Island, the rate of accidental drug
overdoses involving prescription opioids was three times higher than that of other boroughs in the city. The PDMP
also showed that Staten Island residents filled high rates of opioid prescriptions, with high doses (more than 100
morphine milligram equivalents), and high median day’s supply.
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effective way to educate physicians who routinely prescribe opioid analgesics to encourage safer
practices.
The fourth and final category on the continuum of prescriber oversight are “judicious”
prescribers who prescribe opioid analgesics carefully and with consideration, and do not write
refills or increase dosage without a thorough assessment. Judicious prescribers tend to follow the
guidelines developed for both acute and chronic pain advising physicians to favor non-opioid
alternatives or to use the lowest effective dose and begin by prescribing short-acting rather than
extended release formulations when opioids are utilized. Other recommendations for chronic
opioid therapy include, but are not limited to: utilizing urine toxicology screening to assess for
the presence of other controlled substances or illicit drugs, as well for the presence of the
prescribed medication; establishing patient treatment goals; and discussing the potential risks and
benefits of opioid therapy with patients (Dowell et al., 2016).
Participants who attempted to obtain opioid analgesics from doctors with the intention of
misuse came to realize they were extremely unlikely to receive ongoing prescriptions if a doctor
turned out to be a judicious prescriber, even if they had suffered a warranted injury. For example,
Harry, who was prescribed opioid analgesics following an accident in which he crushed his hand
described how, after his initial prescription had run out, his request for continued medication had
been firmly refused. He recalled: “Basically the hand healed [and the doctor stopped
prescribing]. . . He did his job properly, yeah, and exactly right.” Similarly, when Gina (white,
aged 22), who had initiated misuse with her boyfriend several years previously broke her ribs
and was prescribed Tramadol, an opioid considered to have a low potential for dependence
(Epstein et al., 2006), her request for a repeat prescription was denied. Gina said of her doctors,
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“They wouldn’t give me anymore . . . They said that I went through it and that my ribs should be
healing, so they wouldn’t give me any more.”
Felipe (Latino, aged 45), who had used heroin prior to misusing opioid analgesics, knew
nothing about the oxycodone-acetaminophen combination his doctor prescribed him following
an accident in which he suffered a badly broken leg, and had no idea it would provide him with a
similar high to heroin. Initially prescribed a one-month supply of 5mg pills, he quickly
recognized the opioid effect and returning to his doctor hoping to get a further supply of pills
recounted:

I tried to go back to the doctor and get more, he told me no. And when he said no, I said
“But you just gave me, and you only gave me such and such.” And he was like, “Yeah,
but this is addictive stuff and it’s only as needed.” And I said, “Yeah, but I’m in pain! I
went through the whole nine yards with him, but he didn’t want to give it to me. So I
came out and I bought it in the street.

Although these doctors behaved in a medically appropriate manner and prescribed opioids as
intended for acute pain, the fact that pills were so readily accessible within the illicit market
meant that while none of these participants had obtained another prescription from a doctor, they
were easily able to source alternative supplies enabling them to continue using opioids.
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, the nature of oversight among physicians
prescribing opioid analgesics is wildly divergent and ranges from flagrant to judicious practices.
While it is likely that those prescribers at, or toward the flagrant end of the continuum, will come
under scrutiny of regulatory or criminal justice entities, cases against these doctors typically take
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several years to build and during that time, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of pills might
have been prescribed and either misused by patients, or diverted to the illicit market. Further,
loose prescribers who prescribe beyond the scope of professional practice are likely to be more
difficult to identify and sanction. Implementing a system of oversight that is driven by a
regulatory body rather than law enforcement, including loss of license for cases shown to involve
aberrant prescribing, might be a first step toward mitigating medical providers who fall into this
category. However, finding a balance between limiting loose prescribers and educating routine
prescribers in a way that does not discourage them from writing warranted prescriptions is a
challenge.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
THE ILLICIT OPIOID MARKET: A TALE OF TWO INTERVENTIONS

In response to increasing mortality and morbidity rates associated with opioid analgesic
misuse, numerous initiatives have been implemented since the early 2000s in an attempt to both
reduce the number of opioids prescribed, and to stem the flow of pills diverted from medical to
non-medical use. Centered predominantly on supply-side interventions, these have ranged in
scope and include initiatives related to: the promotion of judicious prescribing; the
implementation of state prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs); legislation tightening
the operation of pain clinics; the addition of prominent warning labels to opioid packages; and
the introduction of abuse-deterrent formulations (Alpert et al., 2017). Concomitantly, legal action
against some pharmaceutical companies has resulted in substantial fines,46 and further litigation
is ongoing. While it is likely that many of these initiatives, both individually and collectively,
have exerted some influence on the supply and availability of opioid analgesics, two events that
were often discussed among the participants in this study as having altered the dynamics of the
opioid analgesic market in New York City were: (1) the abuse-deterrent reformulation of
OxyContin®; (2) the passing of the New York State Internet Tracking System for OverPrescribing, or I-STOP, bill which came into effect in August 2013.
As described in Chapter 2, the brand name opioid analgesic OxyContin® was released by
Purdue Pharma in 1996 and marketed as a long-acting pain medication with a controlled-release

In 2007, Purdue Pharma was fined $600 million to resolve criminal and civil charges for “misbranding”
OxyContin®. Additionally, three company executives were also charged as individuals and collectively paid a total
of $34.5 million in fines. The executives were sentenced to three years’ probation and 400 hours each of community
service to be served in drug treatment facilities (Meier, 2007). More recently, several states, including Ohio and
Illinois, as well as the Cherokee Nation, have also filed suits against several pharmaceutical companies citing that
each trivialized the risk of opioids while simultaneously overstating their benefits for chronic pain.
46
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formulation that the company claimed minimized the risk of misuse and dependence (Cicero et
al., 2005). However, the time-release mechanism easily could be bypassed by rubbing or sucking
off the coating and grinding the tablet into a powder, thereby releasing the entire dose, which
could then be used intranasally, or via injection. According to the FDA, efforts to make
OxyContin® abuse-deterrent began in the early 2000s; however, it was not until August 2010 that
the new formulation was released onto the market. Vitally, physicochemical barriers in abusedeterrent OxyContin® render the tablet impervious to crushing or dissolving (Coplan et al.,
2016), while still maintaining the time-release properties that distinguishes this type of
formulation from the generic short-acting version. Although subsequent research has shown that
the new tablet is not entirely infallible (Cicero, 2012), the premise of abuse-deterrent
formulations is that the effort required to tamper with the pills is so labor intensive that the
majority of people will be deterred from doing so, and in 2013, OxyContin® became the first
opioid with FDA-approved labeling describing abuse-deterrent characteristics (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, 2013).
The reformulation of OxyContin® represents a substantial disruption to the supply of
opioids across the U.S. (Alpert et al. 2017). As evidenced by findings from Coplan and
colleagues (2016), comparison of the year prior to the introduction of reformulated OxyContin®
to the three years following indicated a 13 percent reduction in the number of OxyContin®
prescriptions dispensed, as well as reductions in rates of OxyContin®-involved misuse, overdose,
and death (Coplan et al. 2016). A survey study of 2566 opioid-dependent patients entering
substance use treatment programs across the U.S. also found a significant decrease in the number
of patients reporting OxyContin® as their primary drug before and after reformulation (35.6% vs.
12.8%). Further, the authors noted a simultaneous increase in the use of opioids such as
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hydrocodone and short-acting oxycodone following reformulation, as well as a significant
increase in high potency opioids such as long-acting oxymorphone sold under the brand name
Opana® (Cicero et al., 2012). Similarly, a time-series analysis conducted with a total of 232,874
patients47 found that during a four-year period, including 17-months following the introduction
of the abuse-deterrent OxyContin®, while overall rates of prescription opioid misuse did not
change, there were increases in the prevalence of misuse of certain opioid analgesic compounds
such as long-acting oxymorphone (e.g., Opana) and single-entity, short-acting oxycodone
(Cassidy et al., 2013). These finding are reflected in the narratives of participants from this
study.
Prior to August 2010, many participants reported that OxyContin® 80mg had been the
prescription opioid of choice within the illicit market; however, the introduction of the abusedeterrent formulation was a catalyst for a market shift. Although in the immediate aftermath of
the reformulation some participants reported an increased prevalence of Opana,48 by the time
time data were collected for this study, the preferred opioid analgesic for most was the generic
oxycodone short-acting 30mg tablets. Jack, gave his assessment of the illicit opioid market
following the reformulation of OxyContin®.
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Patient records were accessed from assessments from 437 substance use treatment programs in across 33 states.
In 2012, Endo Pharmaceutical released a new tamper-resistant formulation of Opana, a long-acting oxymorphone
formulation first marketed in 2006. However, in March 2017, an advisory panel convened by the FDA concluded
that the potential risk to public health posed by Opana as a drug of abuse outweighed its benefits as a prescription
opioid. The decision was made following several outbreaks of HIV, HCV, as well as a serious blood disorder linked
to the misuse of Opana via injection. One such outbreak occurred in Scott County, Indiana, a rural area with a
population of 24,000 and high rates of poverty and unemployment. In 2015, newly reported cases of HIV resulted in
an investigation, the findings from which identified increases in injection drug use among people misusing Opana as
a primary risk factor. While the new iteration of Opana had rendered the pill unsuitable for intranasal use, it
remained possible to circumnavigate the time-release formulation for injection use. In response, many people
reported transition to injection and as of March 2017, there were 215 confirmed HIV cases in the county (Duwve,
2017). In June 2017, the FDA took the unprecedented move of requesting that Endo Pharmaceuticals voluntarily
remove Opana from the market, the first time the FDA has requested that a currently marketed opioid drug be
removed because of concerns about abuse.
48
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In 2010, they were supposed to stop the production of OxyContin®. . .They came out with
OPs49 instead, and there were scripts of oxycodone being written, but barely, so they
were hard to come across. . .There wasn’t a lot of doctors writing scripts for [oxycodone]
because everybody was getting arrested. So they were writing out OPs because they’re
gel and you can’t shoot or sniff them. And dealing with OPs to sell is like a fucking
mission because nobody wanted them.

The transition from the original OxyContin® to the new formulation occurred swiftly with
estimates suggesting that within one year of its release, 97 percent of OxyContin® dispensed in
the U.S. was abuse-deterrent (Coplan et al. 2016). While two participants reported they were still
able to access the original formulation (or “OCs”) from a corporate pharmacy chain by
specifically requesting the “generic” version,50 most were unaware of this possibility and
adjusted to the new market accordingly. Nate (white, aged 22), acquired his pills for a time from
an individual who was being prescribed for cancer pain. He explained:

I had a guy who was still getting the OCs from the pharmacy. . . He’d go to the pharmacy
and he’d say, “Can I get generic OxyContin®?” And they’d give him the OCs, and this
was for months after they... He was an older guy, 50-something years old. . . He had
tongue cancer. He had no tongue, but he didn’t feel it. He liked the money more. . . And
then when they’d reformulated the 80s and they really disappeared, he started getting the

The “OPs” Jack refers to in his narrative is the street name of the new formulation of OxyContin and corresponds
to the imprint on the tablet. Prior to reformulation, the imprint was OC.
50
A generic version of the original long-acting OxyContin formula was produced by Apotex, a Canadian
Pharmaceutical company and for a short time after reformulation could be ordered by special request.
49
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30 milligram roxys and even then he’d give them to me for like $10 a pill. And at that
point, that’s when the prices started going up to like $15 for one...”

An analysis of the New York State Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP)
examining numbers of OxyContin® prescriptions filled by New York City residents in 20mg,
40mg, and 80mg doses two years prior and two years following reformulation suggests that the
reductions in OxyContin® prescriptions seen elsewhere were mirrored in New York City. As
illustrated in Figure 5, from 2008 to 2012, the number of prescriptions filled for OxyContin® in
doses of 20mg and 40mg remained fairly stable; however, between 2010 and 2011, the number
of prescriptions filled for OxyContin® 80mg decreased sharply, supporting participants’ views
that following reformulation, OxyContin® 80mg was no longer the drug of choice within the
illicit market.
Figure 5: OxyContin® prescriptions filled by New York City residents 2009-2011

Unpublished data: New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
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Similar reductions in the number of prescriptions written for OxyContin® have been reported
elsewhere, with estimates suggesting that two years after reformulation, the dispensing rate of
this drug had decreased 39 percent (Larochelle et al. 2015). In their study of pharmacy and
medical claims data for commercially insured patients, Michna and colleagues (2014) found that
while 69 percent of their sample had made the switch to the new OxyContin® product, the
remainder either transferred to other long-acting formulations that were not abuse-deterrent
(21.3%) or discontinued with long-acting opioids (9.3%). Further, of those who continued to use
opioids, three-quarters (76%) switched to short-acting formulations (Michna et al., 2014). A
complete analysis of New York City data is not currently available; however, preliminary
findings from the NYS PDMP suggest that a substantial number of patients who had been filling
80mg long-acting oxycodone prescriptions in the months prior to August 2010 transitioned to
short-acting formulations following the release of the new OxyContin® product (M. Nolan,
personal communication, June 26, 2017).
Given that the accessibility and price of OxyContin® to the consumer did not greatly alter
as a result of the reformulation, there are limited explanations for the sharp decline in
prescriptions for OxyContin® 80mg immediately following the release of the new formula,
particularly considering the stability of the 20mg and 40mg formulations. However, as data from
the participants in this study suggest, the fact that the tablets could no longer be crushed for
intranasal or injection use meant that OxyContin® as the preferred drug for misuse quickly lost its
appeal. Dario (white, aged 33), explained further:

I was getting [OxyContin®] for a minute. I was getting that for like a year and a half, two
years. . .The whole neighborhood was going [to the same doctor] I ended up finding out,
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he had everybody. But then they eventually changed the 80s, so I just told him “Don’t
give them to me anymore.”. . . Then they were junk, they didn’t do anything. Cus’ they
went from $60 a pill to $8, and nobody wanted them and they didn’t really get me high
really. They did, but it wasn’t like it was, so I just didn’t want ‘em. . . Cus’ we’re addicts
and we want that full rush. Like I tried, I had…when he gave me the OPs I didn’t know,
and then the pharmacy gave me them, I was like “What the fuck is this?” And then they
told me, “That’s how they are now.” I ate 60 of them. You’re not gonna believe me, I ate
them in like three days, like 60 of them. Like, it didn’t really fuck me up, not that I
remember. I probably was fucked up but it didn’t really…it didn’t fuck me up like I
should’ve been. Like when I sniffed ‘em, I was fucked up. Like when I ate them, I was just
eating them like candy and they were gone, they were gone in three days.

Similarly, Jordan explained how, following the formulation change, his father was no longer able
to sell the OxyContin® 40mg tablets he was prescribed and had been selling for several years.
Asked whether there was still a market for OxyContin®, Jordan replied: “No, not at all. No,
because they sniff them. They can’t shoot them. . . People will take them [to not get sick], but
they’re definitely not first, second choice.”
It is evident then, that the reformulation of OxyContin® resulted in a decrease in the
number of prescriptions filled for this drug, with a concomitant increase in prescriptions filled
for short-acting oxycodone. The analyses that yielded these findings included patients who had
been receiving OxyContin® for several consecutive months prior to the reformulation change
(Coplan et al., 2016), and for these individuals, the switch to a different type of pain pill would
have involved a discussion with their doctor. Recall, the OxyContin® formulation change had
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been pending for several years, and at the time it was released, received wide press coverage. It
is likely, then, that physicians and other medical practitioners licensed to prescribe opioid
analgesics would have been aware of the new formulation either prior to its implementation or
immediately after. However, an explanation as to why many providers appear to have been
willing to switch their patients to short-acting oxycodone 30mg, rather than continuing to
prescribe the new abuse-deterrent OxyContin®, is largely lacking in the literature. Some
participants in this study reported successfully lobbying their doctor for specific types of opioids,
or medication strength, and several mentioned that, following the OxyContin® formulation
change, they had complained to their doctor of unintended side effects from OxyContin® with the
intent of initiating a change in formulation to short-acting oxycodone.
Commentators have posited that the willingness of doctors to alter their patients’
medication in response to direct or indirect requests is associated with the perception of patients
as consumers whose reviews may ultimately influence the success of a medical practice
(Lembke, 2016). Indeed, whereas clinical decisions about a patient’s care were traditionally
decided by physicians (McKinley et al, 2014), recent research suggests that patients who take an
active role in their medical care often visit a doctor with a pre-formed therapeutic plan that may
include the type of medication they expect to be prescribed. Findings from this study indicate a
significant difference in a physician’s likelihood of prescribing oxycodone to treat sciatica to
patients who specifically requested this medication compared with those who did not, and patient
requests for narcotics tended to move prescribing from weaker to stronger formulations
(McKinlay et al., 2014).
A recent analysis by Alpert et al., (2017) examining the effect of the OxyContin®
reformulation found that while the rate of heroin-involved overdose deaths remained fairly stable
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between 1999 and 2010, it more than tripled between 2010 and 2014 (from 1.0 to 3.4 per
100,000). The authors suggest that although the reformulation of OxyContin® resulted in a
reduction in OxyContin® misuse, it is also associated with an increase in the number of heroin
deaths such that “each percentage point reduction in the rate of OxyContin® misuse due to
reformulation leads to 3.1 more heroin-related deaths per 100,000.” (Alpert et al., 2017: 5). Thus
they estimate that up to 80 percent of the increase in heroin mortality since 2010, may be a direct
consequence of the OxyContin® reformulation (Alpert et al., 2017).
The second event that many participants spoke about as contributing to a shift in the
opioid analgesic market was the introduction of the Internet System for Tracking OverPrescribing (I-STOP) legislation that came into effect in August 2013 and required all
prescribers in New York State to consult the prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP)
database when prescribing any Schedule II, III, IV controlled substances. Prescription drug
monitoring programs are state-run electronic databases used to track the prescribing and
dispensing of scheduled medications to patients. They can be used for clinical practice—i.e., to
provide the prescriber with information about a patients’ history of prescribed controlled
substances—and/or for monitoring purposes to identify diversion (CDC, 2017). Although the
PDMP has been existence in New York State for many years, the capability to monitor
prescriptions in real time was only achieved in 2002 (Paulozzi and Steir, 2010). Moreover, prior
to the I-STOP legislation, many medical providers were unaware of the program’s existence, and
fewer than five percent of prescribers in the state had an active registration; however, within six
months of the bill’s enactment, there were more than 67,000 users conducting an average of
42,300 patient look-ups per day (PDMP Center of Excellence Briefing, Brandeis University
2016).
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In tandem with increasing the number of physicians utilizing the PDMP, in the first
quarter following implementation, there was a 9.5 percent reduction in the overall number of
opioid prescriptions filled by patients in New York State. One area in particular where PDMPs
are likely to have had an impact is reducing the prevalence of patients exhibiting “doctor
shopping” behavior, i.e., those visiting multiple prescribers within the same month in order to
obtain opioid analgesics. Indeed, following the introduction of the mandate in August 2013, the
number of individuals categorized as doctor shopping—in this case defined as receiving
prescriptions from five or more prescribers and filling them at five or more pharmacies in a three
month period—decreased by 75 percent in the quarter following implementation as compared to
the same quarter in the previous year (PDMP Center of Excellence, 2014).
Among the participants in this study, the implementation of I-STOP was reported to have
had a substantial effect on a market already constricted following the reformulation of
OxyContin® three years prior. Recall Becky, who had switched her opioid preference from
heroin to pain pills a few years earlier and described how, in recent months, it had become
considerably more difficult to find a reliable source of opioid analgesics on the illicit market. She
explained:

I had a really good connection with this one guy but he ended up telling me that I wasn’t
paying him enough, and I was, so he said if you don’t start giving me this much money,
I’m not gonna, I can’t give you these anymore. So I said alright, I’ll find somebody else.
And I’ve been having trouble finding someone else, so I don’t know. I notice there’s a lot
of people…my one friend told me that his doctor got arrested so…and now they have this
website, and so a lot of people that deal drugs that had more than one doctor are getting
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in trouble and they can’t see that doctor anymore. I’ve noticed a lot of people have been
telling me. I’ve been hearing about that website a lot recently.

Similarly, Harry, who for several years had been buying opioid analgesics diverted from others’
prescriptions, reported that on returning from an upstate work trip, he was disconcerted to find
that within the short time he was gone, both his sources had been cut off from their doctor and
were no longer able to sell him the pills on which he had come to depend. He recalled:

I was buying the pills in [Anonymized], and I came back to get them and nobody had
them anymore. And I’m like “How could everybody just…three different people, two
different people, all of a sudden their doctors cut them off? How could this be?” And I
was asking other people, new people, and they said the same thing, their doctors cut them
off. The doctors cut them off. The doctors cut them off. And then it was like the price went
from $5, to $7, to $10 [for Percocet® 10mg].

Assessing the impact of PDMPs has proved challenging, especially in light of the wide
variability in types of programs and whether their use is mandatory or voluntary. A
comprehensive review of the efficacy of PDMPs was recently conducted by the PDMP Center of
Excellence (2014) and findings suggest that PDMPs are constructive in a number of ways
including, but not limited to: improvement of clinical decision-making and patient care;
identifying and reducing doctor shopping; and reducing inappropriate prescribing and medical
costs. However, while PDMPs probably are useful tools to curb the availability and diversion of
opioid analgesics onto the illicit market, and may have reduced some of the harms associated
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with overprescribing, the current emphasis on these databases as an apparatus for enforcement,
rather than as a tool with which to improve clinical care, has resulted in a number of unintended
consequences.
Currently, 49 states now have PDMPs and, as previously reported, physicians across the
country, as well as pain advocacy groups, have expressed concern that changes in prescribing
practices as a result of the scrutiny afforded by the PDMP has resulted in a “chilling effect,”
whereby patients with legitimate pain are being undertreated (Reisman et al., 2009). Equally
important is how doctors have responded to patients who they have discovered through PDMP
look-up are visiting multiple prescribers to obtain controlled substances. Although, according to
the law, medical providers cannot prescribe to patients they suspect are seeking opioids for
maintenance or detoxification, abruptly cutting off those who are opioid dependent without
implementing an alternative treatment plan likely has contributed to an increase in patients
seeking out other types of opioids. Thus, while PDMP’s may have served to diminish opioid
diversion, data suggests that market constriction, resulting in lower availability and higher prices,
has pushed many individuals with an opioid use disorder toward heroin (Kuehn, 2013).
While the association between opioid analgesic misuse and heroin was raised in the
literature as early as 2003 (Siegal et al., 2003), warnings went largely unheeded. Further, a DEA
alert sent to health providers to coincide with the release of abuse-deterrent OxyContin® also
seems to have been ignored (Mars et al., 2014). Throughout the next decade, as access to opioid
analgesics through prescription continued to rise steadily, so the number of people reporting past
year heroin use also increased, from 400,000 in 2002, to 600,000 in 2010 (SAMHSA, 2011), and
findings from the NSDUH reported that four out of five recent heroin initiates previously had
misused opioid analgesics (Muhuri et al., 2013). Drug-poisoning deaths involving heroin also
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rose sharply and between 2000 and 2013, with rates increasing from 0.7 to 2.7 deaths per
100,000 persons (CDC, 2014).
Among participants in this study whose first experience of opioid misuse had been via
pain pills, many had since initiated heroin citing reductions in the availability of prescription
opioids as a primary factor. Anton (white, aged 23), who had first misused opioid analgesics
recreationally and begun using heroin two years previously, reported that numerous people in his
social network also had transitioned to this drug. Commenting on the current market for illicit
opioids he said:

Everybody’s switched to dope now. For the same reason, cus first of all, it’s harder to
get. Because, you know, even the doctors themselves cannot prescribe as much, or as
frequently because they realize there’s an epidemic. You know, everybody’s pretty much
doing opiates, especially in the north-east, everywhere from like New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Baltimore, yada yada, New York, stuff like that. So everybody’s just
moving to dope now pretty much. And that’s why I changed too, because the game
changed also. It’s not just that [pills] are too expensive for me, it was too expensive for
everybody. It’s supply and demand, and people just can’t keep up with the
prescriptions. . . It’s supply and demand. Then it was popular to do oxycodone, but they
realized since it’s like $25 to $30 a pop, what’s the point? When I can get a bag of dope
for $10. So you’d be getting three bags for the same amount as getting one pill.

Of the participants in this study who reported first use of heroin following misuse of
opioid analgesics, 26 were opioid dependent prior to this initiation. As initiatives to reduce the
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diversion of opioid analgesics were enacted, and pills became scarcer and more expensive, the
cost and effort of sustaining daily use of these medications became untenable, and once heroin
was introduced into participants’ social networks, the stigma associated with this drug soon
dissipated. Recall Darren, who started using opioids following a back injury. After his
prescription was cut off by his doctor, finding pills on the illicit market was so expensive and
time-consuming that the prospect of using heroin became more acceptable, especially as a means
to avoid withdrawal, a state that many opioid dependent participants were fearful of finding
themselves in. Following the reformulation of OxyContin® he reported:

Everyone wanted roxies [oxycodone] which were the 30mg. So basically, you know,
every month that went by they got harder and harder to find, and the heroin thing came
along. And someone had said to me, you know, when I really couldn’t find the pills, you
know, they started to become very difficult to find, and there was one week that I couldn’t
find them at all, and I got very scared and started getting real sick and desperate and I
ran into somebody and they said “Hey, you know, don’t fool yourself, an opiate’s an
opiate. . . They’re telling me “Hey, this is just heroin. Heroin is a straight opiate without
Tylenol or synthetic mixtures.” So in my mind, being so desperate at the time to be
feeling better, I believed the guy and I started snorting bags of heroin.

As Jordan, who first misused pills from his mother’s supply suggested, the transition to heroin
for those who were opioid dependent was almost inevitable once the market for opioid analgesics
had been tightened up. He commented:
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I’m sure that like cracking down on the doctors, the government didn’t plan for this to
happen, but it was just perfectly set up for street dealers because people are already
addicted to powerful pharmaceutical grade opiates, and heroin in itself, though it not be
pharmaceutical or made in laboratory is a powerful opiate. So you have a bunch of
middle-class white kids with money, with families that come from money, that already
have a predisposition to physical addiction of opiates, so of course, heroin is going to
explode, you know.

The impact that initiatives to curb opioid analgesic diversion ultimately had on the
market, and subsequently on individuals who were already opioid dependent, could and should
have been better anticipated. For example, although in New York City, health department
guidelines were issued to prescribers in the form of a letter advising medical providers to speak
with patients who they identified through the PDMP had a suspected opioid use disorder, as
reported by participants in this study, clinical care in these cases was often lacking, and often,
patients were simply cut off by their doctor with no discussion or referral to drug treatment.
Given that many participants who were opioid dependent prior to using heroin initiated use of
this drug at a point when they were feeling vulnerable to opioid withdrawal, better promotion of
and increased access to opioid agonist therapy such as methadone or buprenorphine could have
provided opioid dependent patients with an alternative to seeking out illicit opioids.
The reformulation of OxyContin® and the implementation of I-STOP appear to have
constricted the market for the misuse and diversion of opioid analgesics with some effect on
negative health outcomes. For example, following the release of the abuse-deterrent formulation,
the number of prescriptions for opioid analgesics decreased slightly from 2011 to 2013, with a
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concomitant decrease in the number of overdose deaths involving these drugs (Dart et al., 2015).
Recent data from the NYS PDMP also shows a reduction in the number of prescriptions written
for New York City residents, from 85 per 1,000 residents in 2012, to 62 per 1,000 residents in
2016, a reduction of 27% per cent (Bachhuber et al., 2017). However, it seems clear that these
supply-side interventions resulted in an impetus for some individuals—especially those with an
opioid use disorder—to seek out alternative drugs, including heroin, which arguably pose a
greater public health risk (Paulozzi et al., 2012). Any future supply-side initiatives ought to
carefully consider the possibility of unintended consequences and plan accordingly. For example
where interventions are likely to lead to market constriction, public health officials should bolster
the promotion of, and access to, evidence-based treatments for opioid use disorder including
opioid agonist therapy (OAT) such as buprenorphine and methadone.
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CONCLUSION

In his book, The Culture of Control, David Garland (2001) suggests that “all too often we
tend to see contemporary events as having only contemporary causes, when in fact we are caught
up in long-term processes of historical change and affected by the continuing effects of nowforgotten events” (2001: 77). Thus, to fully understand, and effectively address the public health
harms resulting from opioids in the U.S., it is critical to locate patterns of prescribing, use, and
misuse of these drugs, within an historical, political, and social context, and not simply view it as
the consequence of recent, well-intentioned efforts to relieve the pain of millions of Americans.
Indeed, when considering the current opioid epidemic, Goldberg astutely notes, “the
problems centering on the regulation, distribution, and use of opioid analgesics and the problems
centering on the undertreatment of pain are simply not the same problems [emphasis in the
original] (Goldberg, 2010: 20). As Goldberg argues, while opioids are doubtless an important
tool with which to treat pain, despite the exponential increase in the number of opioid
prescriptions filled across the U.S., there appears to have been little headway made in reducing
the number of people who report chronic pain, and in recent years, the efficacy of opioid
analgesia for treating chronic-non cancer has been repeatedly called into question (Chaparro et
al., 2013; Von Korff et al., 2011). Moving forward, then, the focus ought not simply to be how
better to regulate, or control opioids to minimize the risks of misuse and diversion, but rather
how can we rethink our cultural and societal attitudes toward both pain (Bourke, 2014) and I
would add, the use of licit and illicit drugs.
In their essay on the undertreatment of pain, Resnik and colleagues (2001) acknowledge
that pain is a problem for medicine, largely because of its failure to conform to a scientific
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approach. The authors present five reasons why this is so, including: “(1) pain is subjective, not
objective; (2) the causal basis for pain is often poorly understood; (3) pain is often regarded as a
‘mere’ symptom and not a disease; (4) there often are no ‘magic bullets’ for pain; and, (5) pain
does not fit the expert knowledge model” (Resnik et al., 2001: 277). While their analysis of the
problem is comprehensive, the solutions they propose—better education, more dialogue between
patients and medical providers, increased understanding from health care professionals as to the
subjective nature of pain, and a more inter-disciplinary approach to pain management—fall far
short of the sweeping, deep-rooted, and philosophical transformation necessary to achieve
meaningful change in the conceptualization and treatment of intractable pain. Thus, although
pragmatic solutions for effective pain relief might seem like a sensible option, as Bourke (2014)
suggests, what is needed is “attention [to] be paid to ideological frameworks, interpersonal
relationships, and environmental interactions between the person-in-pain and those around him
or her,” including a “repudiation of the Cartesian distinction between body and mind, as well as a
radical re-think about the inequalities that mark people’s lives” (Bourke, 2014: 300).
While it is perhaps unrealistic to suggest that such a transformation will take place in the
current political climate, we ought at least to ponder why, given the scope and intensity of harm
that opioid use and misuse has had at a population level, the use of prescription opioids has
remained so abundant. For example, although recent data from the CDC demonstrate a reduction
in the number of opioid prescriptions filled nationally, from 81.2 prescriptions per 100 persons in
2010 to 70.6 per 100 persons in 2015, the morphine milligram equivalent prescribed per capita
remained three times higher than it was in 1999 (640 MME compared with 180 MME) and the
average number of day’s supply of opioid prescriptions actually increased (Guy et al., 2017).
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If prescription opioids had been shown to be effective for chronic pain, the argument to
perpetuate their use, despite the potential for harm would be more compelling, but many studies
now demonstrate this is not the case, and clinical evidence suggests that even a short duration of
opioid therapy can increase the risk that patients will transition to long-term use (Shah et al.,
2017). Moreover, it is also not that we lack the technical ability to treat long-term pain using
non-opioid based medications, or indeed, non-pharmaceutical tools (Goldberg, 2009); only that
the structure of the for-profit health care system in the U.S. does not accommodate treatments
(for example, cognitive behavioral therapy, acupuncture, visualization techniques) that while
effective, are time-consuming and therefore not conducive to help doctors meet billing quotas
(Lembke, 2016).
Americans constitute only 4.6 percent of the global population, yet they consume roughly
80 percent of the world’s opioid supply (Manchikanti et al., 2010). To better understand the
proliferation of opioid use in the U.S., it is helpful to examine the political and economic
structure and the shift toward neoliberalism that occurred in the latter half of the twentieth
century, a characteristic of which is the dynamic of capitalist production and market exchange,
driven by a profit motive (Garland, 2001). As referenced in Chapter 1, in the U.S. post-war era,
pharmaceutical companies took advantage of the consumer boom, and adopted a number of
strategies including extensive advertising in medical journals as well as teams of detailers to visit
doctor’s offices to promote brand-named medications (Hertzberg, 2009). An essential marketing
strategy included direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) which has proliferated since the early
1980s, and coincided with a political climate particularly favorable to the pharmaceutical
industry including deregulation and new interest from consumers regarding their health care
choices. The loosening of government oversight in the post-Reagan era was also a tremendous
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boon for the industry and during the previous 30 years, pharmaceutical companies consistently
have been one of the most profitable businesses in the U.S. (Angell, 2004).
In tandem with growing profits, the pharmaceutical industry has become a powerful
lobbying force primarily through their trade association, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). As described by Freudenberg (2014) in his book
examining the influence of corporations on public health, PhRMA represents forty-eight of the
world’s leading pharmaceutical companies and lobbies hard to “create laws, court decisions, and
regulations that enable its member drug companies to maximize profits and defeat any policy
that might interfere with this goal.” (Freudenberg, 2014: 112). Active in both federal and state
elections, PhRMA has contributed millions of dollars to a variety of players on the political
spectrum successfully “capturing” the FDA in order to shape its decisions and make it more
disposed to beneficial business practices. For example, in 1992, PhRMA negotiated with the
FDA that, in return for user fees, the regulatory body would complete new drug reviews within a
12-month period. In 1993, user fees accounted for only 7 percent of the FDAs drug-review
budget; however, by 2004, this had increased to 53 percent (2014: 120).
Although the Federal government has taken some steps to mitigate the public health
harms that have been wrought by opioid analgesics, including, but not limited to: encouraging
the development of abuse-deterrent formulations; prescriber and patient education; and,
instituting label changes for opioids, their actions have at times been contradictory. For example
in 2014, the FDA concurrently both rescheduled hydrocodone from a Schedule III to a Schedule
II controlled substance, and approved the first long-acting, single-entity, hydrocodone
medication, Zohydro®, a product that is available in 10mg to 50mg doses, and is not abusedeterrent. Given that hydrocodone is the most misused opioid in the U.S., and that Zohyrdo® is a
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pure hydrocodone product that easily can be crushed to release the full dose of the medication,
the FDA-appointed scientific advisory committee voted 11-2 against approving this medication.
However, the committee was ultimately overruled, and while the FDA profess to be a sciencebased agency, in the case of Zohyrdo®, market forces and the influence of the pharmaceutical
industry appear to have trumped the concern for public health.
With regard to the vigorous marketing techniques utilized by the industry to promote
drugs such as OxyContin®, Freudenberg points out that an effective strategy to avert regulation
was to offer up voluntary standards of practice. For example, in response to growing concern
over potential conflicts of interest between the pharmaceutical industry and health professionals,
in 2002, PhRMA established the Code on Interactions with Health Care Professionals which laid
out ethical parameters intended to protect the best interests of the patient. However, while the
document is an acknowledgement of some of the ethical issues relating to these interactions, its
framing maintains that marketing remains a valid and necessary strategy to improve patient care,
rather than a recognition that “the very nature of pharmaceutical marketing to professionals
threatens professional objectivity and good healthcare” (Weber, 2006: 68). Until there is some
acknowledgement from the industry, as well as professional bodies such as the American
Medical Association, that interactions between healthcare professionals and pharmaceutical
representatives predominantly constitute product promotion rather than “education,” the status
quo will remain (Weber, 2006), and the aggressive tactics utilized by companies like Purdue will
continue.
It is also of note that while pharmaceutical companies continue to heavily promote opioid
analgesics, they are simultaneously funding interest groups such as the Community Anti-Drug
Coalition of America (CADCA), and Partnership for Drug-Free Kids, allowing them to heavily
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influence these organizations’ policy goals away from prescription drug misuse, and toward anticannabis campaigns (Fang, 2014). Recent studies following legislation change sanctioning
medical cannabis have found that, in states where medical cannabis is permitted, rates of opioid
analgesic prescriptions have fallen substantially (Bradford and Bradford, 2016). Further, in a
study conducted by Bachhuber et al., 2014, findings indicate that states with medical cannabis
laws have significantly lower opioid-involved overdose mortality rates. While an alliance
between pharmaceutical companies and interest groups advocating for tighter drug controls may
seem like a contradiction, their common goal is to lobby for cannabis to remain a Scheduled I
controlled substance, as relaxation of regulation around cannabis control could heavily impact
those companies for whom sales of opioid analgesics represent a significant market share.
While the pharmaceutical industry is concerned with profits, the medical profession
surely ought to be motivated by what is in the best interest for their patients, and doubtless, for
many physicians, this is their primary concern. Nonetheless, the structure of the medical system
in the U.S. is such that, rather than being driven by scientific evidence, treatment is often
dominated by market forces, as well as patient expectations for doctors to provide a “quick fix,”
and recent research shows an increasing demand for all types of prescription pills, with almost
three-fifths (59%) of U.S. adults reporting use of any prescription drug in 2011-2012, an increase
of nine percent from the previous decade (Kantor et al., 2015). As patients become more engaged
with their healthcare choices through DTCA, doctors also have been under increasing pressure to
respond to requests for particular medications, and patient satisfaction surveys, that can help
make or break their business, exert further pressure to respond to consumer-led demands
(Lembke, 2016).

179

However, as this study has shown, although the health care system is heavily influenced
by the medical industrial complex, physicians’ exercise fairly wide discretion in their prescribing
decisions, and as described by participants, the range of prescriber oversight includes a
continuum of practices that range from flagrant to judicious. Although there has been a
substantial amount of media attention paid to the prosecution of aberrant prescribers, evidence
shows that the number of criminal proceedings against doctors for over-prescribing is low. And,
while some scholars have argued that cases of negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness
should be arbitrated by state licensing authorities (Rich and Webster, 2011), in some states, even
a felony conviction related to the practice of medicine is not grounds for board review, or license
revocation (Jung et al., 2006).
I must profess to an ambivalence on this issue. On the one hand, it seems justified that
physicians who are found to be in violation of the law and their professional code of conduct
should, (just like the rest of us), face criminal sanctions rather than have the opportunity to be
adjudicated by a potentially sympathetic professional body, especially if their motive for
dispensing opioids to their patients is driven predominantly by economic gain. On the other,
cases involving criminal prosecution often take several years of investigative work before
charges are brought, during which time doctors could continue to prescribe thousands, if not
millions of pills. Thus, sanctions from state boards, including the revocation of licensure, could
be a more efficient mechanism to shut down unscrupulous prescribers in a timely fashion.
However, targeting doctors also perpetuates a prohibitionist approach toward drug use shown to
have failed time and time again, and as demonstrated by some participants in this study, will
likely result in increased harm as people seek out alternative sources of opioids from the
unregulated and illicit market (Netherland and Hanson, 2016).
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Any intervention aimed at reducing the availability of prescription opioids will probably
have similar consequences, and two initiatives described by participants in this study—the
reformulation of OxyContin® in 2010, and the 2013 New York State I-STOP bill mandating
physicians look up their patients at the point of prescribing—were both reported by participants
to have had a sizeable impact on the prescription opioid market. However, despite warnings from
several bodies (including the DEA), stating that individuals using OxyContin® were potentially
at risk of transitioning to heroin (Mars et al., 2014), the public health community largely failed to
respond. It is worth mentioning here that while the opioid problem has evolved as a result of
these supply-side measures, the potential harms resulting from the shift to heroin have been
further exacerbated by the recent introduction of non-pharmaceutical fentanyls (NPFs)51 into the
illicit drug market. New York City mortality data show that between 2010 and 2016, the rate of
unintentional drug overdose death increased 143 percent, from 8.2 per 100,000 residents in 2010
to 19.9 per 100,000 residents in 2016: more than 82 percent of these deaths involved an opioid.
In 2016, there were 1,374 unintentional drug overdose deaths in NYC compared with 937
unintentional drug overdose deaths in 2015, an increase largely driven by NPFs (Paone et al.,
2017). Given that NPFs are often mixed into the heroin supply chain without the users
knowledge, the transition to heroin for many opioid analgesic users is likely to turn this public
health crisis into a public health catastrophe.
And what of the individuals in this study, whose experiences with opioid analgesics are
most often viewed at the individual level, but are rarely considered as a product of the broader

51

Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid 50 to 100 times more potent than morphine. Starting in 2014, reports from across
the country began to emerge that non-pharmaceutical fentanyls (NPFs), so called because of the wide array of
fentanyl analogues and compounds, were being illicitly manufactured and mixed into the heroin supply chain, often
without the consumers’ knowledge. Between 2014 and 2016, the number of overdose deaths in New York City
increased from 800 to 1347. In 2016, 72 percent of drug overdose deaths involved heroin and/or fentanyl (Paone et
al., 2017).
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political and economic structure. For many, initiation into opioid misuse occurred within
communities described as being awash with prescription pain pills, and while participants may
not have received the opioids they misused directly from a healthcare provider, their overarching
understanding of the illicit opioid market was that the vast majority of diverted medication had
originated from a doctor’s office, rather than been diverted from another source. Indeed, that
opioid analgesics were so freely available from physicians had served to normalize their use, to
the extent that for many individuals in this study, pain pills were, at least initially, considered “no
big-deal.”
And yet, any serious discussion among physicians regarding the iatrogenic consequences
of increased opioid prescribing, has been conspicuously absent from the literature, especially
acknowledgment of potential downstream effects, from a prescription that may have been
warranted. The rhetoric among many doctors is that much of the problem is attributable to “bad”
patients who exhibit drug-seeking behavior; however, what is sorely lacking within the medical
community is any reflection on factors that may have contributed to those patients becoming
drug-seekers in the first place. Further, once a patient has an opioid use disorder, the health care
system is woefully inadequate to engage and provide effective substance use treatment.
The difference in the perception and understanding of opioid analgesics as “ethical”
medications (DeGrandpre, 2006) compared to illicit drugs such as heroin, the use of which
within most social groups is highly stigmatized, and considered inherently dangerous, is
illustrative of how objects or things are ascribed meaning, not as a result of their intrinsic
characteristics, but rather how and where they are positioned in society (Lovell, 2006). For
example, while opioid analgesics are deemed “safe,” by the government, medical professionals,
and consumers alike (it is the person using who is risky, not the drug itself), heroin is considered
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as exceptionally dangerous, despite its almost identical pharmacological properties. Moreover,
even the use of the same object can be considered valid or invalid depending on how it is
experienced, and while taking prescription opioids to alleviate physical pain is condoned, the
moment one recognizes, or names the drug effect as pleasurable, even when taken as directed, its
use becomes censured.
Drug policy in the U.S. is littered with these incongruous distinctions (recall the
differences in sentencing policy between cocaine and crack), driven predominantly by racial
bias, and the cultural meaning ascribed to particular substances. Indeed, when the opioid problem
was perceived principally to be related to prescription pain medication and largely affecting
white communities, the issue was typically framed as one concerning public health rather than
public safety, with many high ranking officials including James Comey, then head of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), stating that we could not “arrest our way out of the problem.”
That this stance was likely driven by the high visibility of white people affected by opioid use is
unconscionable. However, as Netherland and Hanson point out in their analysis of the media
portrayal of white opioid users versus black or brown heroin users, “the prescription opioid
epidemic has created an interesting policy space and an important opportunity for both a new
representational and political approach. . . [by showing] that a less punitive, more humanistic
approach to responding to drug problems is possible” (Netherland and Hanson, 2016: 679).
At the start of this project, I shared this optimism. However, as the opioid landscape has
evolved, and heightened attention on heroin and fentanyl has once again stimulated a “tough on
crime” rhetoric including interdiction as a primary response, mandatory minimum sentences, and
the investigation of accidental drug overdose scenes as homicides, I fear that the window of
opportunity for sensible drug policy reform may have already closed.
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